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Preface 
India and China the two major Asian countries are inheritors of great 
civiUzations of Asia. Due to their geographical contiguity, common borders as 
close neighbours and the requirement of having trade cooperation they are 
bound to have host of problems. Their relationship is compounded and even 
shaped by both the internal and external factors of regional and global settings. 
Geographically speaking they share a long stretch of border with each 
other and consequently they face a colossal boundary dispute, which require an 
immediate and strategic solution and resolution. The present study is a 
comprehensive and in-depth study of the process of negotiated settlement of 
the boundary dispute. The hypothesis is that sufficient efforts have been made 
by both the Governments to carry forward the peace process through the 
method of the negotiated settlement. 
Sino-Indian relations have experienced profound upheavals and 
behavioural fluctuations over past five decades ranging from benign warmth in 
the 1950s through hyper tension in 1960s and 1970s to rapprochement in 1980s 
and readjustment in 1990s onwards. After establishing formal relations, 
friendly exchanges between the two nations had taken on a good momentum. 
In 1954 two Prime Ministers Chao En-Lai and Jawahar Lai Nehru signed joint 
communique and put forward famous Panchsheel principles. This era was 
characterized as Hindi-Chini brotherhood era. Nehru played an important role 
in helping to bring China's presence on to the world stage. By the end of 1959 
serious dispute occurred between India and China on border demarcation and 
shelter to Dalai Lama in India. 
In October 1962 direct military intervention took place in all the three 
sectors of the Sino-Indian border i.e. Eastern to Western sectors. This caused a 
complete infringement between Sino-Indian relations. 
After some years India and China started to restore their normal 
relations and revised their friendly ties, shattered by 1962 border dispute. 
In 1975 China started soft paddling with India. In 1980-1990's the solution to 
the Sino-India border dispute entered into a positive process of negotiated 
settlement. The post cold war period witnessed significant developments in the 
bilateral relations. After the disintegration of Soviet Union both Asian powers 
realized the urgency of stabilizing the borders and further improve over all 
bilateral relations in an uncertain world. In this connection Confidence 
Building Measures (CBMs), Joint Working Groups (JWG), Expert Groups 
(EG), Special Representatives (SRs) and reciprocal visits of the heads of the 
states have been playing very important and vital role. Mutual accommodation 
of each other's vital interests will encourage China to consider the McMahon 
Line in the eastern sector, which is strategically important to India. If India 
cannot remain insensitive to the Chinese strength in South Asia and the World, 
China also cannot afford to remain perpetually hostile towards India. China 
has been repeatedly saying that it wants to improve relations with India and 
establish bonds of friendship. 
In recent past China has resolved many disporatic boundary disputes 
with Russian states (CIS), ASEAN states and Japan then, why not with India. 
But there is sheer need of strong determination and accommodative approach 
of both the countries somehow loss and gains are the essential part of political 
solutions. India and China would have to forego with some perseverance and 
patience also. 
Sino-Indian differences, improved relations and peace process possess a 
primary prominence in international relations literature. The scenario of two 
big Asian neighbours got much importance since 1981 when negotiations for 
peaceful settlement of boundary disputes started to accelerate. After the end of 
the cold war US hegemony and western world order are the challenges to the 
oriental world. In this view there exists a fertile ground to study different 
dimensions of tensions especially territorial dispute and efforts made by them 
(India-China) to come close in more pragmatic and meaningful way. 
The present study is intended to explore the major irritants and 
circumstances, which determine the Sino-Indian relations. The study has 
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explored and analysed the relations starting from 1947 till today in 
chronological order. The study consists of seven chapters. 
The first chapter is based on historical retrospect of relations between 
India and China. It also analyses friendly exchange between India and China, 
which culminated in the form of Panchsheel. 
The second chapter has investigated out the genesis of major and minor 
roots of tensions and mistrusts between India and China, which led to 1962 
October War. 
The third chapter outlined the major efforts of restoration of relations 
between India and China which started in mid seventies. It also has brought 
about the details of the role of good offices and decision making authorities of 
both the states in the settlement of border disputes. 
The fourth chapter explores the process of resolution of the problem. 
It covers the detail of the eight round of official level talks held between India 
and China and also highlights the problems that occurred in the way of 
resolving the border problems. 
The fiifth chapter covers the extensive details of the Joint Working 
Group (JWP) and Expert Group (EG) which were established between India 
and China to forge a fair and reasonable solution to the border issue. It also 
analyses very meticulously the practices and use of Confidence Building 
Measures (CBMs) and changed behaviour of decision making authorities in the 
direction of friendly relations between India and China. 
The sixth chapter sheds light on the well defined decision of India and 
China to explore the political scope for evolving the framework of boundary 
settlement. It also brings about the roles played by Special Representatives in 
this direction. 
The seventh chapter concludes the entire panorama of the process of the 
negotiated settlement of the Sino-Indian border dispute. It reveals the nature of 
development, the milestones achieved, the bottle necks of the process, the fast 
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track of events and the nature of their dwindling political will. It also 
enumerated a package of suggestions to expedite the resolution of the conflict. 
It anticipate also that Sino-Indian friendship is essential for South Asia to face 
the existing challenges of the world politics. 
The study is primarily based on an extensive and critical analysis 
of primary and secondary sources. The primary source includes Government 
Publications, Official Reports, White Papers, Lok Sabha Debate etc. 
The secondary sources include Books, Journals, Periodicals, Newspaper, 
Reports and other sources available in different libraries. 
CHAPTER - I 
Chapter-I 
Historical Background 
India and China, thie two giants of Asia are inheritors of age old, great 
civilizations and are neighbours. Sino-Indian relationship, although essentially 
bilateral in nature, is compounded and even shaped greatly by external factors 
of regional and global settings.' Although both countries initiated the process 
of nation building generally from late forties, i.e., 1947 and 1949 and 
respectively, the models of their development as well as political system was 
not similar. While India followed the path of parliamentary democracy, mixed 
economy and non-alignment; China adopted one party rule of communism, 
state controlled economy and joined communist camp of Soviet Union. 
However, different political systems did not come in the way of flowering of 
relationship between India and China in the era of anti-imperialist and 
Pan Asiatic sentiment. 
In 1947, when India became independent, the nationalist Kuomintang 
government was in power in China; India established diplomatic relations with 
China in 1948 and sent K.M. Panikkar as its first ambassador. Military defeat 
of the Kuomintang government at the hands of the Communists led to the 
establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949.^  India 
welcomed this transfer of power.'' Both India and People's Republic of China 
emerged on the world map almost at the same time when the whole world was 
in the grip of cold war and the atmosphere was tense."* Soon thereafter, the 
Government of India extended official recognition to it on December 30, 1949. 
Thereby, India became one of the first non-communist states to recognise the 
People's Republic of China.^ On this occasion Nehru said, that "it was not a 
question of disapproving or approving it was a question of recognising a major 
event in history, of appreciating it and dealing with it".^ 
However, Governor General C Rajgopalachari and Home Minister 
Sardar Vallabhai Patel did not share Nehru's enthusiasm to build bridges 
immediately with China. Instead they were keen that he " go slow in the 
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mater". On the other hand the Chinese Communists, were unhappy about 
India's policy of non-alignment.^ Mao Tzedong openly stated that throughout 
the world, one sided either towards imperialism or with socialism and a third 
road did not exist. He said that, " sitting on the fence will not do nor there a 
third road. We oppose the illusions abut a third road". During this period, the 
Chinese continued to ignore the fact that India was an independent country and 
called Nehru a hireling of Anglo-American imperialism.^ Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru on his part, persistently viewed Indian independence and the 
Chinese revolution as parallel expressions of resurgent Asian nationalism. In an 
oft quoted statement in Parliament, Nehru visualised China as the third great 
power in tomorrow's world but hastened to add that India was destined to be 
the fourth.'" He was aware that in New Asia, China and India were destined to 
play vital and perhaps competitive leadership roles. But the architect of India's 
China policy, Nehru wanted the two emerging Asian great nations to be 
friendly to each other. 
During his visit to Britain and United States, Nehru pleaded both the 
Governments to accord recognition to China. India had quite vociferously 
pleaded in the U.N. to give China, a permanent footing". It was stated that this 
would further strengthen the immemorial friendship between India and China 
and consolidate to the stability of Asia and the world peace.'^ Irrespective of 
domestic and international public opinion. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru 
seemed to be overenthusiastic in developing friendly and peaceful reations with 
Communist China. He also strongly supported China in a BBC interview.'^ 
Tibetan Episode: 
The issue of Tibet stood in the way of cordial neighbourly relation. Tibet 
issue was a British legacy and the Britishers recognised the Chinese suzerainty, 
if not sovereignty, over Tibet subject to internal autonomy and British presence 
in Tibet. Independent India thus inherited from British the right to keep a 
political agent at Lahasa, maintain trade agencies at Gyantse, Gartok and 
Yatung, maintain postal and telegraph offices along trade route upto Gyantse 
and station a small military detachment to ensure safety of the British routes. 
India after independence also acknowledged suzerainty of China over 
Tibet, subject of Tibet's status as an autonomous unit. New Delhi, therefore 
was surprised when the Chinese leadership declared that "liberation of Tibet 
was one of the basic tasks of the People's Liberation Army".''* The Chinese 
army moved into Tibet on October 7,1950, approximately 40,000 troops 
marched without any prior intimation. India's reaction was one of shock and 
disbelief.'^ Only on October 25, 1950, China formally announced the first 
phase of "liberation of Tibet".'^ 
Thus, the so-called "liberation" altered the status of Tibet from an 
autonomous country, to a Chinese province. Concurrently, it led to a dispute 
between India and China over the alignment of their common border. 
Subsequently, their dispute involved developments in the Tibetan region. India, 
considered China's annexation of Tibet as a threat to her border. It made her 
lodge a strong protest with the Chinese Government through several notes 
which expressed "surprise" and "regret" on the use of armed force in Tibet. 
India sent three notes to China and stressed that the settlement of the Tibet 
problem should be effected by peaceful negotiation adjusting the legitimate 
Tibetan claim to autonomy within the framework of suzerainty.'^ In response 
China made sharp remarks to these notes. It stated that India had raised 
objections as result of "having been influenced by the imperialists" and 
asserted that "Tibet and integral part of the Chinese territory", besides the 
"problem of Tibet is entirely a domestic problem of China".'^ The Chinese 
Government further proclaimed that in the settlement of the Tibetan question 
"no foreign interference will be tolerated." 
The unexpected rebuff from China gave rise to a widespread demand 
that the Government should revise its attitude towards China. Some rethinking 
on Sino-Indian relations started in Nehru's cabinet itself. Home Minister, 
Sardar Vallabhhai Patel, publicly criticized Chinese intervention in Tibet as 
"unjustified,"'^'and wrote to Nehru that China was behaving like a "potential 
enemy" and that the "liberation of Tibet" could be a new threat from the 
country's north and northeast. Sardar Patel described the Chinese occupation of 
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Tibet as a tragedy that had brought "the expansion of China to our gates".^^ 
He also cautioned that Communist China had some definite aim and ambitions 
that were contrary to India's national security. He also warned Nehru of the 
danger of adopting a complacent or vacillating attitude towards China in the 
context of its perfidious action in Tibet. 
Some members of Parliament drew the attention of the Government of 
India to Chinese maps depicting Chinese boundaries extending up to river 
Brahmaputra in Assam,^-' Prime Minister Nehru categorically stated that India's 
northern borders were clearly defined by the "McMahon Line"^ "^  and "map or 
no map, that was our frontier".^ "^  In the wake of the Tibetan tragedy, India 
perhaps realized the potential Chinese threat to its northern frontiers. 
As a result of Chinese annexation of Tibet there was uproar in the Indian 
Parliament which flayed Nehru's China policy. Indian public option favoured a 
military retaliafion to protect Tibetan autonomy . The Indian intelligentsia 
was inclined to the maintenance of Tibet as a buffer between India and China, 
whereas the upper echelons of the Indian bureaucracy were of the view that 
India should acquiesce to the Chinese occupation of Tibet. While the Indian 
public opinion emanated from emotional considerations the administrative 
leadership took a different view due to ground realities. 
The Government of India believed that Indian intervention to protect 
minimal extra-territorial privileges acquired in Tibet through inheritance would 
make a weak case in the face of international public opinion. Nehru was of 
the opinion that non-violent struggle to protect Tibetan culture and religious 
autonomy was best. Taking up arms, Nehru felt, would only give China an 
excuse to use military might to crush Tibet. In such an event India was too 
weak to do anything militarily.^^ Moreover, Indian military capability could not 
comfortably challenge the Chinese military machine in Tibet. Thus India 
decided against a confrontation with China in Tibet. In this regard India did not 
take any initiative on the Tibet issue in the United Nations, as she was against 
internationalising the matter. This implied that she was reconciled to sacrifice 
some of her own interests in the matter. 
Due to the dangers of expansion of the Korean war in November 1950, 
the question of the Indo-Tibetan border was, however, relegated to the 
background for sometime to come.^" The Korean war provided an opportunity 
for India to play a role of 'honest broker' between China and Western 
powers. Nehru become conscious by then about the shift in the world balance 
of power caused by the emergence of China as a formidable land power, able to 
face the American challenge in Asia, as also the advantageous position gained 
by India in holding middle ground in the new power balance. Nehru and his 
advisers thought as Mrs V.L. Pandit put it, " war is a greater threat to us 
than communism in Asia."^^ In this context it becomes necessary for India to 
avoid bickering with China on the issue of Tibet, so that she might play the role 
of an honest peace-broker between the warning parties. 
On December 6, 1950, Nehru clarified that he was interested in Tibet's 
autonomy but without challenging China's suzerainty over it. He further said 
that Tibet was not in position to begin or continue the war and "there is no 
threat from Tibet to China obviously".''^ India voted against a resolution, 
branding the People's Republic of China as an 'aggressor' in Korea, in General 
Assembly on February 1, 1951.^ '* And taking over of Tawang in the first week 
of February without any opposition form the Chinese was rightly regarded by 
the Government of India as indicating that China was psychologically prepared 
to accept the McMahon Line as the boundary. All this led to a further 
improvement in Sino-Indian relations during this period.^^ Sino-Indian 
Friendship Association grew like mushroom all over the country and it was 
hoped that relations between the two countries would gradually grow more 
positive.^^ 
Nehru stated in Parliament on February 12, 1951, that "we were 
aggrieved at a certain turn of events in Tibet, but we did not allow that to affect 
our policy or our desire to maintain friendly relations with China. I am glad to 
say that our relations with the new China are friendly at present"." According 
to the Government of India, "friendly China and a friendly Tibet are the best 
guarantee for the defence of the country".^^ The Government of India got some 
relief when the Tibetan authorities signed a 17-point agreement with the 
Chinese Government on May 23, 1951.^^ As a result of this agreement Tibet 
was incorporated as a Chinese province. It then became known as Tibetan 
Autonomous Region with China permitting it to enjoy independence in purely 
provincial matters; but exercised control over her defence, communications and 
external affairs/^ 
Nehru's policy towards Tibet was preservation of security and integrity 
of India; India's desire to maintain friendly relations with China; and India's 
sympathy for the people of Tibet.'*' During 1950 the Chinese occupation of 
Tibet cast a dark shadow over Sino-Indian relations for a brief period. Since 
1951, there started an exchange of visits between India and China by goodwill 
and cultural missions, and this fostered mutual understanding.'*'^  There was a 
discernible conciliatory shift in China's attitude towards India, partly in 
response to India's constant friendly overtures and partly influenced by a subtle 
change in international communist tactics.'"' The Chinese press started praising 
Nehru's statesmanship and spoke of India as a neutral and peace loving 
country. The Government of India welcomed the soft attitude adopted by the 
Chinese.''^ India declined to attend a conference convened in San Francisco on 
September 8, 1951 to sign a peace treaty with Japan because, among other 
reasons, China was not a party to it.''^  
On September 27, 1951, Chou En- Lai informally assured the Indian 
ambassador, K M Panikkar at Beijing that China intended in every way to 
safeguard Indian interests in Tibet, adding that "there was no territorial dispute 
or controversy between India and China.""*' India welcomed the new soft line in 
China's policy and resumed its endeavours to put Sino-Indian relations on a 
firm basis in a wider perspective. As early as 1952, India as a gesture of 
goodwill had expressed its willingness to remove in due course its telegraph 
lines and military escort in Tibet and being to trade agents and other 
subordinate agencies within the framework of normal consulate relations. 
A high powered Government of India cultural delegation went to China. In 
September 1952, the Indian Political Agency at Lahasa was named Indian 
Consulate General. India's ambassador to China, K M Panikkar has observed 
that, "the main issue of our representation at Lahasa was thus satisfactorily 
settled and thus there was no outstanding issue between us and the China." 
Talks had been going on between the Government of India and China 
regarding a new arrangement in respect of Indo-Tibetan relations in March 
1953.'''' The aggravation of the conflict in Indo-China in 1953 also contained 
new portents of a widespread conflict in Asia. In this context of a danger of war 
in Asia due to threat of American expansionism prompted the Government of 
India to mend their fences with China.^° Secondly, a hostile Pakistan on its 
Western and Eastern fronts that was part of America's anti-communism 
coalition and was receiving American military aid also forced India to initiate a 
friendly policy towards China.^' Nehru insisted that any policy towards China 
would have to take into consideration the close proximity of the two nations 
having a frontier of 2000 miles. He said that, " we have to consider our 
policy in regard to China remembering not only whatever past we may have 
had, but the present and the future, that we have to live together in peace and 
friendship, and I hope co-operation."" Such utterances of Nehru prove that he 
was alive and sensitive to the reality of some future border war tension between 
the two nations, but under the pressure of exigency or passing events, could not 
go beyond dealing with these in an idealistic manner.'^ 
In September 1953 Nedyam Raghavan, the Indian ambassador to China 
delivered a letter from Nehru to Chou En-Lai, the Chinese Premier, which 
expressed India's desire to open negotiations with China on bilateral issues. 
The subsequent consultations between the foreign affairs officials of both the 
countries resolved that negotiations should be held immediately. Negotiations 
between the representatives of the two Governments began on December 31, 
1953 and though expected to take only six weeks dragged on for almost four 
months. Contrary to the Indian approach towards these negotiations, China 
attacked, great importance to its "first ever negotiations with a non-socialist 
country" and set up an eleven member "Commission for Sino-Indian 
negotiations."' Nehru had already expressed his desire to waive off any claim 
in Tibet as being not in keeping with full sovereignty of China, and to maintain 
trade relations with Tibet in cooperation with China. As China declared 
Sinkiang a closed area, India had also agreed to drop the Kashgar consulate 
from the agenda of the forthcoming talks, despite its earlier hopes of reopening 
the trade routes between Kashmir and Sinkiang through Ladakh.^^ Even while 
the negotiations were going on, some members expressed their distrust of the 
Chinese motives and urged the adoption of a "more positive policy". 
Nehru assured the House that the Government was fully aware of the need for 
maintaining the country's security and that McMahon Line was India's 
boundary and there was no question of discussing it with any country."^ 
The Year of Panchsheel - 1954 
The efforts on the part of both sides led to the signing of "Sino-Indian 
Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between India and the Tibet Region of 
China" on April 29, 1954. This marks the beginning of a new phase in 
Sino-Indian relations. Accordingly, India renounced the traditional position it 
had enjoyed in Tibet as inheritor in British treaty rights.^'' 
The main provisions of the Agreement and notes exchanged between the 
two governments provided: 
1. The Government of India agrees that the Governments of China may 
establish Trade Agencies at New Delhi, Calcutta and Kalimpong. 
Similarly, India may establish trade agencies at Yatung, Gyantse and 
Gartok. 
2. Government of China agrees to specify Yatung, Gyantse and Phari as 
trade markets, India in turn named Kalimpong, Siliguri and Calcutta as 
trade marts. 
3. Pilgrims from India may visit Kailash (Rimpoche) and Mansarovar 
(Mavam Tso)in Tibet and pilgrims from Tibet may visit Indian Buddhist 
sites such as Benaras, Samath, Bodh Gaya and Sanchi. 
4. The traders and pilgrims from both India and China would carry 
passports and other travel documents issued by respective governments. 
5. The Government of India would withdraw within six months from now, 
the military escorts stationed at Yatung and Gyantse in Tibet, and would 
hand over to the Government of China at a reasonable price 12 rest 
houses, the postal, telegraph and public telephone services together with 
their equipments.^^ 
In the preamble to the agreement the two countries reaffirmed that they 
would abide by the famous five principles "Panchsheel", namely: (1) mutual 
respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual non-
aggression (3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs 
(4) equality and mutual benefit and (5) peaceful coexistence.' India viewed 
Panchsheel as a major step towards world peace. It was this aspect that Nehru 
emphasized while presenting the agreement to Parliament on May 15, 1954, he 
said that "by this Agreement, we ensure to a very large extent peace in a certain 
area of Asia. I would earnestly wish that the area of peace could be spread over 
the rest of Asia and indeed over the rest of the world".^° 
Nehru's words, so sincere and hopeful, sound strange in retrospect. 
The Indian Prime Minister asked the members of Parliament to accept the 
solemn declaration of peaceful co-existence contained in the preamble 
"not only with respect to India and China but also the other countries of Asia", 
promising that "this atmosphere of fear which is haunting us will gradually go 
away". Nehru added, "We have done no better thing than this since we became 
independenf .^' 
No doubt Nehru was optimistic regarding 1954 treaty which he 
anticipated to be proved as comer stone of Sino-Indian friendship but the 
opposition front was not satisfied with this move, consequently mixed reactions 
and criticism came up. For instance the opposition leader Kriplani declared that 
China had demolished a buffer state, in international politics when a buffer 
state is abolished by a powerful nation that nation was considered to have 
aggressive designs on its neighbours. In consonance with his critical view to 
Nehru's policy he articulated that India should not go to war with China but at 
the same time should not under estimate Chinese intentions because Chinese 
aggressive intentions did not reflect any healthy sign for its neighbour India. 
Kripalani later described the 1954 treaty as being "bom in sin because it was 
enunciated to put the seal of our approval upon the destmction of an ancient 
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nation which was associated with us spiritually and culturally." Collectively, 
Parliamentary and public reaction in India to the new pact was nevertheless 
generally favourable. Press and Media also appreciated the step.^^ 
The Sino-Indian agreement thus gave strong signals to other Asian 
countries that the China indeed could coexist peacefully with its neighbours. 
It was for the first time that China through negotiations made a capitalist 
country to abolish its priveleges in China. It exhibited the independent foreign 
policy and new diplomatic approach of New China on all fronts including the 
negotiation policy, negotiation skills and the spirit of resolving the jittery 
problems through consultations.^^ The agreement between India and China, on 
Tibet certainly contributed a great deal towards the improvement of relations 
between the two countries. 
Latter on the two Asian nations - India and China, thus emerged from 
the Geneva Conference as factors of decisive importance in the context of 
world politics in general and Asian affairs in particular.^'' Nehru wanted India 
to play an important role at the international stage in the capacity of a big Asian 
power, which could be gleaned from the activities of Menon in Geneva. China 
on its part as reported by most of the Chinese sources entered the international 
political stage in Geneva with the status of the fifth great power of the world, 
and was face to face in a trial of strength with the US and UK etc. 
While in Geneva, Krishna Menon had extended an invitation to Chou 
En-Lai to visit India. Chou took time off from Geneva Conference and visited 
India for the first time from June 25-29, 1954. The Chinese premier was given 
a rousing welcome and slogans of "Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai" (Indians and 
Chinese are brothers) generated a temporary euphoria about China. Chou had 
cleverly timed his visit to India with deliberate finesse. Pointing out that no 
solution of any international problem, an Asian problem in particular, would be 
possible without the participation of the China; Premier Chou had mooted the 
suggestion for an Asian consultative Committee to which Nehru showed no 
interest. 
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Intoxicated by the agenda of world peace, the Indian leadership did not 
raise the crucial issues that existed between India and China, instead harped on 
Panchsheel throughout. Chou also proposed to Nehru that by adhering to the 
Panchsheel, India and China should set an example for the world, providing 
that countries can coexist peacefully. On June 28, both the Prime Ministers 
issued a joint statement that reaffirmed their faith in Panchsheel. Both 
propounded that India and China would not only build their relationship with 
Asian countries on the basis of these principles but would also use these as 
basis for developing relations with other countries of the world. Before his 
departure, Chou invited Nehru to visit China. Chou flew black to Geneva and 
continued his honeymoon with Krishna Menon.^ ^ Barely six weeks after the 
conclusion of Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet, the Chinese Embassy in 
New Delhi on July 17, 1954, delivered a note to the Indian Ministry of External 
Affairs accusing that "over thirty Indian troops armed with rifles had crossed 
the Niti Pass on June 29, 1954 and intruded in the Wuje [Wure] [Bara Hoti] 
area of the Tibet region of China. The above happening was not in conformity 
with the principles of non-aggression and friendly co-existence between China 
and India, and the spirit of the Joint Communique issued by the Prime 
Ministers of China and India.^ ^ On August 14, Chou En Lai in a telegram to 
Nehru lauded the role played by India at Geneva Conference. 
Nehru's China Visit: 
Elated by India's international position and say in the world affairs, 
Nehru did not lose much time to ponder over the invitation extended by 
Chou En-Lai. Barely four months after Chou's India visit, Nehru was in China 
on October 18, 1954.^ ^ A two year trade agreement between India and China 
was signed on the eve of Nehru's departure from India.^ ^ Nehru received a red 
carpet welcome in China and was greeted by large numbers of people. Nehru 
stayed in China for next ten days and met many Chinese heavyweights 
including Mao, Liu Shaoqi, Chou En-Lai, the Dalai and the Panchen Lama. 
Mao met Neliru four times separately on the 19, 21, 23 and 26 October. 
Although there was no specific agenda for the talks between Nehru and the 
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Chinese leaders, reports from Beijing indicated that in the latter's discussion of 
the general question of preserving peace in Asia "an alternative to SEATO had 
figured predominantly". 
Nehru, however, had the notes exchanged between India and China on 
the border intrusions in mind and raised the issue with Chou En-Lai. Nehru 
raised the mater in a private meeting by saying that "the boundary drawn in 
your maps is not con-ecf. Chou En-Lai took a realistic view and told Nehru 
that "China was still not been able to produce new maps". Chou then patiently 
explained to Nehru why? "The Sino-Indian boundary problem is an issue left 
over by the history. Since the founding of New China, we have not been able 
to survey and demarcate (the boundary), the newly published maps are the 
reprints of old maps, moreover, these maps were first published and circulated 
by the Kuomintang Government". Reassuring Nehru, Chou said, "once the 
conditions are ripe, we would produce a new maps in accordance with the 
outcome of the negotiations". The official Report also confirms these remarks 
of Chou who further told Nehru that "there were such errors even in the 
depiction on these Chinese maps of the frontier of China with the Soviet Union 
and outer Mongolia". It could be discerned from Chou's remarks that China 
wanted to renegotiate the boundary issue between Tibet and India especially 
after the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet that gave China basis for such 
negotiations as India had tacitly accepted the "illegality" of McMahon Line by 
recognising Tibet as a part of China albeit it was known to all that India 
administered the area south of the McMahon Line. 
A part from the boundary question, Nehru also discussed the issue of 
Nepal with China. There was also a discussion on the question of the 
restoration of China's status in the United Nations.^^ Nehru returned with full 
praise for China's economic development. Thus the "Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai" 
euphoria had reached its zenith in 1954. In the hysterical euphoria generated in 
the wake of Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai, Nehru turned a blind eye towards China.™ 
Praising Nehru's efforts in extending the area of peace, Chou En-Lai 
maintained that the "friendly co-operation of India and China constituted an 
important factor in safeguarding peace in Asia and the World." Echoing similar 
sentiments, Nehru in his reply stressed the peaceful nature of China. "I am 
convinced that the people of China, like the people of India, are devoted to the 
cause of peace". ^ ' 
Reporting on his visit to Lok Sabha on November 22, 1954, Nehru 
stated that while it was difficult to ascertain the political consequences of his 
visit or to measure its effect on India's relations with China, it had undoubtedly 
brought about deeper understanding between the two nations. Both countries 
were fully aware of the differences in their political and economic structures, 
but such differences, Nehru stated, need not come "in the way of our 
cooperation in many fields and, more especially, in our working for peace in 
Asia and the world".''^ 
In Nehni's eyes, the supreme need of the moment was peace, 
particularly peace in Asia. The only power that might disturb Asian peace was 
China with her irredentist ambitions. Unfriendly policies would merely 
antagonise the Chinese Cornmunists and make them belligerent. Friendly 
policies, on the other hand would win them over to the cause of peace, stability 
and progress. This appears to have been the assumption on which Indian policy 
towards China was based." 
Having just returned from his China visit, Nehru's unrelenting 
enthusiasm for China was once again exhibited at the Bandung Conference 
1955, when he became the main sponsor of Chou En-Lai to this conference 
irrespective of criticism from various countries. The credit for the success of 
the Bandung Conference goes to the close cooperation between Chou and 
Nehru. The "Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai" hype was followed by the flurry of a 
number of diplomatic, trade and cultural exchanges. 
The Sino-Indian relationship entered into a bright phase in 1955. India 
sincerely wanted China's participation in internafional affairs. China's 
participation in the Afro-A"Sian Conference, held in Bandung was possible 
because of the good offices of Nehru. China got an opportunity to enter into 
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world diplomacy and at the first instance could succeed to woo the Afro-Asian 
nations away from India's leadership. China had the ambition to lead the 
uncommitted block and to become the spokesman of Asia. Nehru was the 
stumbling bloc to the Chinese designs. The foreign policy of China had a dual 
role to perform; on the one hand it had to show that good neighbourliness was 
its perennial concern and on the other that it had the most important military 
strength in Asia.^ ^ 
After Chou and Nehru visits, Song Qingling (the widow of Sun 
Yat-sen), Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of National People's 
Congress (NPC) visited India in December 1955.^ ^ Chou En-Lai visited India 
for the second time in November 28,1956 on a goodwill mission. Besides 
discussing many international issues with Nehru, he referred to the border 
between India and China, and it was decided that while there were no dispute 
regarding the border, there were certain petty problems which should be settled 
amicably by the representative of two Governments.^^ In an address to 
members of Indian Parliament on November 29, Chou referred to the long 
unbroken record of Sino-Indian friendship for several thousand years and hope 
for the continuation of this peaceful tradition in future.^ ^ Chou surprised the 
crowd when he ended his speech with the words "Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai" and 
"Jai-Hind" (long live India) 
In Calcutta during a press conference, when a reporter asked Chou 
whether he would like to send a message or any proposal for the US 
Government through Nehru who was about to visit the US ? Chou replied 
Prime Minister Nehru is a messenger of peace, no matter where he goes, 
no matter who he meets; he would discuss matter concerning the world peace. 
If Nehru happens to discuss the problem of Sino-US relations with President 
Eisenhower, in that case we are sure that he would raise the view that would be 
beneficial for improving Sino-US relations. As expected by Chou, Nehru did 
voice China's concern to the US over various issues including Taiwan, and yet 
again supported the Chinese claim for the UN seat in his UN address on 
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December 20, 1956. At this point it could be said that Chou's understanding of 
Nehru far exceeded Nehru's understanding of Chou/^ 
A trade agreement signed between India and China in October 1954 was 
renewed in 1956. This agreement led to steep rise in trade between the two 
countries. The New China News Agency reported that trade between India and 
China had increased steadily in the past fifteen months. India's exports to 
China had increased nine-fold, while imports from China had increased three 
and a half times over the pre-agreement period.*^ In 1956, Indian visitors to 
China included a Parliamentary delegation, an agricultural delegation to take 
stock of Chinese techniques, and another agricultural delegation to study 
Chinese cooperatives. Military delegations were also exchanged. Thus by 1956, 
China was making in roads into what had been known till then as an 
Indo-centric region to convert it into a Sino-centric region. General K.S. 
Thimayya had cautioned the Government of India to be wary of China more 
than of Pakistan and advised it to make adequate defence preparations on the 
northern and north-eastern frontier. However General Thimayya's advice was 
Ignored. Reports of violation of Indian territorial integrity in many border 
areas also soon began to reach New Delhi. These complaints went on 
multiplying as time passed.^^ 
The Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-Lai after visiting the Soviet 
Union, Poland, Hungary and Afghanistan yet again landed in New Delhi on 
January 24, 1957. He held three hour long discussions with Nehru. Though 
Chou informed the reporters that he had came to India just to hold private 
discussions with Nehru, however, it is obvious that issues such as increased 
uneasy calm at the Sino-Indian borders. The inclination shown by the 
Dalai Lama to stay on in India, and to some extent to gauge the Indian reaction 
prior to his Nepal visit were in his mind. Chou also drew India's attention 
towards Kalimpong that was being used by America and other countries as a 
centre of espionage and sabotage against Tibet. Nehru expressed sincerity and 
assured Chou En-Lai that the Dalai and Panchen would return to Tibet through 
same route they had followed for their journey to India. As regards activities of 
espionage in Kalimpong, India would follow a cautious approach. 
The Indian Vice President S. Radhakrishnan visited China from 
September 18 to 28, 1957. Both sides as usual harped on the issues of "peaceful 
coexistence" and "world peace" at the time when real trouble was brewing on 
the boundary. Mao in a banquet held in the honour of his Indian guest on 
September 19 spoke, "Our two people are each building their own state and 
striving for world peace. For the shake of these common goals, our two 
countries are carrying on a close and friendly cooperation. The uniting together 
of one billion people of China and India constitute a great force and is 
guarantee for Asian and world peace". Mao also thanked India for the support 
it had extended to China on various international issues and expressed no doubt 
about India assuming an ever-important role in the world.^^ Radhakrishnan on 
his part reiterated Indian position of sponsoring China at every international 
forum by saying that without any suggestion and guidance from China it would 
be difficult for us to solve the problems concerning Asia. Contacts were also 
developed between the two nations outside the pale of governmental 
cooperation, at the cultural and commercial levels. There was a steady flow of 
study teams, military missions and educational delegations between the two 
countries. India-China Friendship Associations were also established in both 
the countries to promote better understanding and relations. 
Side by side on other front according to China, India occupied the area 
between Hopsang Khad and Shipki Pass in 1957. According to India, Chinese 
troops intruded into Walong in Lohit Frontier Division of NEFA (now 
Arunachal Pradesh) in October 1957, in the Eastern Sector which India 
regarded as delimited by the McMahon Line.^ ^ The construction of Tibet 
Sinkiang highway in October 1957 was another turning point in the 
Sino-Indian relations. The completion of the road meant that it would be 
difficult for Tibet to put any resistance to China, as the latter would have access 
to Tibet from both western and eastern sides. Secondly, as the road penetrated 
through the Aksai Chin, the area claimed by India, China would be in position 
to contest it militarily as there was no Indian communication network in this 
area. Since the completion of this road, China according to Indian perception 
shed the element of duplicity in dealings with India, and by calculative 
aggressive moves went on occupying covertly Indian territory and 
consolidating its position there.^ ^ The subsequent moves on border from both 
the sides did not show any signs of reconciliation, and both posed in extremely 
dangerous confrontational attitude. 
Map Controversy: 
Meanwhile in June 1958, the Chinese crossed into the Indian territory 
and occupied Khumak Fort well inside Ladakh. Using the Fort as a military 
base, the Chinese gradually established posts at Spanggur and Diagra. The 
exchange of notes through diplomatic channels was further quickened by the 
publication of a map of China in China Pictorial Magazine, in July 1958. 
The following parts of India's territory were claimed by China:-
1) Four of the five divisions of Indian's North East Frontier Agency 
(NEFA) now known as Arunacnal Pradesh. 
2) Some areas in the north of Uttar Pradesh; and 
3) Large areas in eastern Ladakh, which constitutes part of the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir. Thus, China had laid claims on over 51,000 square 
miles of Indian Territory. 
The year-to-year publications of these maps naturally give rise to some 
concern in Indian political circles. While drawing the attention of Beijing to the 
maps showing Indian territory as part of China, the Indian government in its 
protest note to the Counsellor of China in India on August 21, 1958, pointed 
politely that sufficient time had by now elapsed since the new Chinese 
government was established for them to correct the old maps. On September 
28, 1958, a Chinese armed party intruded into the Di Chu valley of the Lohit 
Frontier Division and advanced upto Jachap. In October 1958, Chinese 
intruded in Sangcha Malla and Lapthal and established outposts at these two 
places. The Chinese are also said to have violated the Indian air space in 
October 1958 in the Spiti Valley. China on the contrary considered these areas 
within Chinese territory and accused India of occupying these. Subsequently, 
the Indian government sent a protest note to the Chinese ambassador in India 
on October 18, 1958. China in a strongly worded note of November 3, 1958 
replied that the Indian armed personnel unlawfully intruded into the Chinese 
territory and, as such they have been detained but deported subsequently on 
October 22. China also repeated its earlier stand that they had not yet 
undertaken a survey of their boundaries, nor consulted the countries concerned 
and they would not make changes in the boundary on their own. 
India replied to the Chinese note on November 8, 1958 expressing 
surprise at the Chinese contention. It further noted that whether Aksai Chin 
belonged to India or China was a question of dispute and need to be settled. 
The Indian note remained unanswered. It is rather strange to note that contrary 
to its stand in eastern sector, India at this stage maintained that Aksai Chin was 
indeed a disputed area. Nehru in a letter of December 14, 1958 to Chou En-Lai 
pointed out that "there can be no question of these large parts of India being 
anything but India, and there is no dispute about them. I do not know what kind 
of surveys can affect these well-known and fixed boundaries." Chou En-Lai 
replied to Nehru's letter on January 23, 1959. Chou repudiated the Indian claim 
of traditional boundary and wrote that Sino-Indian border has never been 
formally delimitated. Thus, Chinese Premier had emphatically made it clear 
that a border dispute did exist between India and China. However, he shrewdly 
concluded, "the Chinese government has always held that the existence of the 
border question absolutely should not affect the development of Sino-Indian 
friendly relations."*^ China also questioned the legality of the McMahon line 
and rejected it as the product of British imperialism and as being judicially 
invalid. 
From the above discussion it can be concluded that small border clashes 
began from mid and late fifties, first in the middle sector, then in the western 
sector of Ladakh, where the Chinese constructed a road linking Sinkiang to 
Tibet across the Aksai Chin plateau and finally in the eastern sector along the 
McMahon line.^^ The bitterness of relationship grew over the cartographic 
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invasion of China. The foreign poHcy of China had a dual role to perform, on 
the one hand it showed that good neighbourliness was it perennial concern and 
on the other hand it showed that it had the most important military strength in 
Asia, thus by 1959, China had exhibited its territorial ambition in the 
Himalayan region and made India aware with the reality of the boundary 
dispute between the two. Nehru's illusions of containing China through 
diplomacy and appeasement had been shattered. The relations between the two 
countries had nose-dived there by setting into motion a process of deterioration. 
A part from it, the entry of Dalai Lama added fuel to the fire in embittering the 
relations between the two nations. Beside this two other developments - an 
uprising in Tibet and the Sino-Indian confrontation - occurred which turned 
deteriorating relations into open hostility. 
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Chapter-II 
The Sino-India Border Dispute 
The year 1959, marks the beginning of the Sino-Indian confrontation. 
An uprising in Tibet and the Sino-Indian confrontation occurred, which turned 
deteriorating relations into open hostility. China had made known its territorial 
ambition in the Himalayan region (consisting of Ladakh, Tibet, Bhutan, Sikkim 
and parts of NEFA) and made India aware that there existed a fundamental 
border dispute between China and India. The uprising in Tibet in early 1959, 
in effect, marked the beginning of the end of Sino-Indian friendship and 
widened the gulf between India and China. Nehru's illusions of containing 
China through diplomacy and appeasement had been shattered. It was realised 
in the Indian Parliament that the Chinese assurances of their faith in the 
Panchsheel, lulled India into a false sense of security.^ The relations between 
the two countries had nose-dived and the process of deterioration started in 
their relations. 
The Flight of the Dalai Lama: 
In the wake of these developments, the Dalai Lama, alongwith some of 
his followers, fled to India on March 31, 1959, were his request for political 
asylum was granted by the Indian Government.^ Soon thousands of Tibetans 
fled to India and sought asylum. But it was made clear to Dalai Lama that he 
should not indulge in political activity in Indian territory. This act of India was 
perfectly in conformity with the rules of international law and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.'' The Tibetan revolt and the Dalai Lama's 
dramatic escape and subsequent refugee status received widespread sympathy 
both in India and abroad.^ Indian popular support for Tibet was both 
spontaneous and immense. In keeping all these points in mind China openly 
blamed India for engineering rebellious activities in Tibet. The Chinese 
Premier reminded India that developments in Tibet were China's internal 
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affairs and v/amed that China would not tolerate foreign intervention in its 
domestic affairs.^ 
The Tibetan Revolt: 
India was committing an unfriendly act towards the Chinese by morally 
supporting the Tibetan people. The uprising in Tibet further widened the gulf 
between India and China. China warned that India was already having enough 
trouble with Pakistan and if she now persisted in her attitude towards Tibet, 
China would see to it that another front was opened against her in the north. 
This threat naturally roused the suspicion that China was going to woo Pakistan 
against India.'' The boundary dispute with China arose from the Tibetan 
question. If China was not allowed to over run Tibet, there would have been 
negligible common boundary between India and China. The Tibetan question 
proved to be the genesis of conflict.^ In the wake of Tibetan episode, India 
wanted to play the role of an honest peace broker but China scuttled every such 
effort. 
Side by side with these efforts to tighten the screw on Tibet, the Chinese 
now began a new series of intrusions across India's traditional northern 
frontier. On July 30, 1959, the Government of India received information 
regarding the presence of a Chinese armed detachment in the region of Western 
Pangong Lake in Ladakh and of the establishment of a Chinese camp at 
Spanggur, both these places lying well within the Indian frontier. News was 
also received that an Indian police party of six men on reconnaissance duty 
within Indian frontier was arrested and taken into custody by the Chinese. 
The Govermnent of India immediately lodged a strong protest to Beijing 
against the violation of the Indian border and the arrest of the Indian police 
party, "engaged in bonafide duties within Indian territory. Beijing, however, 
instead of answering the Indian protest, brought forward counter charges 
against India, alleging that Indian armed persormel had intruded into Chinese 
territory, and as they did not withdraw inspite of "friendly warning", there was 
no alternative but to disarm and detain them.^ This was soon followed by other 
and more violent intrusions. 
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On August 7, 1959, Nehru revealed, an armed Chinese patrol had 
violated the Indian border at Khinzemane in the Kameng frontier division, 
pushing the Indian patrol to a bridge at Drokung Samba, although no exchange 
of fire had taken place. Later, the Indian picket had re-established itself at the 
same place and did not accede to the Chinese demand to withdraw and lower 
the Indian flag."' The Government of India protested to the Government of 
China against their violation of the Indian boundary at Khinzemane on 
August 11, 1959." 
Longju Incident: 
Inspite of warning, another strong Chinese detachment crossed into 
Indian territory on August 25, 1959 south of Migyitun and fired without notice 
on an Indian forward picket, killing one person on the spot and seriously 
wounding another. On the following day the Chinese detachment outflanked 
the Indian post at Longju, over whelmed the small Indian force of 18 men of 
the Assam Rifles and compelled them to withdraw.'^ When the Government of 
India made a strong protest against this unprovoked firing on a static post 
within Indian territory on August 28, 1959. Beijing replied that 'Longju was 
indisputably part of Chinese territory', the Indian personnel who were there 
were guilty of violating Chinese territorial integrity, it was they who had 
opened fire and Chinese only acted in self-defence. The Chinese reply added: 
"no section of Sino-Indian boundary has been formally delimited; ... the so 
called McMahon Line was set forth in the past by the British imperialists 
unilaterally and has never been accepted by the Chinese Government; it of 
course can not be regarded as legal". The Chinese note closed with a somber 
warning: "No violation of Chinese territory will be tolerated. All areas that 
have been invaded and occupied must be evacuated. Any armed provocation 
will certainly meet with Chinese frontier guard's firm rebuff. '•^  
After Longju, it was no longer possible or desirable to keep back the 
facts about Chinese aggression from the Parliament or people of India on 
August 28, 1959, in reply to a series of questions and adjournment notice in the 
Lok Sabha, Nehru, revealed that the Chinese had been continually violating 
Indian territorial integrity and these incursions had occurred in places as 
apart as Ladaldi in the north-west and NEFA in the extreme north-east. He gave 
a complete account of the Longju incident and announced that the entire NEFA 
border, which had hitherto been guarded by the Assam Rifles and the militia, 
would henceforth be placed under army control. Although the Indian and 
Chinese versions of the Longju incident differed, it was clear that this incident 
soured the relations.''^ 
Three days later on August 31, speaking to the Rajya Sabha, Nehru gave 
a more concrete account of the policy which his Government would follow in 
dealing with Chinese incursions. It would be a "double policy", he said. 
The Government would strengthen border defences and repulse further 
incursions and at the same time hold themselves in readiness to "settle matters 
by conference".'^ In other words he would not lead the country to war in order 
to recover the areas which had been forcibly occupied by the Chinese. For this 
he would employ the methods of negotiation. Any fresh incursion however 
would be repulsed with force.'^ 
These incidents naturally produced an uproar in both the countries, 
differing accounts of what had happened, and mutual protests. '^  In early 
September 1959, China revived the controversy over the Sino-Indian border by 
its refusal to accept the validity of the McMahon Line and reiterated its claims 
on Indian territory, specially in the NEFA and Ladakh areas of India. 
The impasse over the Sino-Indian border dispute rested on differing positions 
of both the countries. India insists on the legality, validity and legitimacy of the 
McMahon Line as the boundary line demarcating the Sino-Indian Border. 
According to the Government of India, the frontier in the eastern sector was 
demarcated through negotiations by the British Indian Government and this had 
always been honoured by the past governments in Tibet and China. But on 
the other hand China refused to ratify this treaty and also branded it illegal and 
as the one imposed on Tibet by Britain and declared that Tibet was not an 
independent nation to enter into a treaty of this sort. There were also 
differences of opinion between the Chinese and Indians with regard to drav/ing 
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of the McMahon line, over Longju and Dhola called Chedong by the Chinese. 
The Chinese claimed that both these areas were north of the line, whereas the 
Indian Government claimed that they were in south of it. Chinese logic in 
challenging the legality of the line was both factually incorrect and legally 
irrelevant.'^° Similarly, India had based its claim over Ladakh at the western 
sector on a treaty which the rulers of Tibet negotiated in 1842, after being 
defeated in a war by the rulers of Ladakh. While repudiating this view, the 
Chinese Government maintains that the Chinese central government of the time 
neither participated in negotiations nor ratified the results. According to the 
Government of India, all its territorial claims are based on geography, history, 
tradition and old treaties and agreements with China. On the contrary, Beijing 
mamtams that the boundary has never been delimited. 
In regard to these challenges, there were exchange of notes between two 
govenmients and both the government alleged on each other. Uhimately, 
Chou En-Lai came out with the ideas which had been occupying his mind all 
these years. Moreover, this was not the first occasion that Chou En-Lai gave an 
inkling of his mind to Nehru. While discussing Chou En-Lai's letter in the 
Parliament Nehru expressed his great concern that the demand for Himalaya to 
be handed over as a gift to the Chinese - was really a matter of anxiety. He 
compared the Chinese attitude with that of those aggressive, imperialist powers 
of the west, which not long ago regarded themselves as leaders of the world 
and expected the rest to follow them. "What is happening in China today is the 
pride and arrogance of might that is showing in their language and in their 
behaviour to us and in so many other things they have done". "What we have to 
face today", he said in another context, "is a great and powerful nation, which 
is aggressive. It might be aggressive minus communism or plus communism. 
Either way it is there". Nehru now realised that his assessment of China, 
on which India's China policy was based, was wrong. In a depressing tone he 
confessed to the Parliament that "the Chinese had valued India's friendship 
only to a very low extent in the final analysis". With disarming frankness, 
he told his critics: "I did not know that China would behave like this". 
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Regarding the policy to be pursued in the face of Chinese threats and 
claims, he told Parliament that while the McMahon Line was India's frontier, 
he would be prepared for minor adjustments here and there. "A particular place 
one mile this side or that side of the McMahon Line was a small matter". 
The broad principle was the water-shed. "I stick to that broad approach. But if 
a slight deviation by evidence or facts in alignment is necessary, it is not a 
major matter. That has to be decided by facts, not by anybody's coercion". 
To Chou En-Lai he wrote to the same effect, saying that while the Government 
of India could not discuss with China the future of large areas of Indian 
territory which China claimed, they would be prepared to discuss minor 
adjustments here and there. "No discussion", however, "can be fruitful unless 
the posts on the traditional side of the Indian frontier now held by the Chinese 
forces are first evacuated by them and further threats and intimidations 
immediately cease". 
In the face of continuous Chinese aggressions, India had no alternative 
but to step up its defence preparedness; but Nehru continued to be hopeful that, 
once the Chinese understood the extreme caution that India had shown in the 
matter of giving asylum to Dalai Lama they would begin to appreciate the 
Indian position. '^* Between late September and early November 1959, as Kavic 
has noted, the Chinese appeared to be relenting. "After weeks of frustration, the 
Indian Ambassador in Beijing was received cordially by the Foreign 
Ministry and Chou replied with a warm telegram to Nehru's congratulations on 
the tenth anniversary of the Peoples Republic". ^ ^ He couched in the warmest 
language, applauding the principles of co-existence and describing the current 
differences between India and China as "only an episode" in a story of "age-old 
friendship".^^ 
Kongka Pass Incident: 
But this renewed attempt at reconciliation was cut short by another 
severe blow. On October, 21, 1959, New Delhi got the staggering news that an 
Indian police party on routine patrol duty near Kongka Pass in the Chang 
Chenmo Valley in Ladakh had been ambushed and fired upon the Chinese 
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troops. All the situations regarding this strategy got clear afterwards. 
On October 20, two Indian policemen and a porter went out on patrol duty in 
Kongka Pass in Ladakh but they did not return. Consequently a party was sent 
to trace them out, the search became unsuccessftil. Next morning another party 
under the leadership of Karam Singh went out to continue research. After they 
had gone about five miles, they saw the hoof, prints of some horses, obviously 
belonging to the Chinese. Following these marks they forwarded ahead and 
found a Chinese soldier on hills shouting as if asking for surrender. 
In response, Karam Singh also loudly declared that it was their area. 
Immediately there was a volley of fire both from front and from the hill top. 
The Indian personnel fired back in self defence, but defeated by the Chinese 
military because of their strength and strategic position. Nine Indians were 
killed, one was seriously injured, and others surrendered. 
After this encounter the prisoners were kept in bad conditioned tent in 
chilling cold. Wounded person was not given proper attention and medicine. 
They were kept under threat and a pressure was constantly on them that they 
should state that Indian army pre-empted and penetrated into Chinese land, and 
Indians were aggressor. 
The Chinese government also complained that Indian troops "unlawfully 
intruded into Chinese territory" and "opened heavy fire on Chinese frontier 
guards and launched armed attack". In response to that Chinese frontier guards 
were compelled to fire back in self-defence. In their note of October 23, the 
Government of India repudiated the Chinese allegations, affirmed that the area 
where the incident took place was within the Indian frontier and maintained 
that the attacked was launched by the Chinese. 
The Chinese government showed resentment in their note of October 25, 
on Indian statement and said that they could not agree to the allegation of the 
Indian Government. They again reasserted that the place of incident was 
absolutely under Chinese territory and any violation of this should be rebuffed. 
They also rejected Indian claim for any compensation. The Government of 
India in their memorandum of November 4 proved strongly with evidences that 
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the area under dispute belonged to India. Ultimately on November 14, 1959, 
the Chinese handed over the dead bodies and released the Indian prisoners. '^ 
The Kongka Pass incident brought Sino-Indian relations almost to a breaking 
point. Nehru admitted in a speech in Delhi, that "the border question was a big 
one and had possibilities of becoming bigger in the future", and that a new 
chapter had been opened in the relations between the two countries when the 
Chinese opened fire. Following this incident the Tibetan borders of Ladakh, 
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Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh were assigned to the army. 
New border posts were set up, and new measures undertaken to meet any 
situation which the Chinese might have created in future. 
Meanwhile, there was strong criticism in the world press of Chinese 
action in the Indian borderlands. Practically the entire non-communist press in 
East, South-East, West Asia and Eurasia voiced sympathy for India and 
condemnation of Chinese aggressiveness. Consequently in a major policy 
speech to the Supreme Soviet a few days later, the Soviet Premier declared that 
the Soviet Union would be happy "if there were no more incidents and if the 
existing frontier disputes were settled by way of friendly negotiations". ^ Under 
this pressure of world, Beijing now decided to change its tactics and pursue its 
objectives in a new form. 
Secondly, attempts were made to 'show up' India-to prove to the world 
that China was in dead earnest about settling her border dispute with India and 
if it could not be solved, it was entirely due to Indian intransigence. '^' 
On November 7, 1959 the Chinese government came forward with a proposal 
that the armed forces of each side withdraw twenty kilometres from the line of 
actual control along the entire Sino-Indian border and halt patrols, to which 
Nehru replied on November 16, that the government of India had not posted 
any armed personnel at or near the international boundary. He further informed 
Chou En-Lai that the Indian border outposts already had instructions not to 
send out any forward patrols and if a similar decision was taken by the Chinese 
government also, the risk of border clashes would be completely eliminated. 
The Government of India, however, refused to agree to any arrangement, even 
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as an interim measure, which would maintain the forcible Chinese occupation 
of Longju.^' As for Ladakh, Nehru proposed that India would withdraw all her 
personnel to the west of the line shown as the international boundary in 
Chinese maps of 1956, and China on her part should similarly withdraw all her 
personnel to the east of the international boundary as shown in India's official 
maps and described in Indian notes. "As the two lines were separated by long 
distances, it was clear that there would hardly be any risk of border clashes 
between the forces on either side." In the middle sector of the frontier touching 
Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and Punjab, there were no Indian border areas 
under Chinese occupation, and there should be "no risk of border clashes if the 
precaution is taken not to send out border patrols".^^ The Indian Government, 
clearly, was not prepared to apply the same principle on the eastern sector, 
where her boundaries were more clearly demarcated. Nehru's proposals were 
out-rightly rejected by Chou En-Lai in his letter of December 17, 1959, as 
"lacking in fairness". Chou En-Lai suggested at the same time that the two 
Prime Minister should meet on December 26, either in China or Burma. While 
the government of India thought that this was not likely to serve any useful 
purpose, Nehru extended an invitation to Chou En-Lai to come over to Delhi 
and discuss the matter with him.^ '^  
A brochure released by the Ministry of External Affairs on January 13, 
1960, unequivocally declared that the government of India "cannot accept the 
Chinese contention that the entire Sino-Indian frontier was undelimited. 
Negotiations on this basis are unacceptable to the government of India". Near 
about the same date Nehru told a Press Conference at New Delhi that there was 
no common ground between the Chinese and India points of view, and 
therefore he did not visualise any meeting between himself and the Chinese 
Prime Minister in the near future. Hardly, three weeks had passed since then 
when India was startled by the news that Nehru had invited Chou En-Lai to a 
meeting at New Delhi.^'' Nehru defended himself by saying that he had invited 
Chou En-Lai "for a meeting and not for negotiations!" 
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Chou En-Lai needed no persuasion to accept the invitation. In a sense it 
was for him a diplomatic victory. A meeting without preconditions is what he 
was pleading for. He got it. Intimating his acceptance of the invitation on 
February 26, 1960, he wrote: "The Chinese Government .... takes a positive 
attitude towards the forthcoming meeting and has confidence in it... 
I particularly hope to see the dark clouds hovering between our two countries 
dispersed through our joint efforts so that the long-standing friendly relations 
between out two countries may be consolidated and developed".^' 
Chou's Visit to India: 
Chou En Lai accompanied by his formidable deputy Marshal Che Yi 
arrived at New Delhi on April 19, 1960 to discuss border problem with India. 
The start was very ominous in that Nehru, in his welcome speech referred to 
the shattering of all dreams of age old friendship due to the unilateral actions of 
the Chinese during the last few months. Chou was a little amiable when he 
stated that despite difficulties, the friendship between the two countries would 
survive. The talks with Nehru were held in cordial manner but Chou had 
nothing new to offer but to reiterate the old Chinese stance. He talked in terms 
of border deal by swapping NEFA for northeast Ladakh. The public opinion in 
the country was tense and all the political parties, including a small section of 
the congress party, were suspicious about the outcome of the meeting. Nehru 
had often to address the demonstrators pleading with them not to remain so 
agitated. 
According to a junior officer in the Ministry of External Affairs K. 
Natwar Singh who was in attendance on Chou, as a gesture of taking his senior 
colleagues into confidence Nehru got a meeting of Chou arranged with the 
Home Minsiter G.B. Pant and Finance Minister Morarji Desai. The Plain truth 
spoken at these meetings offended Chou very much. But Chou at times did not 
behave as an equal at these talks. He came out with a formula which had no 
substance of any 'give and take'. His deputy was very strident in his utterances. 
Dr. Radhkrishna who also met him observed that Che talked like a Marshal, 
and not as a Foreign Minister, trying to lay down terms as a victor to the 
34 
vanquished." Chou at a press conference held on April 25, 1960, made a six 
point statement: 
1. There exists a dispute on the boundary between the two parties. 
2. There exists between the two countries a line of actual control up to 
which each side exercise administrative jurisdiction. 
3. While determining the boundary between the two countries certain 
geographical principles, such as watershed, river valleys and 
mountain passes would be applicable equally to all sectors of the 
boundary. 
4. A settlement of the boundary question between the two countries 
should take into account the national feelings of the two peoples for 
the Himalayas and the Karakoram mountains respectively. 
5. Pending settlement of the boundary question through discussions, 
both sides should keep to the line of actual control and should not put 
forward territorial claims as preconditions, but individual 
adjustments may be made. 
6. In order to ensure tranquillity on the border so as to facilitate the 
discussions, both sides should continue to refrain from patrolling 
along all sectors of the boundary." 
Chou En-Lai's visit to India in April I960 turned out to be a failure in 
the sense that there could be no common ground between the two sides on the 
border dispute. The most they could do was to agree to have an official body 
comprising equal number of each side who would examine, check and study all 
historical documents, records and maps relating to the boundary question. Their 
reports would state the points of agreement and disagreement which would be 
reviewed at the political level to find out whether any solution was possible. 
Thereafter, the first meeting was held in Beijing on June 15, I960; 
at which a four point agenda was adopted. The agenda spelt out the details 
which included the location and terrain of the boundary, treaties and 
agreements signed between the two countries from fime to time, traditions and 
customs which were observed by both the countries and administrative 
jurisdiction claimed by each side. The officials took up their work seriously 
which was spread over forty seven meetings held in Beijing, New Delhi and 
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Rangoon between November 17 and December 12, 1960.^ ^ As anticipated, 
nothing fruitful emerged out of this prolonged examination of documents and 
maps. Reporting to the Parliament on December 21, 1960 Prime Minister 
Nehru stated that the joint report of the Chinese and Indian official teams really 
consisted of "two reports" with hardly anything in common between them. 
They did not even agree to disagree; they just disagreed. 
In the meanwhile neither India nor China had been sitting idle. Despite 
financial difficulties India has been pushing through an elaborate programme of 
road construction in vital Himalayan areas. Defensive measures of other kinds 
have also been undertaken along the frontier. China too has been busy 
constructing new motorable roads and air-fields, creating new military outposts 
along the frontier, and according to some unconfirmed reports, setting up 
rocket bases on the Tibetan plateau. There was mounting evidence of intense 
reconnaissance activity, of trespasses into Indian territory by Chinese 
personnel, of violations of Indian air space by Chinese air-craft, and of growing 
infiltration in the Indian borders.''^ India had also complained against obstacles 
put in the way of Indian pilgrims, traders and trade agency in western Tibet. 
China countered by asserting that Indian planes were violating Chinese air 
space and objected to the expulsion of the representative of Hsinhva News 
Agency.'*' Speaking to the Rajya Sabha on August 19,1960, Nehru told the 
House that China had for months been carrying on a violent anti-Indian 
propaganda, that reports of Chinese military build up in Tibet were true, 
and that the Indian Communists were engaged in an "unpatriotic" and "most 
anti-national" campaign in the border regions.''^ 
While China was striving for winning friends and influencing people all 
over the world, in Asia, in Africa and in Latin America, her armies were 
engaged in carrying on increased intrusion into Indian territory. India also tried 
to gear up its preparations for defending its territory. Border incidents and 
violations of Indian air space had continued throughout 1960 and 1961.''^ 
Within the next two years, the on going border talks reached a deadlock, with 
neither side showing much willingness to compromise.'^'' From the beginning of 
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1961, the Chinese had started patrolling right up to the new boundary line, 
which they claimed during the officials meeting. In March 1961, a wind of 
change had come over the army headquarters. India showed much alertness 
regarding the frontier situation and was also responsive to the strong feelings in 
the country against making any more concessions to the Chinese. ^ In April 
1961 Chinese personnel intruded into Sikkim near Jalapla Pass. In May there 
was an intrusion into Indian territory near Chushul in the western sector. The 
Chinese troops subsequently occupied Dehra Compass, and established a base 
on the Chip Chap River 17 miles southeast of Daulat Beg Oldi. In the middle of 
1961 one could say that the Chinese and Indian forces confronting each other 
in the bleak Himalayan regions were more or less equal in strength. In July 
1961 a Chinese patrol crossed the Eastern Sector in the Kameng Division of 
north-east frontier agency. In August the Chinese forces in Ladakh established 
3 new check-posts in Nyagzu and near Dambuguru. They also constructed 
roads linking these posts with rear bases.'^ ^ 
In the last week of October the Chinese army units stationed on the 
opposite side of NEFA border were reported to have several incursions into the 
area. Repulsed from a place only a few miles away from Khinzemane, they 
made fresh incursions into the Dirang and Subansiri divisions.''^ Establishments 
of military outposts on Ladakh territory also continued. 
Following the Chinese occupation of Longju, the Government of India 
had started taking same steps to strengthen her defences both in NEFA and in 
Ladakh. With a view to checking Chinese lines of advance India now decided 
to interpose their own posts and patrol activities in between Chinese posts and 
threaten Chinese lines of communications and supply. The development of 
communications was speeded up and the number of check-posts was doubled, 
and some new 'armed posts' were set up. Indian armies were either equal to it 
or would soon be in that position. A three year plan costing Rs. 120 crores to 
build a network of communications in the border areas was drawn up. For the 
first time in the 1961-62 winter the Indian troops stayed in their barracks which 
were equipped with amenities to meet the challenges of the weather and 
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maintained links with their supply posts. Consistent with this growing 
confidence, the Prime Minister told the Lok Sabha on November 28, 1961, that 
the situation had changed "progressively" in India's favour "though not as 
much as we want it but it is a fact that, in areas which they occupied, 
progressively, the situation has been changing from the military point of view 
and other points of view in our favour". "We shall continue to take steps to 
build up these things". Nehru further assured the House, "so that ultimately we 
may be in position to take action to recover such territory as is in their 
possession." 
On the basis of China's bellicose attitude and continuation of Chinese 
incursions in every sector, Nehru ordered in November 1961 that military 
patrols should proceed as far forward as possible towards the international 
borders to prevent Chinese advances or incursions in the western sector while 
Indian forces should establish "effective occupation" in the middle and eastern 
sectors."*^ He instructed for the establishment of rear and intermediate bases. 
While Nehru had ordered the patrolling of borders to prevent further Chinese 
incursions he left the doors open for talks.^ 
Forward Policy: 
Thereafter, the Indian political leadership instructed the Indian army to 
carry out the ill-fated "forward policy", with a view to stemming the advancing 
Chinese frontier line. This policy involved sending lightly armed "penny 
packets" of troops into Chinese claimed border areas. ^ ' The forward policy was 
designed to evict China from territory India claimed by 'dominating' Chinese 
positions and thus forcing their withdrawal.^^ India's forward policy was 
defensive and designed to contain China's territorial expansionism in India's 
areas.^ This "forward policy", however did not silence the opposition. The 
moment any Chinese incursion took place, the Government came for a massive 
attack in Parliament and there was a renewed demand that prompt measures 
must be taken to throw out the Chinese. 
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In the meanwhile, China had proposed on December 3, 1961 
negotiations on a new agreement on trade and intercourse. The Government of 
India showed a little enthusiasm for the proposal in view of a virtual deadlock 
in the Sino-Tibetan trade and China's aggressive activities on the Indian 
borders. Nehru informed the House about the Chinese proposal on December 5, 
and stated that the Government would consider the matter. In a debate on 
international affairs on December 7, 1961, opposition members however, 
warned against any negotiations with China in view of its intransigence and 
continuing aggression on the Indian territory. Congress members, however, 
generally felt that the opposition's harping on Government's weakxiess was 
doing even more harm to the nation and its morale. 
The pace of Chinese intrusions into the Indian territory continued 
unabated. The Sino-Indian boundary question took a grave turn during 1962. In 
January 1962 some Chinese civil and military personnel crossed the border in 
the eastern sector near Longju. In April and May there was aggressive advance 
patrolling by the Chinese forces from their strongholds in the Chip Chap area 
of Ladakh, resulting i:: the establishment of a new post in Indian territory about 
ten miles southeast of Spanggur. In reaction to these events, Indian troops were 
asked to open fire if the Chinese tried to dislodge them from any position on 
Indian soil. More troops were dispatched to Ladakh and new posts were 
established, including one at the Spanggur Lake and two on the north and south 
shores of Pangong Lake. 
This was the time when both India and China were faced with great 
difficulties on domestic and foreign policy fronts. Economic condition of China 
was not favourable both in agricultural and industrial sectors, and there was 
trouble in south China. Early in May 1962 the Chinese government warned the 
Government of India that if it continued to refused to withdraw its aggressive 
posts and persisted in carrying out provocations against the Chinese posts the 
Chinese frontier guards will be compelled to defend themselves. China further 
announced that she was resuming patrols in the area between Karakoram pass 
and Kongka pass in Ladakh because of India's provocative actions and would 
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resume patrols on the entire Sino-Indian frontier, if India continued to "invade 
and occupy China's territory." 
On the other side, Nehru made a proposal to China on May 14, 1962 that 
both sides withdraw to the west and east of the lines shown in their respective 
maps in Ladakh region of western sector. Nehru also offered to permit the 
Chinese to use the Aksai Chin road for civilian purposes, pending negotiation 
and settlement of the boundary. China rejected both the proposals and 
continued its pressure on the border. In the meantime, the Sino-Indian 
agreement of 1954 lapsed on June 3, 1962, as India maintained that no 
negotiations could be carried out unless China withdraw its forces from the 
Indian territory and restored the status quo as it existed in 1954.^ 
However, by the end of July 1962, India had managed to established 
posts in forward areas in Ladakh that covered about 3,500 square miles of 
territory which China occupied earlier." Erection of check posts in strategic 
areas along the McMahon Line by India, especially in Dhola in the Thangle 
area incurred China's displeasure. The Dhola post was located in an area where 
China had already raised objections about the exact demarcation of the 
McMahon Line. 
China was watching India's move of constructing check posts and 
accused India of provoking and aggravating tension along the Sino-Indian 
frontier. China also warned India to withdraw its "aggressive" posts and stop 
the provocations otherwise it would be compelled to act in self-defence. 
Without waiting for India's response, China decided to forcibly push its own 
probes as a bulwark against India's forward policy.^^ From the above 
discussion it can be concluded that the matters were drifting the other way 
leaving no scope for negotiations. It appears that both India and China were 
engaged in a stupendous effort to strengthen their respective positions. Both 
seemed to be working on the assumption that the other would not challenge 
military positions directly.^^ 
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Nehru considered war to be bad for India, China and the world, as he 
remarked: "continuing hostility between India and China will affect China and 
affect Asia and will have other far-reaching effects for generations".^^ At the 
same time, he added, " we will not hesitate to meet any threat to our territorial 
integrity with firmness and, where necessary, by force". This indicated a 
definite hardening in the Government's attitude. 
On the other side China reported on August 4, that the present tension 
had been caused by India's steady encroachment and establishment of "military 
strong points", on the Chinese territory. It maintained that China had never 
crossed its national frontier, and it could give no consideration to India's 
proposal for "one sided" withdrawal.^' On August 14 there was a fresh clash in 
the Pangong Lake area between the Chinese intruders and Indian troops. 
The Indian troops were also alleged to have been engaged in outrageous 
provocations in the Lake Pangong area and to have made fresh intrusions along 
the middle and eastern sectors of the boundary. On the middle sector they were 
supposed to have intruded once again in the area of Wiye and set up a military 
strong point there. On the eastern sector they were charged with repeatedly 
crossing the ".... so called" McMahon Line and making intrusions northwards. 
The Chinese at the same time suggested that they would like to have 
discussions "as soon as possible",^^ in their note. 
India replied to this note on August 22, still maintaining that no useful 
discussions could be held unless the status quo preceding Chinese occupation 
of the Ladakh area was restored, but at the same time expressing her 
willingness to "receive" a representative of the Government of China to discuss 
these essential preliminary measures.^^ Before India had received a reply to 
its note, the Chinese had seized the Dhola post and Thagla ridge in the 
Kameng Frontier Division on September 8. '^' China's reply to the Indian note 
of August 22 was received on September 13, 1962, and proposed that 
discussions on the "Sino-Indian boundary question" be started on October 15 
in Beijing and be held alternately in Beijing and New Delhi thereafter.*' 
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Throughout August and September 1962 both Indian and Chinese 
continued to build up their military outposts in Ladakh, the Chinese 
government charged the Indians for having set up 22 new Indian military 
strong points since the spring and the Indians alleged that the Chinese had set 
up 34 new posts there since May 1962.^ ^ In their notes of September 20-21 the 
Government of China not only threatened that "flames of war may break out" 
in the eastern sector but mentioned that they had already ordered their troops 
to undertake the same type of "measures ... as in the western sector" in the 
"eastern and middle sectors", and admitted having set up "additional posts" and 
taken up patrolling in the western sector.^'' Marshal Che Yi, in referring to 
Lord Home's speech in the UN accusing China of "invasions" of India, did not 
hesitate in calling "Indian reactionaries and the British imperialists" as "jackals 
of the same lair". 
On September 20, 1962, the Chinese forces, which had hitherto made 
only isolated intrusions crossed the established boundary of the North East 
Frontier Agency in the Thagla region and started firing on a post, situated two 
miles east of Dhola. The firing went on five days and nights. From the morning 
of September 26 until the afternoon of September 27 there was exchange of fire 
in the vicinity of a patrol post near Dhola. "In consequence of the increasing 
waton nature of the Indian attacks", reported the Peking Review, September 28, 
"fighting is now in progress in this area". An intensified attack on September 
29 was followed by an uneasy lull in fighting. Along with military intrusions 
China intensified her propaganda offensive. She accused Indian armies of 
capturing places north of the Thagla ridge which simply did not exist, and 
threatened "retaliatory" measures in other parts of the NEFA sector. 
By the end of September the entire north-eastern frontier of India had 
become a live frontier. China was not only concentrating her troops in this 
region but constructing airfields also.^^ The situation in Dhola Thagla area was 
deteriorating and until the beginning of October 1962 India still continued to 
believe that China would not invade India.^^ 
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Nehru returned from his overseas trip on October 2. On October 3, 
China rejected India's idea of setting preconditions before the talks on the 
boundary question. On October 4, in Cabinet meeting the Government of India 
decided, rather belatedly, to use armed forces to deal with China. October 5, 
Indian Defense Minister Krishna Menon announced the creation of new border 
command in the North -East Frontier Agency.'" On October 6, India made it 
clear to China that she would insist on the Chinese armies withdrawing both 
from Ladakh and NEFA before she could agree to send her representative to 
Beijing. 
The Chinese reply to this was in the form of action and not in words. On 
October 10, they made a massive attack on an Indian army post north of the 
Namka Chu river. This was the heaviest Chinese attack so far in the eastern 
sector. The Chinese and Indian armies now took strong positions on the two 
banks of the Namka Chu River.^ ^ On October 12, 1962, Prime Minster Nehru 
told the press at New Delhi's Palam Airport before he left for Srilanka that he 
had already "ordered the armed forces to clear the Chinese from the NEFA". 
That declaration of Nehru's was seen as India's ultimatum to Chma. 
Confirming this, on October 14, Indian Defence Minister V.K. Krishna Menon 
told a meeting of Congress workers at Bangalore that the Government had 
come to a final decision to "drive out the Chinese". He declared that the Indian 
Army was determined to fight the Chinese to the last man.^ ^ 
At that moment Nehru's announcement seemed to be more politically 
motivated rather than based on strategic calculations. It could have been 
designed to silence domestic criticism of Nehru's China policy but it could also 
offend the Chinese. The operational feasibility of Nehru's statement was very 
doubtful because India at that juncture was ill prepared to face an armed 
confrontation with China. India's decision of forcible eviction of the Chinese 
troops in the Dhola-Thangla area proved to be a prelude to an open war 
between the two countries.^'' 
On October 18, 1962, Mao Tse-Tung said at an enlarged meeting of 
the Chinese Communist Party's Politburo; for many years, "we have taken a 
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number of measures to seek a peaceful resolution of the boundary issue but 
India rejected all of them. They intentionally provoked even more violent 
armed clashes. They are bullying others too much. Now that Nehru is 
determined to fight with us. we have no way out but to keep him company. 
However, our counter attack is only meant to serve a warning to Nehru and the 
Govermnenl of India that the boundary question cannot be resolved by military 
means".^^ 
Invasions: 
On October 20, 1962 China launched a major invasion against India in 
all the three sectors of the Sino-Indian border, with the main thrust in the 
NEFA and Ladakh areas. This changed the entire perspective of Sino-Indian 
relations. The Chinese invasion was so sudden, calculated and supported by 
logistics that India's advance posts were suddenly overwhelmed, as were many 
of the defensive positions a few miles back. As compared to India, China's 
rapid advance was supported by a well established line of supplies and 
communications. The Indian troops were out-numbered and out weaponed. 
India was taken by surprise, and was not at all prepared for such a large scale 
of war. But on the other hand China was fully prepared and had chosen its own 
moment to strike. It was China that first launched the offensive with infantry 
and artillery. India's retaliation to the Chinese offensive was weak, 
uncoordinated and poorly planned. ^ ^ Thus a grave situation had arisen on 
India's northern frontiers from NEFA to Ladakh on account of "continuing and 
unabashed aggression by Chinese forces". Explaining the Indian reverses 
Krishna Menon said, "the Chinese have very considerable superiority in 
numbers and fire power".^' Indian and Chinese versions differ regarding the 
issue of who precipitated the war. 
On October 22, Nehru, in a broadcast to the nation spoke about the 
grave situation on the Indian frontier created by China, a "powerful and 
unscrupulous opponent" who cared for neither peace nor peaceful methods. 
Stating that this was the greatest menace faced by India since its independence, 
he appealed to all parties and groups, "to unite in this great enterprise and put 
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aside the controversies and arguments, and present a solid united front before 
all those who seek to endanger our freedom and integrity", and declared that 
India will "carry on the struggle because we cannot submit to the 
aggression or domination of others". 
China did not cease invading on India. On October 22, at 3:00 
a.m., the Chinese launched a vigorous attack on the Indian post at 
Kibitoo, at the other end of the NEFA on the tri-junction of India, 
Burma and Tibet, and also started concentrating at Longju, in the 
Subansiri District, in the central part of NEFA, Fighting was now taking 
place on five sectors, in the Chip Chap valley and the Pangong Lake 
regions of Ladakh in the tri-junction of India, Bhutan and Tibet on the 
western extreme of NEFA, in the tri-junction of India, Burma and Tibet 
on its eastern extreme and a Longju in the middle. The Chinese captured 
Tsang Dhar, a brigade headquarters and four of the five Indian out-post 
in the region, on October 23. By October 24, the Chinese had crossed 
the McMahon Line along a twenty-five mile front to a depth of eight 
miles on the Khinzemane sector and were in control of the entire section 
from the Bhutan border to Bumla.^' 
During the course of war both the sides suffered a lot. For 
Chinese also it was very hard nut to crack to inflict heavy Indian troops. 
On the other hand Indian army also played with the tooth and nail while 
facing the Chinese onslaught. In the meantime Chou En-Lai proposed a 
three-point ceasefire formula on October 24, 1962. In a three-point 
proposal for the settlement of the boundary question China reiterated its 
earlier stand of traditional customary boundary line and the illegality of 
McMahon Line, and accused India of occupying 90,000 sq kms of 
Chinese territory in Eastern Sector (South of McMahon Line) and 
rejecting all Chinese initiatives for peaceful resolution of the border 
crises. The statement also accused India of starting a massive general 
offensive on October 20 in both eastern and western sectors and stated 
that Chinese fronfier guards were forced to strike back in self defence 
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under such serious circumstances. The three proposals it advanced 
included:^^ 
1. Both parties to affirm that the Sino-Indian boundary question must be 
settled peaceful through negotiations, and that, pending a peaceful 
settlement both parties would respect the line of actual control between 
the two sides along the entire Sino-Indian border and the armed forces of 
each side would withdraw twenty kilometres from this line and disengage. 
2. Provided the Indian Government agreed to this proposal, China would 
withdraw its frontier guards in the Eastern Sector to the north of the line 
of actual control, while both China and India would simultaneously 
undertake not to cross the line of actual control in the Middle and Western 
sectors. 
3. In order to seek a friendly settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary 
question, talks should be held once again by the Prime Ministers of China 
and India.^ ^ 
As the Line of Actual Control had been pushed deep into Indian territory 
for four days of steady Chinese advance, the terms were not acceptable to 
India. Nehru in this contexl observed that after advancing forty to sixty 
kilometres by blatant military aggression to offer to withdraw twenty 
kilometres provided both sides did that was a deceptive device which could 
fool no body.^ "* Rejecting the proposals Nehru replied on October 27 that India 
would welcome any Chinese representative to discuss further measures to 
facilitate a peaceful settlement, provided China reverted to the position as it 
prevailed all along the boundary prior to September 8, 1962.^ "' 
Chou in his reply on November 4 said that by the line of actual control 
he meant the line which existed on November 7, 1959. It merely meant that he 
had accepted McMahon line in the eastern sector which China had already 
recognized, in its agreement with Burma. But the crux of the problem was of 
the western sector in which China wanted to maintain the status quo that is it 
wanted to keep in its control what it had occupied during the war. China 
continued to maintain that its forces in October 1962 had only reached the line 
of November 7, 1959. 
Nehru, in his reply on November 14 said that the November 7, 1959 
line included not only all the Chinese posts established in the three years since 
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1959 but also included all the Indian posts in the territory till October 20, 1962 
which had already been wiped out. China, for its, part took an additional 5000 
to 6000 square miles since their November 7, 1959 position. In the middle 
sector China had no authority south of the main Himalayan watershed ridge. In 
the eastern sector, the Chinese withdrawal would leave them in control of the 
various passes leading into India. It meant Indian forces would remain twenty 
kilometres to the south of the actual line of occupation leaving the entire Indian 
frontier defences at the mercy of any fresh invasion. 
Meanwhile, the uneasy lull on the Sino-lndian border was again broken 
on November 15, 1962 when China launched a massive attack on the eastern 
front. During second phase of the offensive in eastern sector, the Chinese apart 
from meeting tough resistance by the Indian forces at the battle of Nuranang, 
overran Indian positions at Sela, Dirang, Bomdila and Walong etc. places 
without much fight.^ ^ 
Unilateral Ceasefire: 
On November 21, when China's advance was at its peak, it declared an 
unilateral ceasefire along the entire border, and announced that its troops 
would, from December 1, 1962 withdraw to positions twenty kilometres behind 
the line of actual control as existing on November 7, 1959. The statement, 
however, warned that China reserved the right to fight back in self defence in 
three circumstances: 
1. if the Indians should continue their attack after the Chinese frontier guards 
have ceased fire and when they are withdrawing; 
2. if after Chinese withdrawal, Indians advanced to the line of actual control 
in the eastern sector and/or reftised to withdrawn but remained on the line 
of actual control in the middle and western sectors, and 
3. if, after withdrawal, the Indian troops should cross the line of actual 
control and recover their positions prior to September 8, 1962.^ ^ 
The statement further expressed the hope that India would make a 
positive response which will open the way for further negotiations. Further, the 
Chinese government suggested to Indian government that the officials of the 
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two sides should meet to discuss the twenty kilometres withdrawal of their 
armed forces to form a demilitarised zone, the establishment of civilian check 
posts and the return of captured personnel. ^ ^ In the history of the modern world, 
China may be the only country to declare a unilateral cease-fire, especially after 
such a rapid and substantial advance into foreign territory.^" 
The unilateral declaration of a ceasefire was a military victory for China 
not because they were more powerful but because we were ill-prepared. 
The new Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan had to admit; the training of Indian 
troops was not meant for mountain oriented war; they did not have the heart for 
a war that China was likely to launch; had no requisite knowledge of the 
Chinese tactics and ways of war, their weapon, equipments and capabilities. 
There were other factors also responsible for India's defeat at the hands of the 
Chinese; the organisation and establishment, equipment and logistics for 
mountain warfare compared unfavourably with those of the Chinese; our 
military intelligence was extraordinarily inadequate, basic equipment units 
were deficient, most of the wireless sets and signal equipments were old and 
too heavy for operation in mountainous region and winter clothing was seldom 
available.^^ 
Nehru submitted that the Chinese proposals of November 21, 1962 were 
merely a repetition of their earlier proposals, with the addition of the unilateral 
declaration of ceasefire and withdrawal.^^ There was ample controversy over 
the Line of Actual Control, which was September 8, 1962 position to India and 
November 7, 1959 position to China^ "*. Till November 25, the Government of 
India did not accept the Chinese ceasefire proposal, as the acceptance of such a 
proposal would amount to acceptance of Chinese control over large Chunks of 
Indian territory in Ladakh and key positions in NEFA.^^ The Government of 
India, he declared, could neither compromise with this further Chinese 
aggression, nor permit the aggressor to retain the position he had acquired by 
force by further aggression since September 8, 1962, "as this would mean not 
only letting him have what he wanted but exposing our country to further 
inroads and demands in the future". Statesman like Ram Sevak Yadav, Frank 
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Anthony and some others viewed the Chinese proposal as another trick to gain 
time to make another base for attack.^'' A deadlock started from both the sides. 
The Colombo Proposals: 
Meanwhile, efforts were made by some Afro-Asian countries to help 
to resolve the tension on the borders and evolve a fomiula to bring India 
and China to the negotiating table. Consequently a conference of the six 
non-aligned nations comprising Burma, Cambodia, Shri Lanka, Egypt, Ghana 
and Indonesia was held in Colombo on December 10, 1962. The six 
non-aligned nations intended to negotiate only because they presupposed that 
the dispute constituted a threat to the "concept of Afro-Asian Unity", and also, 
"for the countries with policies .of neutrality and non-alignment". It was 
considered to be very significant in international quarters. The six powers held 
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their meeting at Colombo to consider the Chinese proposal of cease-fire. 
The ceasefire formula, evolved by the conference and later known as the 
Colombo Proposals, attempted to provide an equitable and fair basis for further 
negotiations between the two nations, and to restore peace in the sub-
continent. 
In the eastern sector, the line of actual control, that is the McMahon Line 
would serve as the cease-fire limit except in Thagla and Longju areas which 
were in Chinese occupation. In the middle sector where there was not much 
controversy the two countries would negotiate for a peaceful settlement. 
The problem was of the western sector for which it was suggested that China 
would carry out the 20 km withdrawal which it had proposed in the cease-fire 
announcement, but there would be no reciprocation from the Indian side, the 
Indian troops would stay where they were as they had already been pushed 
back much in the Indian territory. The area vacated by the Chinese could be a 
demilitarized zone to be administered by civilian posts of the two countries to 
be agreed upon. India accepted these proposals which would virtually restore 
its position in the east and require China to pull back from about 2700 sq. miles 
in the western sector. As regards the military posts, they were to be replaced on 
parity basis so that neither side could claim priority over the other.'°° 
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Chinese rejected the proposal as they wanted withdrawal of both sides 
and not of Chinese troops alone by twenty kilometres along the whole border 
and not only in the western sector. Meanwhile, Chou En-Lai informed 
Mrs. Bandaranaike that Chinese accepted the proposal in principle but he 
insisted that Indians should not be allowed to go back into the strip in which 
they had infiltrated under the forward policy, either with troops or civilian 
personnel."" In effect, it meant a rejection of the substantive part of the 
Colombo Proposals. India, on the other hand, in the light of the clarifications, 
accepted the proposals totally and unreservedly, thus placing the ball firmly in 
China's Court.'°^ 
In January 1963, it was clarified by the Ceylonese Prime Minister, 
Mrs. Bandaranaike that the Government of India was prepared to accept the 
proposals subject to the parliamentary approval. On January 25, 1963, Nehru 
placed the full text of proposals before the Lok Sabha along with certain 
clarificafions of the neutral power's intentions received from the Ceylonese 
Prime Minister. Infact, the Colombo Proposals, "were used to lure and lull 
India into the belief that it was possible toward off the Chinese menace through 
negotiations with Beijing." In the spring of 1963, Beijing out-rightly refused to 
accept the Colombo Proposals, whereas India had accepted them without any 
reservations.'"•' The Government of China also rejected the reference of the 
border dispute with India to the International Court of Justice. They were not in 
favour of arbitration and finally had rejected the Colombo Proposals.'"'' Nehru 
insisted that there would be no talks, until the Chinese Government accepted 
them in toto. The acceptance of the Proposals was in favour of India's security 
interest.'°^ 
In 1964 Chou En-Lai was reported to be ready for opening up 
direct negotiations with India on the basis of the Colombo Proposals. 
He declared, "Relaxation of the Sino-Indian boundary question is entirely 
possible provided India agrees to return to the conference table without 
preconditions". The proposals of the Colombo negotiations were reduced to 
four alternatives: 
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1. Address private state communication to the two contending powers, 
India and China, appealing to them to come to a settlement; 
2. Postpone the conference to an alternative venue with expanded 
membership; 
3. Pass resolution in general terms propounding the philosophy of 
non-alignment and peace; and 
4. To adopt a resolution incorporating the stand points of Ghana and the 
The Colombo Proposals died a lingering death as neither India nor 
China had accepted them for reasons of their own. The border conflict dealt 
heavy blow to the sentiment of friendship between the two countries. As a 
result, the diplomatic impasse continued for a long period. Nehru stated in the 
AICC meeting on May 17, 1964 that India had taken the lead in accepting the 
Colombo Proposals as well as the suggestion of considering the vacation of the 
post as a basis for starting negotiations, and it was now upto China to take 
further initiative for direct talk with India.'°^ The bilateral relations remained 
unchanged in the Post-Nehru period. 
The first important Parliamentary discussion on External Affair after 
Nehru's demise took place on September 25, 1964. The new External Affairs 
Minister, Swaran Singh initiated the discussion and regretted that China 
continued to take a "negative and intransigent attitude towards the Colombo 
Proposals". He categorically stated that India was willing to enter into 
negotiations with China in the "manner envisaged in the Colombo Proposals", 
should the latter withdraw its seven posts in the demilitarized zone in Ladakh. 
He further stated that "we have thus gone to the farthest limit possible within 
the ambit of the Colombo Proposals in order to enable negotiations to take 
place between the two countries". The minister however declared: "we shall 
not go to the Conference Table on Chinese terms and we shall not give up our 
rights in territory which was illegally and by force occupied by China. It is for 
China to give evidence of her sincerity to reach a settlement which she has 
singularly failed to do so far."'°^ 
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Tliroughout the year 1964 both countries alleged border intrusions into 
each other's territories and lodged protests. China continued to negatively 
portray India's image. On October 16, 1964 China exploded atom-bomb and 
conducted its first nuclear test."" With China going nuclear, India's threat 
perception increased manifold. The Members of Parliament warned that the 
entire context of India's defence strategy and foreign diplomacy had changed 
with China emerging as a nuclear power. They further stated that the Chinese 
explosion could not be ignored, it could be written off; it could not be played 
down; it was of major significance. India was the country for which it had the 
most immediate importance.'" Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri realized the 
gravity of the issue and stated in the Parliament that India could not 
simultaneously raise its voice against nuclear welfare and weapons and also go 
in for atom bomb which would add heavily on state exchequer. He was of the 
opinion that India's policy towards nuclear weapons was advantageous to the 
nation, and the government would keep the threat in mind, but it would not take 
any decision in a hurry that only with an atom bomb it could defend itself 
against China. "^ In December, 1964, Prime Minister Shastri stated that in view 
of continued intransigence any questioin of negotiations with China did not 
arise, the India government would continue to believe "in the pursuit of peace 
and in settlement by mutual discussions provided always that such discussions 
can be held consistently with the honour and dignity of the country". Replying 
to the non-communist oppositions demand for a categorical assurance that not 
an inch of land would be surrendered to China, Shastri said: "we are not going 
to give up our Indian territory. But it is true that the Colombo Proposals are 
there and we have to keep them in mind"."^ 
Soon after on December 30, 1964 Premier Chou En-Lai pointed out that 
India had made a totally unreasonable demand on China to evacuate the 
civilian posts in Ladakh, he further stated that China had not given up 
its sovereignty over the 90,000 sp kms of territory south of McMahon Line. 
To this Chinese statement, the official Indian response was that "what 
Chou En-Lai has done is to bolt and bar the door completely."'"* 
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The year 1965 witnessed one of the lowest ebbs in Sino-Indian bilateral 
relations due to Pakistan factor. During September, October and November 
many border incursions and clashes took place on the Sino-Indian border. 
On September 19, the Chinese troops ambushed and killed three civilian 
personnel of an Indian patrol in Tsaskur in the Ladakh sector. Later, on 
September 20 and 21, troops also intruded into Sikkim border at Nathula and 
Dong Chula. On November 13, Chinese troops opened fire on two Indian 
outposts across Dong Chula on the Sikkim border and killed one Indian 
soldier."' Both nations exchanged diplomatic notes and lodged strong protests. 
The Indian Defence Minister, YB Chavan conceded that since 
September 15, China had intruded across the border, or the line of actual 
control on 33 occasions."^ Throughout the year the Chinese government 
maintained, in an intensified form, its hostility towards India. Developments 
during the year revealed, even more clearly than before, that the Sino-Indian 
border question was not merely a territorial issue but an instrument forged by 
China to bring about a political confrontation between the two countries and to 
apply protracted military pressure on India. "^ 
Although no major armed clash took place on the border in 1966, 
Chinese aggressive activity kept the tension simmering on the border. China 
not only reiterated its territorial claims on the western and eastern sectors of the 
border, but also carried out a series of minor intrusions across the border. 
In January, 1966 China lodged protest with the Indian government against its 
alleged interference in China's internal affairs by using the question of Tibet. 
China expressed concern over Dalai Lama's anti-Chinese activities in India. "^ 
On February 16, the Prime Minister told the Lok Sabha that during 
December 1965 to January 1966, the Chinese committed as many as 27 
violations - 19 in Ladakh, 4 in NEFA., 1 in UP and 3 in Sikkim. "^ When 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi assumed the post of Prime Minister after the sudden death 
of Lai Bahadur Shastri, Premier Chou En-Lai sent message to Madam Gandhi 
greeting her on the assumption of the post of premier. '^ ° 
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From mid 1966 onward, the internal condition of both India and China 
was in a state of continuous flux. China was in the midst of socio-economic 
upheaval and acute leadership struggle during the Cultural Revolution phase 
(1966-69). In India, the new Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi was an untried and 
untested leader. '^' Sino-Indian relations further deteriorated in June 1967 with 
the expulsion of two Indian diplomats from Beijing on alleged charges of 
"espionage activities." '^ ^ The Indian External Affairs Minister stated that the 
list of charges of alleged spying was a "tissue of lies". On June 14, the minister 
referred to the humiliating treatment accorded to the Indian diplomats by the 
Red Guards who had been physically assaulted. He further stated that the 
Chinese Government had violated the "ordinary rules of diplomatic usages" 
and had also broken its own "pledge of conducting the diplomatic safely across 
to border." '^ ^ Later in a daring and surprise action, China put the entire staff of 
the Indian Embassy and their families in Beijing under siege in the embassy's 
compound. India immediately lodged a strong protest and warned China that 
should be siege of the Indian Embassy not to lifted "within 4 hours", India 
would take appropriate counter measures. On June 19, India did the same to 
Chinese embassy staff at New Delhi and immediately the next day China lifted 
the siege of the Indian Embassy in Beijing. India responded on June 21 by 
lifting restrictions on the movement of the Chinese staff and sent back two 
Chinese diplomats from India. '^ '^  
The winter of 1967 witnessed skirmishes on Sino-Indian border. 
On September 11, Chinese troops attacked Indian troops on the Sikkim border 
across the Nathula and opened heavy mortar and artillery fire. After repeated 
Indian protests and proposal for ceasefire, by September 15 there was a virtual 
cessation of all hostile activity. The Chinese again fired heavily on the Indian 
positions at Chola, on October 1 and both sides suffered casualties. On October 
10, Chola again witnessed exchange of heavy fires between Indian and Chinese 
troops. The Indian Defence Minister informed the Parliament that Indian losses 
in the two border incidents were 88 killed and 163 wounded, while the Chinese 
casualties were estimated to be 300 killed and 450 wounded in Nathula firing 
and 40 in Chola. The minister assured that the government was keeping a close 
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watch on developments across the borders having a bearing on India's security, 
and those were accordingly taken note of in the defence plans.'^ "^ 
The presidential address on February 12, 1968 underscored India's 
desire to seek normalization of relations with China. "We have always wished 
the Chinese people well - The principles of mutual respect, non aggression and 
non-interference along provide a durable basis for international relations. On 
our part, we seek restoration of our relation with China on these principles". 
Despite Chinese intransigence, India was moving towards creating a 
favourable climate for ending the stalemate in Sino-Indian relations. Premier 
Gandhi stated at Press Conference on January 1, 1969, that the Government of 
India was prepared to "try and find" a way of solving the dispute with China 
without insisting on its acceptance of the Colombo proposals as a 
precondition. '^ ^ The President, Zakir Husain, stated further in his address to the 
Parliament on February 17 that it was our firm belief that the disturbed image 
of our country which China projected through its ideological prisms will 
succumb io the realities of the situation. Governments have expressed more 
than once with frankness and sincerity their desire to have friendship of 
relations with China consistent with our sovereignty, territorial integrity and on 
the basis of absolute non-interference in each others internal affairs. 
On April 8, 1969, External Affair Minister Dinesh Singh outlined the 
Government's China policy in the Lok Sabha that, our policy is based on 
friendship and cooperation. We do not wish to interfere in the internal affairs 
of others - the policies of China will have to change one day - we have a long 
frontier with China. We would like to reduce tension along this frontier.'^^ 
Chinese foreign policy during the ensuring period was marked by a 
more relaxed profile. In 1969 China witnessed the end of infamous Cultural 
Revolution. Moderation was the keyword in Chinese internal and external 
policies. Following the ninth National Party Congress in April, China stated 
that regarding boundary question "Government have consistently stood for 
negotiations through diplomatic channels to reach a fair and reasonable 
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settlement. Pending a settlement, the status quo of the boundary should be 
maintained and conflict avoided. '^ "^  As a result, Chinese diplomats started 
attending some receptions in other capitals given in honour of visiting Indian 
dignitaries. The atmosphere further improved, by the end of the year when, 
both the Indian and Chinese diplomats exchanged greetings and attended 
receptions hosted by their respective missions. These developments led to a 
fertile ground for the diplomatic exchange from both the sides (India and 
China). _ ^ 
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CHAPTER-m 
Chapter-Ill 
The Process of Normalisation 
The haze from the ashes of war of 1962 was still smouldering but the 
wind of understanding from both the sides also started blowing since 1970 
onwards. The ruptured diplomatic relations were patched up and verbal 
dialogues started between India and China. At the beginning of the 1970s we 
have the famous smile on Mao Tse-Tung when he greeted our Charge'd" 
Affairs Brijesh Mishra during the May Day celebrations in 1970 in Beijing 
with the remark: "India and China have been friend and they should have the 
same old friendship". He expressed hope that two countries would re-establish 
ties. When the matter was pursued with the Chinese foreign office, their 
response was cold in stating that it was for the government of India to respond 
to the gesture with concrete proposals. They, on their part, were not prepared 
to send a written communication to place on record what Mao had said. Mao 
Tse-Tung's overture was judged to be extremely important by the Indian side 
and conversations were opened in three to four capitals between the two 
governments.^ However, the problem was that the Indian Government could 
not actually act upon a mere gesture as there was nothing in writing to indicate 
that Chinese intentions and expressions were in consonance with their gesture. 
Nevertheless the Indian Government treated the incident seriously and took 
note of diplomat's reports on the matter.'* Very slow progress was being 
maintained. 
In 1970 Defence Minister Swaran Singh, referring to India's relations 
with China while initiating the discussion on a resolution on Foreign Policy at 
the AICC (I) meeting in New Delhi said that at present there was not much 
hope and there was no concrete evidence which is likely to be any response 
from China to India's offers of resolving difficulties by peaceful means through 
negotiations.^ 
Indian diplomats held exploratory talks with their Chinese counterparts 
in Cairo. This was a very significant move towards normalisation. Though it 
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did not show any immediate positive results but had all the traits which were 
going to be beneficial in the long term. China also extended cooperation 
involving the investigation into two Indian army officers who were missing 
while climbing the Chomolhari peak in Bhutan. In keeping with this Chinese 
spirit, India gradually minimized the strength of the police contingent posted at 
the Chinese Embassy gates in New Delhi. Otherwise the officially controlled 
Chinese media did not indulge in any direct criticism against the Indian 
Government.' 
In the same year another similar event took place in Moscow when the 
Indian Ambassador D.P. Dhar met the Chinese envoy twice and talked 
about the possibility of a thaw in relafionship of the two countries. All these 
friendly gestures increased diplomatic interaction between the two sides. 
An organisation in conjunction with the Chinese Government invited an Indian 
diplomat for a quasi-official dinner. Its importance stems from the fact that 
these parties were described as "friendly" and "Indian inclusion in the list is 
regarded as a peace feeler". 
Moreover, several Indian diplomatic personnel attended a Chinese 
Embassy reception in August 1970 to commemorate the 43''' anniversary of the 
PL A (Peoples Liberation Army). This was a sharp contrast to the earlier Indian 
response on the matter. Then only a junior official from the External Affairs 
Ministry attended such receptions to maintain minimal diplomatic courtesies. 
It, therefore, indicated that bilateral relations had coursed through a positive 
phase and entered into the cordial one. Otherwise friendly actions pointed to an 
initiation of relaxed relations between the two sides. For instance, Indian 
police guards at that point in time abstained from checking cars entering the 
Chinese Embassy to identify visitors for a diplomatic recepfion.^ On August 
26, 1970 the External Affairs Minister stated in the Rajya Sabha: "We do 
notice a slight change in the attitude of China towards the propaganda 
against her neighbours including India, of late, but we have not yet seen any 
change in the substantive matters so far as the Chinese stand towards India is 
concerned."'^ 
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However, in 1971 India attracted mixed signals from China over the 
involvement in the creation of Bangladesh. On April 6, 1971 an NCNA 
broadcast accused India for "flagrantly interfering in the internal affairs of 
Pakistan". Then on April 12, Premier Chou En-Lai in a personal message to 
President Yahya Khan assured him of China's support to Pakistan in the 
eventuality of Indian aggression. Subsequently, in early July, Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi wrote to Chou En-Lai about the East Pakistan crises, expressing 
the desire for discussions at whichever level China chose. Till July 1971, 
an uncertain situation prevailed but thereafter, the Indian and Chinese 
Ambassadors to Poland confabulated with each others. Subsequently, in 
August 1971, the Indian government received messages via the BBC and New 
York Times that Chou En-Lai was keen on normalising ties. 
India and Soviet Union signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, 
friendship and cooperation on August 9, 1971.''' Regarding the treaty 
K. Subramanyam felt that; the Indian action was designed to countervail the 
expected pressures and possible military moves by the US and China against 
India. India was of the view that the Indo-Soviet treaty did not stand in the 
way of our normalisation with China. It was not directed against China or any 
other country.'^ In the same month China invited an Indian table tennis team to 
participate in the Afro-Asian Friendship Tournament scheduled for November 
in Beijing. On October 5, Chou En-Lai was reported to have said the 
Indo-Soviet Treaty was not "directed against China". In response, Mrs. Gandhi 
welcomed Mr. Chou En-Lai's positive comment on the nature of the 
Indo-Soviet Treaty on October 7.'^ Viewing the complexities of the issues 
between both the countries showed concern in this connection and expressed 
that the leaders of India and China could not pretend that bilateral relations had 
been good ... .the issues involved between them were most difficult and even 
emotional but nothing could be solved without basic good will and effort. 
Thereafter on October 27, Prime Minister Gandhi dispatched a 
congratulatory message to Premier Chou En Lai on China's entry into the 
UN.''' Mrs. Gandhi expressed India's desire for "working in close cooperation 
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with China in the interest of peace and progress in Asia and throughout the 
world."'^ On November 3, India was among 48 nations thanked for supporting 
China's admission into UN at a banquet held by the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry.'^ 
In complete contrast to the smooth course of bilateral relations on 
November 29, 1971 Indian diplomats staged a walk-out from a Beijing 
reception to protest against Chinese Vice-Premier Li Xiannian's provocative 
remarks on India. On December 3, 1971, the Chinese People's Daily charged 
India with plotting to dismember Pakistan by the creation of Bangladesh in its 
eastern wing. Surprisingly, the same day, Pakistan launched a pre-emptive air 
strike on India triggering hot war between the two countries. On December 5, 
China followed up with a draft resolution in the UN accusing India of 
launching a 'large scale' attack against Pakistan.^" 
India's stature rose considerably in international community as India 
remained supportive and practical in the birth of Bangladesh during December 
1971. In a broader sense, India triumphed against the triangular Sino-US-Pak 
axis during the 1971 Indo-Pak conflict (that helped to create Bangladesh) due 
to Soviet political and military support. For India, this was a significant 
strategic development, initiated against the wishes of a super power and a 
major power the US and China respectively. These developments, however, 
were viewed negatively from Sino-centric perspective. Essentially China felt 
threatened by the heightened strategic stature that India acquired; besides she 
disliked the significance the Soviet Union gained in this process, hence China 
turned reluctant towards India after 1971.^' 
In the background of this India had expressed its readiness to hold 
bilateral discussions with China on the basis of the five principles of peaceful 
co-existence.'^^ However, New Delhi's keenness failed to evoke any response 
from Beijing. Relations between India and China started to normalise but in the 
year of 1971 it was a mixed reaction from both the sides. Some where pensive 
attitude and indifference can be felt and somewhere cordial glimpses were 
exhibited. 
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In January 1972, China alleged India was sponsoring a "reactionary 
mutiny" in Tibet the following year the Chinese Government renewed the 
cartographical aggression against India by publishing documents where in 
Indian territory along their common frontier was shown as Chinese.^'' In 1972 
the Chinese Press made a statement detrimental to cordial relations with India 
that in its view India was "conducting frantic anti-China activities and 
interfering in our internal affairs "•^ '' 
Apparently India did not take any serious note of this statement. 
On April 25, 1972 a member Dasaratha Deb (CPM) stated in Parliament that 
regarding normalisation of relations with China formidable steps "should be 
thought over to open the negotiation and settle the dispute with China". The 
view found support from another member Dinesh Singh (Congress) who 
emphasised the need to be flexible in our dealings with China.^^ External 
Affairs Minister Swam Singh reiterated in the Lok Sabha on April 26, 1972 
that "the Indo-Soviet bilateral ties did not stand in the way of normalisation of 
relations with China. It was not directed against China or any other country. 
India could not accept the view that the state of cordial relationship with one 
country might deterus from developing friendship with any third country. This 
was obviously with reference to India's relations with USSR and our desire to 
develop normal relations with China. The Soviet Union had been trying to 
normalise relations with China and would be happy to see normalisation 
between India and China".^^ On April 27, Swaran Sngh expressed India's 
keenness to resolve the boundary problem with China. Once again on May 19 
he re-stated India's policy to normalise relations with China. A month later on 
June 19 the Chinese Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Mr. Tsung Kowen 
expressed hope that India and China would soon exchange ambassadors.^^ 
India's External Affairs Minister was quite categorical in saying at the 
UN General Assembly session in October 1972 that China did not show the 
necessary response despite their intentions to resume normal relations with that 
country in the mutual interest of both the countries.^^ On November 30, 1972 
the Minister of External Affairs made a comprehensive statement in Parliament 
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expressing the policies of India and China. He said: "It is our firm belief that 
India and China must normalise their relations on the basis of the five 
principles of peaceful co-existence. It is necessary that positive steps must be 
taken by both sides for this purpose. We are willing and ready to hold bilateral 
discussions with China on the problems that bedevil our mutual relations. 
We hope and believe that in the vital interests of peace and stability in Asia, 
India and China would be able to take positive steps towards normalisation of 
relations on the basis of mutual respect, equality and reciprocity". Despite 
such seemingly favourable utterances, Mr. Swaran Singh on December 7 
commented that China was unresponsive towards India's friendly diplomatic 
initiatives.•^ ^ 
The year 1972 marked the tenth anniversary of the Chinese aggression 
which had shaken the nation to the core. The bitterness of Chinese betrayal 
and disillusionment with its behaviour was so sharp that it took approximately 
ten years to New Delhi to think of restoring medium of normalising its 
relations with Beijing. The hurt of 1962 continued to rankle in many hearts 
and was not easily forgotten. 
The commencement of the year 1973 witnessed some minor changes in 
the attitude of the Chinese suggesting some relaxation in their rigidity. In 
maintaining diplomatic formality, the Chinese became a little more dignified. 
A Vice Minister of China attended India's Republic day reception in Beijing in 
1973 to which hardly any Chinese dignitary was ever seen on this occasion 
since 1962. A military attache in the Chinese embassy in New Delhi attended 
the navy day. Indian leadership did not read much in these gestures as they did 
when Mao Tse-Tung gave a patronising smile to the Indian Charge d'Affairs in 
1970. But such gestures did show some change in Chinese mind. Two Asian 
neighbours were getting friendly was evident from the Chinese Ambassador's 
attendance at the Republic Day function on January 26, 1973 at India House in 
London. Then on February 23, Mr. Swaran Singh informed the Rajya Sabha 
that it was evident that China was: considering the question of normalising 
relations with India.^ ^ 
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In March 1973, China, sent a new charge d'affairs to New Delhi, after a 
lapse of nearly 18 months and this was a positive step. Further, some 
improvement on the diplomatic front was noticeable and increased contacts 
between the Indian and Chinese diplomats were reported from many world 
capitals. China also toned down anti-Indian propaganda in a limited way. In 
April, China invited an Indian team to play in a Table Tennis Tournament to be 
held at Beijing in August."'^  
On April 23, 1973 a member H. Kishore Singh (Congress) cautioned 
Parliament that China would lay down conditions of Aksai Chin and the 
McMahon Line that the Indian psyche was not ready to accept. Another 
member who was also against significant concessions on the Aksai Chin issue 
further took this up. He stated that it "....should be made clear so China's 
normalisation of relations is one thing and acquiescence with Chinese territorial 
claims is another thing".'^'' 
On June 24, 1973, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said, that India was 
"throwing out feelers" to renew relations with China.'^ ^ The US ambassador 
John Galbraith went on a private visit to Beijing in June 1973. The Chinese 
Foreign Minister Chi Peng Fei told him that China was interested in improving 
its relations with India as part of its general desire for mutually beneficial 
contacts with all the three countries of the subcontinent. 
The new Indian envoy L.L. Malhotra took up his assignment as Charge 
d'Affairs in Beijing in the first week of August 1973. He reached there at a 
time when there had been several indications pointing to the possibility of an 
improvement in the relations between the two countries. The two countries had 
stopped the propaganda warfare at the border which had been going on for 
some years.^^ These events clearly indicated that China now wanted to be more 
realistic in its dealings with India. On August 16, 1973 the Minister of State 
for External Affairs told the Lok Sabha that India was set to begin trade 
relations with China as a part of the normalisation process.'^ ^ 
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Another event took place in November 1973 that changed the Chinese's 
thinking. In that year Brezhnev visited India apparently with one object in 
view namely to let the Indian leadership know about the Collective Asian 
Security Concept which he wanted to sell to all Asian nations in order to create 
a bulwark against any Chinese threat. The Chinese knew that it was directed 
against them and if India accepted it, it would mean perpetual enmity between 
the two countries. When the idea was referred to Indian leaders in a speech by 
Brezhnev before the members of Indian Parliament, the response was not at all 
encouraging. Indian leaders plainly told Brezhnev that it would not suitably fit 
in the parameters of Indian Foreign policy. All this encouraged China to take a 
positive attitude towards Indian approach.^^ 
The next year on April 29, 1974 the Indian government permitted the 
All India Kotnis Memorial Committee's delegation to visit China to promote 
goodwill between the two countries.''° But the entire scenario changed when 
India went for its Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) at Pokharan in May 1974. 
China's antipathy towards India increased. There was, of course, no immediate 
reaction from China to India's PNE. In the wake of Indian Nuclear Test, China 
assured Pakistan of its "full and resolute support in its struggle in defence of its 
national independence and sovereignty against foreign aggression and 
interference, including that against nuclear threat and nuclear blackmail"."" 
Acquisition of nuclear power within so short period of about two years 
after its major success in Bangladesh war was clearly suggestive of India's 
ambition to dominate the region. While criticizing India's move the Chinese 
sought to speak on behalf of other Asian countries. The Chinese Vice-Premier 
Teng Hsiaopeng in a statement alleged that by carrying out the test, India was 
seeking to scare neighbouring countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh and 
Afghanistan. He questioned why it was exploded close to Pakistan's border and 
so soon after Bhutto had returned home after a successful visit to China. 
The Chinese did not at all believe in the assurance of Indian leaders that 
the nuclear test was concluded to examine the potential of nuclear energy 
for peaceful purposes."^ On June 16 Prime Minister Gandhi, while speaking 
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at a meeting of the Foreign Correspondent Association for South Asia in 
New Delhi, said: "We welcome friendship with China. But it has to be a two-
way affairs"/^ The nuclear explosion of India in 1974 was not looked very 
positively by China. It did not trust in Indian assurance that the test was for 
peaceful purposes and criticised as if India was trying to dominate the region. 
On January 13, 1975, Chinese Vice-Minister for Cultural, Sports and 
Physical Affairs said that the, "Chinese People have always very friendly 
sentiments for the Indian people". He was speaking to newsman at Calcutta as 
the leader of the Chinese delegation to attend the 33"* World Table Tennis 
Championship. During his brief halt at Calcutta airport on his way from 
Beijing to Kathmandu, the Chinese Vice-Premier Chen Xilian told the press on 
February 26. 1975 that. "China was ready for talks".'*'' And his country and 
India would finally have friendly relations and the 'twists and turns of 
relationship between the two countries would not continue for long.' ^ 
On April 15,. 1975, Madhav Rao Scindia warned the Government about 
the complacency, which had set into its policy with China. He opined that it 
was not a wise step from the Indian part to accept territorial losses, which 
suited Chinese national interests. Mr. Scindia stated: "our Foreign Ministers 
must ensure that in our game of diplomatic ping-pong with China, we play the 
role of a bat and not a ball" ''^  The intractability of the border dispute arises 
because both sides have strong cases on it. Indian claim to Aksai Chin has no 
basis in treaty, usage or geography such as the watershed principle. While 
India's claim to the McMahon Line has a firm basis in geography as well as 
usage, it has no basis in a valid international treaty.''^ Applying historical 
evidence towards a solution has not made much headway either. 
A few months later there was another border skirmish between Chinese 
and Indian troops in the eastern sector. The timing of the skirmish coincided 
with the date of the 1962 border war - 20"" October. Whether this was a 
symbolic reminder or mere coincidence - is difficult to say. On October 20, 
1975 approximately 40 Chinese soldiers crossed over the Line of Actual 
Control (LAC) and killed four Indian soldiers.''^ The Indian Government 
70 
lodged a strong protest with the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi against the 
"unprovoked" and unjustified firing/^ In response, China refuted these charges 
and instead accused the Indians for coming across the LAC at Tulung La. It is 
important to note that China ignored the matter keeping in view of the above 
incidents, the Ministry of External Affairs concluded that inspite of constant 
endeavours to establish normal relations with China there was no positive 
attempt from the Chinese side. Resultantly, there was no remarkable change in 
Sino-Indian relations. 
On January 8, 1976 Chou En- Lai passed away. Mrs. Gandhi herself 
went to the Chinese embassy in New Delhi to sign the condolence register. 
This was in exact reciprocation of what Chou En- Lai himself had done at the 
time of Nehru's death in May 1964. China took a special note of it and to 
convey their appreciation of the gesture to the government of India, a Vice-
Minister was deputed to go to meet the Indian Charge'd' Affaires and tell him 
that the Chinese people in the moment of their grief shared the sentiments of 
goodwill with the Indian people in all their mutual dealings. The Chinese 
probably wanted to use this sad event to start some fresh initiative from their 
side to end the prolonged stalemate in Sino-Indian relations. The Indian envoy 
was also reported to have been told by the Chinese Minister that if India took 
some concrete steps in this respect, China would not fail to respond in an 
appropriate manner.^ " This is what India needed and got though on a sad 
occasion. It took the two sides 14 years to repair their ruptured relations. For 
India the Himalayan humiliation was a traumatic experience and had to be 
avoided in future. And the only way to achieve this objective was to ensure 
conventional deterrent capability along with good relations with China'^ ' 
Lord Trevelyan, a British diplomat, referring to Sino-Indian relations, 
emphasised the importance of normalisation, while addressing the Press Corps 
on January 9, 1976 at Bombay. He seemed to have spoken with an eye on the 
shape of things. Only a few months later India armounced her decision to 
appoint an Ambassador to China." On April 15, 1976, the External Affairs 
Minister, Y. B. Chavan announced in the Parliament that after mutual 
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consultation India and China had agreed to resume diplomatic representation in 
both the countries at ambassadorial level. This, he said, would hold out the 
prospect of a progressive improvement in Sino-Indian relations. He also 
announced that K.R. Narayanan a Secretary in the External Affairs Ministry 
was appointed as the new ambassador to China. He also assured that our 
initiative to raise the level of our diplomatic representation would be followed 
by China.=^ 
The new Chinese Prime Minister Hua Guofeng was installed in power in 
May 1976. Mrs. Gandhi, as a matter of protocol requirement sent him a 
greeting message to which his reply was more than a routine official 
communication; it was constructive in respect of bilateral relations. It was 
clear that it was the time when Chinese response would be positive if India 
took some concrete step to improve relations between the two countries.^'' 
The new envoy K.R. Narayanan reached Beijing on July 7,1976. 
Despite the mourning in Beijing over the death of Chu Teh, Chairman of the 
National People's Congress, he met Chio Kuan-Huo, Foreign Minister within 
three days of his arrival. Before K.R.Narayanan could present his credentials, 
Chinese government named on July 12, 1976, Chen Chao-Yuan, its envoy in 
Spain, as its ambassador to India. Chen Chao-Yuan of 58 years was not a 
stranger to New Delhi; he had been the counsellor in the Chinese embassy from 
1963 to 1970. By restoring the diplomatic missions to the ambassadorial level, 
the two governments could be said to have created an adequately high channel 
of communication.^^ In his first official statement, the Chinese Ambassador 
stated that full normalisation of Sino-Indian relations through joint efforts was 
in full accord with the interests of the people of the two nations, and expressed 
the hope that the friendship between the two nations would grow fiirther and 
bilateral relations would improve.^^ 
K.R. Narayanan presented his credentials on July 24 to Wu Ten, Vice-
Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in 
Beijing. The Chinese envoy who was to present his credentials on September 
18, 1976 had to do so on September 20 as the function was postponed 
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following the death of Mao Tse-Tung. Though there was nothing new in the 
speeches of the President and the Chinese envoy that had not been said before, 
the tone and tenor of their observations were intended by both sides to 
consolidate the present atmosphere for carrying forward the process of 
normalisation." 
In the mid-seventies significant changes took place in both Chinese and 
Indian internal politics. These political changes provided an opportunity for 
the new leaders of both nations to reassess and reorient their policies towards 
each other amidst the changed context of international relations. In order to 
concentrate on domestic modernisation, China took steps to improve relations 
with the neighbours, as peaceful borders was necessary for the modernisation. 
There are many other factors which compelled China to come closer to India 
during 1970s are: 
1. China recognised the fact that India had become the most important 
power centre in South Asia after 1971, and that no combination of other 
South Asian countries could balance India. 
2. Indo-Soviet friendship treaty is also one of the factor which compel 
China to create a positive atmosphere for Sino-Indian bilateral relations 
in the fact of Sino-Soviet confrontation.^^ 
3. China's security considerations on its western front, especially in Tibet. 
Political unrest and ethnic strife kept the situation in Tibet far from 
normal. The Dalai Lama and thousands of reftigees from Tibet were 
living in Indian territory. Security on western front apparently required 
India's cooperation. 
4. Finally, the American defeat in the Vietnam war and its growing 
domestic crises forced the United States to reduce its presence in East 
Asia. Chinese leaders were concerned about Soviet efforts to fill the 
power vacuum by proposing the Asian Collective Security regime. 
Vietnam began to lean towards Soviet Union and took steps to bring all 
Indo-China imder its own control excluding Chinese influence there. 
Under such circumstances, it was imperative for China to take steps 
diplomatically to stabilise Sino-Indian relations in order to foil the 
perceived Soviet designs in the Asia-Pacific region.^ 
In the context of the changed scenario, the Chinese leader on their part 
had weighted the issue very carefully before responding to the Indian initiative 
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for the restoration of ambassadorial level relationship. The Indian move had 
certainly helped Chinese to give the impression that their political turmoil 
between radicals and moderates, at the home front had made no differences to 
the basic foreign policy pursuits. 
Soon after the establishment of ambassadorial level relations, a series of 
interactions in the form of exchange of visits started taking place. A major 
delegation of non-official led by Wang Bing-Nan visited India of which Prof J. 
Xianlin, Vice-President of Beijing University was a member. This was 
followed by a visit of Prof Huang Ki-Chuan, director of the Institute of South 
Asian Studies. He visited several centres of advanced studies in India. These 
two visits started a process of gradual establishment of non-official contacts 
between the two countries.^° The Parliamentary Consultative Committee on 
External Affairs lauded the process of normalisation on December 22. In 1976 
there was a slight change in the Chinese stand over the Kashmir issue.^' 
The year 1976 marked a turning point in China's destiny. With the death 
during that year of the three great leader of the Chinese Revolution - Chou 
En-Lai, Chu Teh, Mao Tse-Tung a new set of leader with new convictions 
came to the force. And with this, came new wave of liberalism in the 
economic, political and social fields commenced. China has embarked upon an 
ambitious modernisation programme and is now opening itself out increasingly 
to the outside world. Contacts at the official and unofficial levels have 
intensified and the outlook for trade with India has improved to a considerable 
degree.^^ 
A year after the resumption of fiill diplomatic relations the Congress 
Party was voted out of office and the Janata Party came to power in March 
1977 and Mr. Morarji Desai became the new Prime Minister. Reacting to the 
political development, Chinese Prime Minister Hua Guofeng sent a 
congratulatory message to his new Indian counterpart, Morarji Desai and hope 
that, "the traditional friendship between Peoples of China and India would 
develop". There was obvious optimism in China about a reorientation in India's 
foreign policy at this juncture.^^ During the Janata government's period the 
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continuity of the normalisation process never slackened due to the lack of 
initiative. On March 11, Prime Minister Morarji Desai and Chairman Foreign 
Relations Committee, Wang Bing Nan discussed the border dispute in 
New Delhi. The Chinese delegation conveyed their intentions regarding a 
peaceful solution to the dispute. Moreover Yu Chu highlighted this 
consideration to Barun Sen Gupta, an Indian journalist during a visit to Beijing 
in June 1911 !''^ External Affairs Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, said that the 
Indian ships were allowed to visit Chinese ports so as to step up bilateral trade. 
Despite cordial relations between the Asian giants, the Tibetan factors 
continued to be an irritant between them. On July 22, the Tibetan religious 
leader, Dalai Lama met Prime Minister Morarji Desai and Defence Minister, 
Jagjivan Ram at New Delhi. The meeting was criticised by Chinese 
Charge'd' Affairs, Liu Hsing-fii on August 4. He protested with the Indian 
Government against its leader's meeting the Dalai Lama and accused the 
Government about interfering in Chinese domestic affairs. In response to it, on 
August 6 the Government refuted the Chinese allegation that its parleys with 
the Dalai Lama amounted to interference in Chinese internal affairs. On August 
29, Defence Minister, Jagjivan Ram, who addressed army officers and other 
rank at Fort William, Calcutta, referred to the upswing in relations with China 
said that there were: "positive signs of improvement in our relations with 
China". Otherwise the Janata Government pursued a rigid policy on the border 
dispute. This is evident from Prime Minister Morarji Desai's statement to a 
Japanese newspaper 'Yomiuri Shimbum'. He said: that "our territory is in the 
possession of China. Therefore they have to take the next step. We will respond 
adequately. "^ ^ 
It is important to note, Dr. P.C. Chunder, a Cabinet Rank Minister, 
represented the Indian Government aflter a 16 years gap at the Chinese National 
Day reception in New Delhi on September 30.^ ^ It shows that the Janata 
Government, like its predecessor regime kept up the pace of normalisation. 
When Janata Government inherited a situation from the Congress Government, 
two courses were open to them, one, unless the territorial dispute was settled 
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there should be no contacts with China; two, to remain firm on their territorial 
claims but, at the same time continue to try to normalise relations with China. 
The Janata Government had chosen the second course.^^ China welcomed this 
development for the reason that a party which acted as a proxy of the Soviet 
Union was ousted. The Chinese were more interested in the decline of Soviet 
Union influence in Indian politics. In his first statement Morarji Desai clearly 
stated that his government in following the policy of non aligrmient would be 
completely free to take all foreign policy decisions without being under the 
pressure from any big power. 
Chinese were now hopeful that they would have a fair deal at the hands 
of Desai and they felt encouraged to take the first chance to sound the new 
Prime Minister and see how he react to what they had to say initially. They 
sought to do this through an emissary, the Albanian leader Ceausescu. Morarji 
Desai, told him bluntly that his government would not respond to such 
overtures made by third parties. 'If the Chinese were sincere, let them contact 
me directly' Morarji said.^ ^ 
The Chinese took it seriously and announced to send a high-power 
delegation to India, under the leadership of Mr. Wang Bing Nan. The visit was 
at the instance of the Kotnis Memorial Committee. On March 8, Mr. Bing Nan 
and the Chinese Ambassador Chen Chou-Yuan met the External Affairs 
Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee in New Delhi. He conveyed his 
government's invitation regarding a visit to China.^^ This was the first 
important delegation China has sent to India after the 1962 hostilities. 
Ji Xianlin, the most prominent Indologist in China was among the delegates. 
He had deep understanding about the centuries old history of Sino-Indian 
cultural exchange.^" Mr. Desai clarified all ups and downs which remained 
between India and China and told the delegation that China had done us a great 
harm when we, as friends of China tried to do everything good for it. India has 
been its well wisher since Republic of China came into existence after 1949 
revolution but Chinese behaviour was most of the time subtle and 
unpredictable. Mr. Desai referred Japanese attack of 1937 when India 
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supported it. He said that India was second who gave Republic of China 
recognition in UN. He further said that it was India who pleaded for China's 
permanent seat in Security Council. And by extending so much for China India 
had to face resentment of western countries but it remained firm and 
perseverant on its stand. Mr. Desai desperately said that despite shielding 
China so much what India got in reciprocity was only indifferent behaviour, 
violation at border seizure of 14000 sq km of area and sometimes very harsh 
moves. Lastly he sarcastically said that under these conditions, how could you 
expect us to become friends? 
Wang heard patiently and suggested that the two governments should 
meet and talk over these matters to find an amicable solution of the disputed 
issues.^' Following Wang's visit, many journalists found their way to China. 
But on the other hand, in a statement before the Indian Parliament, Prime 
Minister Morarji Desai said, "We want to have good relations with every one, 
including China. He stated clearly that till the matter relating to our territory in 
Chinese possession is decided, there cannot be full friendship between two 
countries." On April 19, 1978, the then Vice-Foreign Minister of China, Han 
Niang-Lung said in Beijing that though India had not taken any "positive" 
action to improve relations with China the border issue between the two 
government could be frozen and that both sides could discuss other problems.'^ 
The Vice-President of the Chinese National People's Congress Ulanhu said on 
May 29, 1978, that if India had any views on simultaneous pursuit of border 
solution and normalisation of relations, "We would like to discuss them". He 
was confident that a solution would be found. 
BG Verghese, a prominent Indian journalist went to China in June, 1978 
alongwith four other journalists at the invitation of the Chinese Government 
and came back with impression that China was keen to improve relations with 
India. On the other hand India's attitude toward China was that India would 
not go to war with China or use force to solve the boundary question, was clear 
from the Vajpayee's statement of July 20, 1978 in a Parliament. All these steps 
show some positive sign toward normalisation lof relations between the tWo 
countries.''^ \ 
\ ^ - ~ - - - - , / • 
Dr. Subramaniam Swamy's visit to China in SepteiHfeer^'P78, was 
significant - as the first Indian politician to enter China following the 1962 
war. He had discussions on bilateral relations with the Chinese Premier and 
other leaders. The border issue formed the first item for discussions on his 
agenda. A highlight of the visit was Mr. Swamy's meeting with Deng 
Xiaoping. Swamy gives a gist of what the Chinese leader told him. To quote: 
"China is prepared to discuss the border question till we can reach a mutually 
accepted negotiated settlement. In return I think India ought to prepare some 
alternative for the negotiation. We should be prepared to discuss some 
exchanges in Territory. For example why not ask for the Kailash Mansarovar 
portion of Tibet in return for parts of Aksai Chin". Thus this visit was a small 
but sure step forward in the normalization process.^ '* 
On October 6, the Chinese External Affairs Minister, Huang Hua in 
New York said that China was keen on solving all problems with India 
peacefully applying Panchsheel principles.^^ This was the first meeting 
between Foreign Ministers of the two countries since 1960, resulted in an 
agreement from both sides on the need for developing trade and cultural links 
as well as cooperation in the field of science and technology.^^ However, the 
rigidity on the border dispute persisted as evident from Prime Minister Desai's 
statement at a public meeting in Tezpur. He said that the recovery of the Indian 
Territory fi-om China was a prerequisite for good relations with that country. 
The Government of India announced Vajpayee would visit China in October 
1978. The visit, however, had to be cancelled on account of Vajpayee's poor 
health. 
Atal Bihari Vajpayee's China Visit: 
Indian External Affairs Minister Shri A.B. Vajpayee visited China in 
February \2~\%, 1978 where he exchanged views with Chinese leaders on 
normalisation of Sino-Indian relations. It was the highest level visit between 
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the two countries since Chou En-Lai's April 1960 India's visit. It was also the 
first time ever that an Indian External Affairs Minister had gone to China. 
Mr. Vajpayee was accompanied by eight diplomats from the Indian Foreign 
Services including the Foreign Secretary and over 20 journalists." The focus of 
the visit was, on the complex and difficult questions in their relations. 
Mr. Vajpayee held three rounds of talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Huang 
Hua and met Deng Xiaoping, the Vice-Premier and Hua Guofeng, the Premier 
of China. During his discussions with the Chinese leaders, Vajpayee discussed 
the boundary issue, China's support for insurgency in India, Sikkim issue, and 
China's pro-Pakistan stand on Kashmir etc. issues.^^ The Chinese Foreign 
Minister, Huang Hua described Vajpayee's visit as significant in Sino-Indian 
relations and as a good beginning for further strengthening friendly relations. 
He recalled the past contacts between the people of the two countries who now 
under new dispensation wanted to grow more friendly towards each other. 
In his meeting with Foreign Minister Huang Hua, Vajpayee referred 
to China's support to Naga and Mizo insurgents in northeast region. 
He received satisfactory assurance for stopping such support from the Chinese 
government.^' While on the other hand Chinese referred to the presence and 
activities of the Dalai Lama, Vajpayee gave them two-fold assurance. Firstly, 
if the conditions were suitable for his return to Tibet, India would not stand in 
the way and secondly, the Dalai Lama was being extended the courtesy due to 
the head of a religion. None of his followers was allowed to carry on any 
political activities. In this context Vajpayee made a fresh suggestion that if the 
Chinese authorities would extend adequate facilities to Indian pilgrims to visit 
Kailash and Mansarover, it would be regarded as a symbol of China's desire to 
improve relations with India. The Chinese did not seem to have given any 
serious thought to this problem as in their view, this as well as other matters of 
inter-border contacts would come for review at a proper time. 
Vajpayee was quite candid in telling the Chinese that India would have 
no objection to China having bilateral relations with Pakistan but he warned 
that if these relations adversely affected our legitimate interest it would surely 
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impeded the prospects of improvement of Sino-Indian relations. Illustrating his 
point from the example of Kashmir he said that non-recognition of India's 
legitimate interests in the problem would also retard the progress of cordiality 
between India and China. He assured them that as India was committed to 
solve this issue through bilateral dialogue it would resent outside interference 
in this matter. The Chinese seemed to have understood the implications of 
Vajpayee statement. As subsequent events confirmed, the Chinese became 
more realistic in their approach to this delicate issue in so far as they began to 
say that it was essentially a bilateral issue between the two countries which 
could be immediately solved by negotiations. 
Another issue that Vajpayee took up was about the construction of the 
Karakoram highway through the Pakistan occupied Kashmir. Chinese assured 
him that cooperation with Pakistan in this matter did not imply that they had 
accepted the Pakistani ownership of Kashmir; it was an adhoc arrangement 
subject to the final solution of the Kashmir problem 
During a meeting with Vajpayee on February 14, 1979, Chinese Vice-
Premier, Deng Xiaoping proposed his famous "package deal" for the 
Sino-Indian boundary issue. The so called "package deal" of Deng was swapp-
Eastem Sector for Western Sector.^ •^  He elaborated that India held under its 
control areas with rich natural resources, where as the Chinese held areas were 
not economically useful and also uninhabitable. It would be advisable to have a 
comprehensive solution. He also felt that the only problem between India and 
Chin| was the boundary question and if both countries failed to find a 
resolutipji, it would be left to later generations to deal with. This marked the 
commencement of a gradual development of cooperation in functional fields 
after a break of more than two decades'^ '^  Vajpayee's reply was that this was an 
old ^hinese proposal and that a beginning could be made by trying to tackle 
those areas where there was less dispute. Nevertheless, both sides emphasized 
the importance of maintaining peace and tranquillity all along the Line of 
Actual Control (LAC).^^ Chinese Vice-Premier, Deng said: "we should seek 
common ground while reserving our differences. As for the boundary question, 
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we can solve it though peaceful consultation. This question should not prevent 
us from improving our relations in other fields".^^ He further added, "let us put 
aside the problem on which we have real difference, we can go slow on them, 
meanwhile, let's do some realistic things for development of relations between 
our two countries. China and India are the most populous countries of the 
world, how can we remain unfriendly!" 
The five principles of peaceful co-existence were reaffirmed as the basis 
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of normalisation of bilateral relations and settlement of the border dispute. 
On February 15, Mr. Vajpayee had a 40 minute meeting with Chinese Premier 
Hua Guofeng, where in he invited the latter to visit India. ^ ' Mr. Hua Guofeng 
said more contacts between leaders of China and India will help in deepen 
mutual understanding and friendship. Sino-Indian relations will grow 
splendidly so long as both sides abide by the five principles of peaceful 
co-existence.^*' While Vajpayee was about to leave China, China attacked 
Vietnam. Vajpayee immediately cut short his visit and hurried back home. 
Prime Minister Morarji Desai, on February 18, before Vajpayee returned, 
expressed his profound 'shock and distress' at the out break of hostilities which 
could endanger world peace. It was indeed very odd that China took this action 
when Vajpayee was still on the Chinese soil. 
It was assumed in certain circles that the Chinese action was borne out 
of their suspicion that India was still a client of the Soviet Union and it got 
accentuated, when the Janata government, contrary to Chinese expectations 
continued to pursue cordial relations with the Soviet Union. India's support to 
Vietnam's national aspirations for its international status may have also 
irritated China. Another reason could be that the attack served as a warning of 
similar treatment to be meted out to any state trying to challenge China 
particularly those states which China believed were backed by the Soviet 
Union. 
It was a warning to India not to rely too much on the support of the 
Soviet Union. India was supposed to keep in view that China was a dominant 
power in Asia and that India could not exceed the assumed status that it had 
acquired with the backing of the Soviet Union. It also impHed that China would 
not accept any pre-conditions for normalisation. However, a more charitable 
interpretation could be that it was a mere coincidence that they had to take that 
punitive action against Vietnam, they had already made preparations for it 
earlier and they could not delay it. Whatever be the reason, it did a great harm 
to the ongoing political dialogue that had happily begun between the two 
countries after a couple of decades.^' The progress toward normalisation has 
slowed down considerably. 
The Sino-Indian relations existing since 1962 underwent a sea-change, 
namely, an acknowledgement that the boundary dispute would take time to 
resolve.'^ Both side realised that some of the problems between the two 
countries are complex and difficult and it might not be possible to solve them 
in just one or two visits. They agreed, however, that the talks were useful and 
in the nature of 'a preliminary and exploratory exchange of views", which 
would provide the basis for resolving tne boundary question.'"' 
It was not, however, the expectation on either side that Vajpayee's visit 
to Beijing can resolve this difficult problem which concerns differences 
between the two countries involving approximately 50,000 square miles. But 
the willingness on both sides to recognise the question as crucial to the 
establishment of better relations between the two countries is, in itself, a 
significant step forward.''' 
On the political front there has been limit progress towards 
normalisation of relations. Leaders of the two countries have made known 
their intention to improve ties but there has not been a tangible breakthrough in 
1970s. Janata Party's foreign policy was never successful simply because it 
lacked political stability as factionalism prevailed among its members. As a 
result such a state of affairs was not conducive to negotiations with China. 
Eventually the Janata regime ended on July 1979 and the Congress Party came 
back to power.'^ 
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In a minute survey of Sino-Indian relations during 1970s - few points 
emerge form discussion. In beginning or early 1970s the process from both the 
sides is slow but a good beginning was heralded. Gradually mutual talks and 
conferences brought intensity in the efforts and feeling to bring peace and 
permanent solution. But the main problem that hindered the entire scene - was 
the border, lack of political will or preparation of'mind set' of decision making 
authorities from both the sides, change of leadership, domestic problems, 
industrialization, population explosion change in international system, national 
interest and Chinese aggression on Vietnam during Vajpayee's visit are some 
of the factors responsible for retarding the forwarding good relations between 
India and China. However, much was still to be achieved, because it was only 
the beginning of negotiated settlement and not a complete compromise of co-
existence or any boundary solution. 
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Chapter-IV 
Signs of Flexibility - Eight Rounds of Talks 
The first efforts began to attempt a restoration of normalcy in the 1970s. 
The boundary question has become a serious hindrance, the Chinese have 
maintained that since the differences on the border are so wide and the two 
positions so intractable, the best thing to do is leave the border dispute to one 
side and get along with other things. India has insisted that normalcy is not 
possible without progress on the border issue since it was the border, which 
created the abnormalcy in the first place. Atal Behari Vajpayee took the 
initiative by going to China, and then Indira Gandhi continued the process 
through annual consultations.' 
Though the border question was mentioned at several meetings between 
the Indian and Chinese leaders from the 1970s, concrete bilateral talks on its 
settlement were inifiated only in the early 1980s.^ The Congress Party regained 
the reins of power in January 1980, as the Janata government was voted out of 
the office. Mrs. Indira Gandhi, as the new Prime Minister again took an 
immense interest in normalising relations with China.^ By the beginning 
of 1980's, China was moving away from the old rigidities of Maoist era. 
The Chinese Premier, Hua Guofeng, on January 15, 1980 extended warm 
congratulations to Mrs. Gandhi, on her assumption of the office of 
Premiership.'' He said that, "we are happy to see that the relations between 
China and India have improved and developed over the last few years and we 
hope that this trend will continue to develop in the interest of peace and 
stability in Asia". This showed that both India and China wanted to reduce the 
tensions. 
For instance, the Presidential Address to Parliament on January 23, 1980 
indicated the Government's keenness "to discuss all issues with China, 
including the boundary question, in search of peaceful solution based on 
equality".^ Further, on Januar>' 26, 1980, Huang Hua the Chinese Foreign 
Minister attended India's Republic Day celebration at the Indian embassy in 
Beijing. This was the first time in 20 years that the Chinese Foreign Minister 
had graced the annual event. Hua stressed that, "the present turbulent and tense 
international situation places a greater obligation on both China and India to 
promote mutual understanding and cooperation". 
The turbulent and tense international situation, which the Chinese 
Foreign Minister was referring to started in the late 1970s; the Iranian and 
Afghan revolutions followed by the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan; 
disturbed the existing strategic balance in West Asia and South Asia. 
The Soviet Union also succeeded in bringing Indo-China within its sphere of 
influence with Vietnam as its ally. India and China differed considerably on the 
issues of Afghanistan and Vietnam's role in Cambodia. 
Yet both the countries had been realising for some time the need to get 
away from a conflictual relationship and to reduce the tensions. Mrs. Gandhi 
soon realised that any policy of leaning towards the Soviet Union would not 
serve India's Icng-term security interests. She wanted to reap the benefit of 
greater diplomatic flexibility by expanding India's ties with the United States, 
and by seeking improved relations with China. They also agreed that continued 
efforts to normalise Sino-Indian relations would help to maintain the strategic 
balance of the big powers in South Asia. China, on its part, realised that the 
more it denounced India, the closer it would push towards the Soviet Union. 
A tactical approach of softening India and there by diminishing Indo-Soviet 
relationship could be more fruitful. With the emergence of Deng Xiaoping as 
the supreme leader of China and launching of modernisation, this thinking was 
in consonance with the general thrust of economics taking precedence over 
politics. 
China required a peaceful international environment, with emphasis on 
good relations with its neighbouring countries for successfully carrying out 
their economic reforms.^ From the above discussion it was clear that both India 
and China were unanimous in their desire to improve relation. 
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On March 4, 1980 Mr Shen Jian was appointed as the new ambassador 
of China. Welcoming the new ambassador. President of India, Sanjiva Reddy 
hopefully said that the process of normalisation, initiated by the restoration of 
relations between India and China to the level of ambassador in 1976, would 
continue. In this connection Shen Jiein the new ambassador of China said that 
"We firmly believe that through our joint efforts Sino-Indian relations will 
further grow under the guidance of the five principles". * 
On April 8, Prime Minister Mrs Gandhi had met Hua Guofeng the 
Chinese Premier in Belgrade and exchanged views about further promotion of 
bilateral relations. The Chinese Premier and Mrs. Gandhi had gone to Belgrade 
for the funeral of Marshal Tito.^ This was the first meeting at the Prime 
Minister level between the two coimtries since Chou En-Lai's visit to India in 
1960 and both the leaders agreed to continue with the process of improving 
relations. Both sides stressed that better Sino-Indian relations were essential to 
peace and stability in Asia and there was need for mutual consultations as 
also avoidance of confrontation for an amicable solution of their bilateral 
problems.'" 
Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua had a 30-minute meeting with 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in Salisbury (Zimbabwe) on April 18, where he 
said, that the outstanding issues between the two countries need not stand in the 
way of promoting friendly relations and cooperation. Mr. Huang Hua told 
Mrs Gandhi that past issue could be settled in due course; in the meantime the 
two countries could exchange views and understand each other better. 
And there was no Sino-Indian problem, which cannot be solved by negotiation. 
The Prime Minister told that her discussions with Mr. Huang were of a general 
nature and the border question did not came up in their way of negotiation. 
The External Affairs Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao in Parliamentary 
consultative committee on May 16 said that the task of carrying Sino-Indian 
relation would be tackled with great care. He observed that the core of cordial 
Sino-Indian relations exists in tracing out a permanent and expeditious solution 
to the boundary problem. He further explained that the friendship between 
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India and Soviet Union should not cast any shadow in the process of 
normalisation between India and China. Mr Rao enunciated that the national 
interest of any country is the most important motive to be achieved. Having a 
non-aligned foundation, India maintains the pursuit of its interest and hence, 
the Indian foreign policy would not go at the cost of any country. He concluded 
that India and China should be in position to discuss all their important 
problems including boundary dispute in a very professional manner. 
Subsequently, after one month Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Han Nianlong said at a banquet given in Beijing on Jime 20, 1980 in honour of 
Indian External Affairs Secretary (East) Eric Gonsalves that India and China, 
as the two big nations in Asia have a responsibility to safeguard peace in Asia 
and the world. The co-existence between India and China is a sincere desire of 
all peace loving people. Mr Gonsalves had a two hours discussion with Chinese 
Foreign Minister Huang Hua on bilateral and internal issues. Mr. Gonsalves 
gave formal invitation to Mr. Huang, to visit India. He said that his visit to 
Beijing is part of an effort to remove the 'abnormal state of affairs' between the 
two countries.'^ Boundary issues can be solved with mutual 'understanding and 
concessions' but even before that, the two sides should develop friendly 
cooperation, 'when there is so much global unrest'. According to Chinese news 
agency Xinliua, China had never asked for the return of all the territory 
illegally incorporated into India by the old colonialists. There are no conflicts 
of 'fundamental interest' between China and India.''' The fact that China and 
India maintain direct contact and dialogue shows that both Governments are 
willing to restore good state-to-state relations as soon as possible and are now 
moving toward this goal.'^ 
Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping said on June 21, 1980, that the 
border problem between India and China can be solved by a package deal 
China's suggestion of 'package deal' on the border dispute based on the Line 
of Actual Control (LAC) could be the beginning of a major initiative to solve 
the problem. This is no longer a signal to resume dialogue, but a diplomatic 
initiative. The "Package Proposar' was very similar to an earlier abortive 
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proposal that Premier Chou En-Lai offered tlie Indian Government in 1960. 
It was formally spelt out in an editorial published in New China News Agency 
in June 1980. Based on actual control of border lines the editorial urged both 
countries to make concessions-China in Arunachal area and India in Ladakh 
area. Acceptance of this proposal according to Deng, would give legal 
recognition by China to the McMahon line in the Eastern Sector and in return 
India should recognise the status quo in the Western Sector. In exchange 
China wanted India to give up its claim on 13,000 square miles in Aksai Chin 
area around Ladakh. Thus, China's proposal has endorsed the post 1962 war 
status quo, with minor modifications. To quote Deng's interview which 
pertains to the package proposal that he made: for instance in the Eastern 
Sector, we can recognise the existing status quo, I mean the so-called 
McMahon line? This was left over from history but in the Western Sector, the 
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Indian government should also recognise the existing status quo. 
According to Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leaders 
have the same 'serious, positive and active' attitude towards improving 
relations with India as Mrs Indira Gandhi has. In an interview to the editor of 
Delhi's defence !, •'/'krant on July 20, Mr Deng wanted to convey the 
message to India's Prime Minister that there are points of differences between 
the two countries, but they are narrowing.'^ " 
Subsequently, the Chinese formally communicated the same offer to the 
Chairman of the Policy Planning Committee, Mr G. Parthasarthy in Beijing.'^ ' 
China continued to push for Deng's "package proposal ", while India continued 
to play over cautiously and the border conflict remained unresolved. China had 
repeatedly offered to negotiate concessions along the Eastern Sector of the 
disputed border provided India conceded China's occupation of Aksai Chin. 
But as India thought such concession would be politically controversial there 
was no progress in bilateral negotiations.^ ^ 
The External Affairs Minister recalled that the boundary dispute 
between the two countries is longstanding and complex. After a long time, the 
two governments have only just begun to come to grips with it once more. 
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This itself is a positive step. India on its part hoped to settle the border question 
in a spirit of the five principles of peaceful co-existence consistent with the 
national honour and interest of both sides on the basis of equality. 
However the package deal was not acceptable to India because it sought 
to legitimise Chinese occupation of territory in western sector between 
1959-1962 without offering any territorial compensation to India. Therefore, 
acceptance of the deal was seen as being tantamount to letting the Chinese 
retain the territorial gains of the aggression of 1962. '^' Reacting calmly to 
proposal, the External Affairs Minister, P V Narasimha Rao submitted in Lok 
Sabha on July 1980 that there were more "effective options" than the "package 
deal"^^ and averred that India rejected the Chinese proposition regarding 
concessions in the eastern sector. 
External events, however, continued to impinge on any attempt to 
improve relations Foreign Ministers Huang Hua, who had been scheduled to 
visit India later in 1980, delayed his visit because of Indian recognition of the 
Vietnamese-supported Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea. Major initiatives 
were taken in 1980 towards normalisation of Sino-Indian border. But no 
positive and concrete result came out because it sought to legitimise Chinese 
occupation of territory in the western sector between 1959-1962 without 
offering any territorial compensation to India. China was gaining from the 
proposal but India was not, as it was of the same nature of previous proposal 
offered by Premier Chou En-Lai to the Indian Government in 1960. 
Endeavours to reach a thaw on border dispute and to improve 
Sino-Indian relations have presently entered a crucial and delicate phase. After 
a lapse of two decades, in 1981 the two sides have again tried to pedal the 
jammed bicycle of their frozen but central issue, the border between the two on 
the lubrication provided by mutual cooperation and exchange on other arenas.'^ ^ 
The Indian Government sent Dr. Subramaniam Swamy Janta Party M.P. 
to China for talks with the Chinese leadership on April 8, 1981.^^ In response, 
the government wanted to get a clear picture of the Chinese mind on this score 
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before formalising visit."^ ^ And this enabled Dr. Swamy to undertake another 
visit to China where he had an extended interview with Mr Deng. In the course 
of this interview Mr. Deng spoke about normalisation and said that the Sino-
Indian border problems could be solved by 'repeated discussion'. ^° 
Another important outcome of this interview pertains to the Sikkim 
issue that had proved to be an important irritant between India and China. 
Mr. Deng said that, "on Sikkim our position is very clear. We made an official 
statement at the time of armexation. We disapprove because it is contrary both 
to international norms and to morality. We will not change our positions. 
We can never approve of the annexation, however, we have also said that we 
will not mention or make use of the subject when discussing Sino-Indian 
relations again or make use of this subject in discussing the improvement of 
Sino-Indian relations. 
So Sikkim as an irritant ceased to have further value in bilateral 
relations. This was a very significant statement that indicated China was 
reconciled to the incorporation of Sikkim into the Indian Union. Mr. Deng also 
spoke about Sino -Indian military equation. He said: we can never be a threat 
to you nor do we think you a threat to us even if you were to take part of 
Tibet that would not be a threat to China. It is not India by itself that could be a 
threat. What we consider a danger is that some other force may take a hand 
there.^' 
Referring to India as the "elder brother of the sub-continent", China had 
decided to send its Foreign Minister, Mr. Huang Hua, to India shortly to 
discuss improving relations.^^ Another major step in this direction was the visit 
of Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister, Huang Hua to India on June 26, 1981. 
It was the first important visit to India by a Chinese leader since the late 
Premier Chou En-Lai's visit in 1960. This was the return visit to Vajpayee's 
1979 China visit. During his New Delhi visit, Huang Hua had extensive talks 
with Indian leaders on international and bilateral issues, including the border 
issue. They agreed that friendly and sincere talks would promote mutual 
understanding reduce differences and increase points of mutual agreement.^^ 
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China agreed that the border was a vital issue that could not be just shelved but 
had to be resolved, and both sides agreed that their officials should resume the 
talks on the vexed issue. In a press conference in New Delhi on June 28, 1981, 
Huang Hua proposed that pending a settlement the two sides should maintain 
the status quo on the borders and maintain tranquillity in the border areas. 
Hua stated both sides should actively promote contacts and cooperation 
in all domains. He further stated that, "both China and India are big countries 
in Asia and both are developing countries. China is willing to develop friendly 
contacts with India in numerous areas and to study and learn from each 
other. "^ ^ 
A tangible gain ensuing from the visit was the decision to hold official 
level talks regarding both 'bilateral problems and bilateral exchanges', which 
apparently followed an understanding between the two sides that border 
settlement, although central to fiill normalisation of relations, need not be made 
a precondition for improvement in relations in other areas. Thus the process of 
normalisation was underway but it was a long and tortuous one. His visit 
opened a new chapter in Sino-Indian relations, as both sides agreed to the 
establishment of an annual dialogue at the level of vice-ministers alternatively 
in Beijing and New Delhi.^^ 
As a follow up to this visit Indian and Chinese officials started working 
from September 1981 towards their first official meeting to discuss the border 
issue. Mr Rao stated in writing to Parliament that approximately 14,500 square 
miles of Indian territory in Ladakh was now in Chinese possession due to 
Sino-Pak collusion in 1964." In October 1981, the Chinese Press highlighted 
the border dispute through the denial of a visa to Mr. T L Rajkumar, Speaker of 
the Arunachal Pradesh Assembly to an Asian Conference of Parliamentarians 
on Population and Development. China's official news agency stated that the, 
"so-called Amnachal Pradesh had been set up in the Chinese territory of some 
90,000 square km south of the McMahon Line in the Eastern sector of the 
Sino-Indian border which India has illegally occupied since the early 1950s."^^ 
Since Arunachal was within this territory, it was objectionable to China. 
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In order to avoid the impasse, China issued visa on a separate paper rather than 
the Indian Passport. China further reminded India that the issuance of visa to 
this Arunachah in a separate paper should not be construed as China's 
acceptance to "Arunachal Pradesh" and change in China's position on 
Sino-Indian boundary. Another move that irked China was when 205 Indian 
Parliamentarians sent congratulatory message to Taiwan on October 10, at the 
occasion of anniversary of the establishment of the Republic of China. 
Side by side the mutual understanding was further enhanced when 
Mrs Gandhi met Chinese Premier, Zhao Ziyang at Cancun in Mexico on 
October 28, 1981. The meeting with the Chinese Premier had given Indira 
Gandhi an opportunity to resume the dialogue with China, which seems to have 
slowed down. Reiterations of respective border claims do not contribute 
anything to the betterment of relations. The time has come for India to decide 
what it wants to make of the fiiture of Sino-Indian relations. Cancun meeting 
had opened a new chapter in Sino-Indian relations.'*'' There could be no doubt 
that a qualitatively different step has been taken towards the resolution of the 
border dispute. 
It is well known fact that the border problem between India and China 
was so complex and longstanding it is not possible to solve the problem in one 
or two meetings. Many initiatives had been taken from time to time from 
1962-onward to resolve the dispute. But due to certain reasons both sides could 
not reach at the proper solution. The year 1981 considered to be the most 
important in the history of Sino-Indian relations because from that year onward 
both countries have decided to have official level talks on the border 
negotiation annually at the vice-minister level alternatively in Beijing and New 
Delhi. 
The First Round of Border Negotiation: 
The first Round of Sino-Indian border talks after the 1962 conflict, were 
held in Beijing from December 10-14, 1981.'" The Indian delegation included 
Eric Gonsalves, Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Ranjit 
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Sethi, Joint Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, G.N. Rao, Indian 
Ambassador to Mongolia, Manorama Bhalla, Secretary in the Ministry of 
Commerce, and two other officials. The Chinese delegation composed of Han 
Nianlong, Vice Foreign Minister in lieu of Huang Hua, the Foreign Minister, 
Chen Zhaoyuan, Director of Second Asian Department in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ding Gu, Director of Second Department 
of Commission for Cultural Relations with foreign countries.'*^ The talks 
consisted of three plenary sessions and of subgroup meetings devoted to 
boundary issues, trade and economic cooperation, cultural exchanges and 
science and technology.''^ 
A lot of groundwork had been done before the process of negotiations. 
On account of this it was imperative for the two delegations to evolve the 
agenda and decide on the nature of modalities to conduct their dialogue. It 
should be borne in mind that this participant delegation was not vested with 
any "political authority." They only had recommendatory powers and could not 
independently take decisions. As a result the delegations would only forward 
suggestions to their governments for further action. 
No progress was made in narrowing difference on border questions; 
rather, both parties were content to restate previously enunciated positions. 
China expressed its willingness to conclude a comprehensive agreement, 
involving China's recognition of the McMahon line as the Eastern Sector 
boimdary and India's surrender of claims to the Aksai Chin. India considered 
this arrangement unacceptable.''^ 
India then suggested that the 1962 Colombo Proposals served as a 
starting point for negotiations. The Colombo Proposals, formulated by six non-
aligned Asian and African states contained the following elements; China 
should withdraw form the western sector, this area to become a demilitarised 
zone pending a final solution in east, India and Chinese forces could be 
positioned along the McMahon Line except for the Thagla Ridge and Longju 
areas where lines of control would be settled in future discussion.*^ But China 
declared the Colombo Proposals outdated. China rejected this and mooted her 
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own proposal of "mutual understanding and accommodation" and "package 
deal" that was not acceptable to India. 
India then proposed sector-by-sector approach, as it was apprehensive 
that China might recognise the McMahon Line. The Indian side was of the 
view that once the legality of McMahon Line was ascertained China would 
make flirther concessions in the western sector. This approach of India 
according to Wang, was erroneous and overemphasised India's unilateral 
interests.'*'' 
Problems in Negotiated Settlement of 1981 border talks: 
From the above discussion this can concluded that despite the efforts 
being made by both the sides no concrete solution to the border problem could 
be achieved because of their differences and adamant approaches. Discussions 
were made on general principles and not on the actual physical, cartographic, 
watershed problems in the several sectors. According to a senior Indian official 
closely connected with this round, the Chinese did not appear interested in 
turning it into anything more than a propaganda exercise. 
It was also felt that Chinese proposed package would makes Chinese 
gains on border through the use of force-legal. So, it was one sided which 
favoured Chinese interests only. Additionally, there was a historical problem 
associated with this proposal, as in many ways, it was having the same text 
which was proposed by Chou En-Lai in 1960. It had been rejected at that time 
because of Chinese claims to significant portions of land claimed by India. 
The intense nostalgia of the humiliating defeat inflicted on India by China in 
1962 had strongly tinged their perception.'*^ There were some of the reasons 
that stood in their way while negotiating border problem. 
Prospects: 
On the other hand it resulted in a bipartite agreement to continue 
contracts, pursue efforts to resolve their differences on boundary dispute. They 
re-affirmed to strengthen friendship and work out programmes for further 
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exchanges in other fields.^" Both sides adopted a, 'positive attitude', '^ which 
was conducive and mutually beneficial to further development of relations 
between the two countries. There was a definite air of frank and friendly 
exchange of views on boundary issue. The differences were obvious and well 
known and several rounds of concentrated discussions were still required to 
iron them out." During the December talks amicable atmosphere prevailed. 
Reporting the matter, the Chinese official news agency Xinhu quoted 
Huang Hua as saying "the talks which the Chinese and Indian officials are now 
holding on the boundary and other bilateral issues-will surely have a positive 
influence of furtherance of friendly and cooperative relations between the two 
countries. "^ "^  Despite wide differences on the border issue it continues to be the 
major bone of contention; its solution shall be beneficial to the strengthening of 
peace and stability in Asia and the world."^'' Deng Xiaoping maintained that the 
talks were "extremely favourable". 
No major change, which influenced the negotiation, has been India's 
withdrawal of its precondition that a border settlement must precede the 
improvement of bilateral relations. Of course, the Indian side continued to 
maintain that normalisation would not be complete without a border 
agreement.^^ In other words, while continuing cooperation in various fields; a 
solution to the border dispute should be explored as a prerequisite to a full 
normalisation of relations. In a way, this realisation is a measure of success for 
the Chinese side that has been arguing that pending the resolution of the border 
dispute both sides should expand their understanding and cooperation in other 
areas as well. For the Indian side, despite the disperse nature of dialogue with 
China, resolution of the border dispute remained the 'central' issue of the 
normalisation process.^^ 
There was a mood of relaxation and apparent willingness on both sides 
to improve relations in other sectors, economic, technological and multilateral, 
without insisting on a period bound resolution of the border dispute in practice, 
though certainly not in theory. Negotiations were thus going on at a 
snail's pace." The External Affairs Minister PV Narasimha Rao admitted in 
99 
Parliament that despite the progress in official level talks in Beijing, still 
obvious and wide differences remained between India and China on the 
territorial issue. He accepted that it was beyond expectation that a substantive 
progress could be made in the first round but it was quite a positive step in last 
twenty years.^^ He further added that the complete normalisation of ties was 
possible only if complete resolutions and stability is maintained in all fields by 
both India and China. It was anticipated that India was considering to take the 
matter forward.^" The first round ended without accomplishing much beyond 
agreeing to meet again. 
The Second Round of Border Negotiation: 
The second round of talks on border was held from May 17 to 20, 1982 
at New Delhi. The Chinese delegation had ten members led by Fu Hua, the 
Vice Foreign Minister and head of the Asian affairs in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. India reappointed Eric Gonsalves as the head of the Indian delegation. 
At this stage the two delegations had set up four working groups to deal with 
the specific issue. While one group dealt exclusively with the border dispute, 
the other three explored the possibilities to further cooperation in science and 
technology, cultural affairs and property and assets. Yet the thrust of the 
diplomatic dialogue was to deal "with the boundary question as the central 
issue" as the delegations leaders Mr Eric Gonsalves and Mr. Fu Hua pointed 
out.^' 
The leader of the Chinese delegation, Fu Hua emphasized the need to 
expand cooperation in scientific, technical and cultural fields. The Indian side 
clarified New Delhi's bargaining posture on a number of points the 
development of Sino-Indian relations in such fields as reciprocal trade would 
be severely inhibited by absence of progress in the border talks; India regarded 
the McMahon line as the boundary in the Eastern sector; and India's 
incorporation of Sikkim was not subject to debate.^^ It should be noted that 
Beijing does not consider Sikkim to be an integral part of India. Nevertheless, 
Sikkim's border with Tibet is the only Sino-Indian frontier defined by treaty-
namely, the Anglo-Chinese agreement of 1890. 
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The May 1982 discussions were structured along the lines of the Beijing 
round. China again stressed the need for a comprehensive settlement 
transforming existing lines of control into permanent boundaries. India on its 
part, called for a sector by sector approach. The Chinese side proposed five 
principles as the basis for settling the border problem and Indians came 
out with six working propositions, including besides general principles, some 
specific procedural and preliminary steps.^ "* China suggested that boundary 
definition should rest on the following concepts: equality, friendly 
consultations, mutual understanding and accommodation, a fair and reasonable 
settlement; and a comprehensive solution. India, in turn submitted the 
following working propositions-a solution must be found as soon as possible, 
the solution should be just, taking into account the legitimate interests of both 
sides, a commonly agreed upon approach and basis for negotiations should be 
found, the proposals advanced by either side, as constituting an approach to the 
problem should be considered by the other. It was also held that it was 
necessary to consider steps to create a propitious atmosphere; and efforts 
should be made to settle the border issue in each aspects of each sector. ^ 
The talks lasted for four days and views were exchanged in a "'ft'ee and 
frank" manner on "wide ranging" issues, there still persisted "wide basic 
differences" on the resolution of the border dispute. However, according to an 
Indian official spokesman, the differences on the boundary dispute have to 
some extent narrowed and eliminated. The spokesman further elaborated that 
there was a difference of opinion between the Chinese and Indian positions in 
every sector of the boundary. And, there was a dispute in respect of all the 
three sectors. If the boundary issue had to be settled in its entirety, according to 
him, all disputes had to be resolved.^^ In other words, the Chinese position on 
"comprehensive" solution to the border dispute is not possible, as problems in 
each sector have to be solved first. The Indian side argued that swapping of 
territories by both countries could hardly bring about an "equitable and 
honourable settlement. "^ ^ 
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The talks ended almost in the same manner as the talks in Beijing in 
December, 1981-with each side trying to explore the others fall back position 
without really disclosing how it would prefer to solve the problem itself 
Problems in Negotiated Settlement of 1982 border talks: 
Delegations from both the sides show their willingness to resolve the 
boundary question. But their efforts were eclipsed by the lack of political 
direction to both the delegations for making major advances on known but 
irreconcilable positions of the two countries.^^ No clear cut definition was 
available for the comprehensive settlement, the Chinese were mentioning 
without spelling it out. The Indian delegation, on its part, was equally cautious 
in its approach and avoided coming forward with its plan to resolve the dispute. 
The thrust of the Indian case is that 'package plan'- which leaves Aksai Chin 
and other areas in the western sector with the Chinese, is not acceptable to 
Indian. Moreover, a solution to the border problem has to be found beyond the 
'package plan' and on that basis whatever belongs to India, should be returned 
to it. There were differences of views on finding out which place of territory is 
whose, was the question dogging between the two Governments at the end of 
the Delhi talks^''. On account of the above hindrances the progress on 
negotiated settlement process remained slow and halting. 
Progress in other Areas: 
The working groups on culture and science and technology at the May 
1982 meeting, made considerable progress in expanding bilateral ties. It was 
agreed that Indian specialists on oil, railways and agriculture would visit China; 
reciprocal visits to India would be paid by the Chinese delegations. It was 
further agreed to institute a program of cultural cooperation (initially focusing 
on exchange of scholars, dance troupes and film & television materials), 
although no date for inaugurating this program was established.^' Bilateral 
trade was also reviewed during the talks and it was found that the present level 
of $100 million worth of goods exchanged between the two countries was not 
enough. A review of all these fact shows that two coimtries were adopting 
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positive attitude, conducive to further development of relations between the 
two countries. 
The Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi stated quite frankly that, 
"we cannot pretend that bilateral relations between India and China have been 
good. The issue between us are most difficult and even emotional. But nothing 
can be solved without basic good will and effort".^ ^ 
Border situation at various strategic points vis-a-vis May 1982 Talks: 
After the 1962 confrontation, the situation was as follows: 
Eastern Sector: (Arunachal) India has whole territory up to international 
border, except Thangla Ridge and Longju. Tibet has passed out of the Chinese 
control and become a fiiU state. The differences in this sector were marginal 
and easier to sort out. 
Middle Sector: India has area up to the so-called line of actual control except 
for small pockets coinciding with the international border here the chances of 
deciding the conflict through negotiations were evident.^'' This area is in UP 
and Himachal Pradesh. 
Western Sector: This is the most crucial area where there is an evidence of 
wide dispute. The Chinese are in occupation of about 14,500 square miles of 
Indian Territory, which to India's reckoning belongs to India. It is known as 
Aksai Chin and can be subdivided into several components. ^ ^ The Chinese 
claims seem to lack soimd basis as the "shifting claim lines have forceftally 
demonstrated."^^ It is hard to see China relinquishing its claim along the 
road linking Sinkiang and Tibet region Alastair Lamb's conclusion is (though 
it is not the Indian position) "that the Mc Donald Carthy Line 1899 which 
divides Aksai Chin and follows watershed between Indus and Tarin basin 
leaving Xinjiang Tibet road in Chinese control constitute a valid boundary, has 
been contested to legitimise the Chinese occupation of territory in the western 
sector as a result of border war of 1962 even beyond the shifting claim lines of 
1956 and I960"." It is here that the Chinese claim having effective control 
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of the large part of this territory since 1957 to 1959, five month before 
Mr. Chou En-Lai's visit to India to hold negotiations. China had not occupied 
significant sections of the area such as Chip Chap valley, Gulwan Valley, 
Lanakha Damchok area, Chang Chenmo and Panggong area. Kongkala across 
Chang Chenmo River to Damba Guru and Damchok. These areas were 
denominated by the Chinese 'progressive forward' policy from 1960 onwards. 
India thinks that the Chinese withdrawal from the Aksai Chin is essential from 
this area before any meaningftil dialogue. 
Both the countries should endeavour to maintain momentum towards 
achieving an acceptable solution. Complimentarily of interests and recent 
changes in the Chinese leadership should not be over looked. The bogey of 
mutual relations is motored by the crux of all disputes, the border dispute. 
Fresh, concerted and systematic efforts should be enhanced to weed out the 
border muzzle. A political problem of this sort requires political settlement, as 
military resorts will further malign it. Both sides should adopt a measure of 
"cautious optimism" and develop an attitude of mutual respect for their 
strategic and national interests. The need is to devise a better alternative frame 
work. China must look at the border dispute in its totality than offering the 
package, as bait for strengthening its bargaining position in the western sector 
and appearing soft in the eastern sector. 
It should however be noted that the Chinese attitude towards Sikkim, 
Bhutan and Kashmir cannot be brushed aside. The dangers of leaving unsolved 
the seemingly irmocuous territorial issues are now being hammered home to 
the whole world by the grisly goings on in the South Atlantic over the Falk 
lands." It is true that the solution of the highly "complex and emotive problem 
is a long haul" and bound to be slow in progress. The need is to solve it at the 
negotiating table. Initial Chinese stand was that the border dispute can be kept 
aside in the refrigerator whereas more cordiality may be developed in other 
areas. India considered border issue to be crucial and central and the rest of the 
cooperation's as a natural corollary and consequential. India wanted the 
Colombo Proposals to become the basis of negotiated peace, where as China 
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considered it out dated as an aftermath of 1962 debacle/* Consequently China 
was busy forgiving a new policy of pragmatism, balance and independence, 
which was evidenced by its fresh negotiations with the USSR stepping back 
from USA and mending once unlikely fences worldwide. 
China called for a speedy end to its long standing border dispute with 
India and is reported to have through if agreement could not be reached, 
it should not affect their economic, technical and cultural relations. Solution 
of the border problem is imperative for the cause of peace in Asia and world 
as a whole.^° It is the stage when the progress should be made as the decision 
makers cannot continue to evade hard choices. Meaningless pleasant 
expressions cannot solve the crux of the problem. To India, Chinese 
withdrawal from the occupied territory was essential to fashion any meaningful 
settlement. 
Nehru did not realize the strategic significance of Aksai Chin till 1958, 
when the Chinese had built the road. Sino-Indian efforts at normalisation, 
of relationship would remain a dream unless both powers evolve a just 
resolution of Sino-Indian border issue. Lt. Gen. E.A.Vas (Retd) suggested three 
approaches to solve border issue during 1982, firstly to solve it through a court 
of Arbitration whose award should be acceptable to both India and China. 
Secondly, to adopt status quo approach giving an edge to China in Aksai Chin 
in the west to make them accept the McMahon Line as boundary in the east. 
Chinese superiority lies in its military strength and thirdly, to adopt Real Estate 
approach allowing the uninhabited land to them in exchange of Kailash and 
Mansarover. It is not an economically viable area for India, though it is 
strategically important to China as it constitutes a natural buffer between 
Sinkiang and Tibet. Therefore Aksai Chin may be exchanged for Chaumbi 
Valley-the southern dagger of Tibet which adjoins Sikkim, Bengal and 
Bhutan.^' 
The establishment of Sino-Indian Association on August 11, 1982 meant 
that both the countries were committed to improve relations. On October 20, 
1982, KC Pant led a delegation of this association to China and was received 
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by the Chinese Premier Zhao Zijang. Zhao told a delegation of the 
Sino-Indian society that China and India were large Asian countries that could 
exert great impact on the world. The 1950s was a period of good cooperation, 
he said and "the two peoples miss that period". He further stated that, "we will 
never forget the help they rendered to the Chinese people when we were in 
difficulty. We hope the seeds of friendship sown by them will blossom with 
beautiful flowers". Meanwhile, Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders 
received another delegation from the Indian Council of Social Science 
Research led by G. Parthasarthi. They also discussed the border problem and 
gave suggestions to resolve the border issue. All these facts show that both 
countries are moving towards normalization of relation. It marked the second 
time in as many days that a Chinese leader, had issued a strong call for better 
relations with India. On October 22, 1982, Mr. Deng Xiaoping told an Indian 
delegation that there was no mutual threat and the boundary question could be 
solved." 
Three months after the conclusion of the May border talks, China and 
Pakistan signed a protocol regarding opening the border pass of Khunjerab on 
the Karakoram highway to commercial traffic.^ '* The pass connected Aksai 
Chin road built by China on the Indian territory in Ladakh according to Indian 
claims on the one hand and POK-Xingjian road [Sino-Pakistan Friendship 
Highway] on the other. India protested to China, and considered POK-Xingjian 
highway a threat to its security, for the highway gave Pakistan a stronger 
foothold in the territory claimed by India, and also an easy access to China 
should she wish to connive with Pakistan against India. 
Another unpleasant incident was walked out by the Chinese athletes 
during the 1982 Asian Games in New Delhi when a cultural trop from 
Artinachal Pradesh performed at the closing ceremony of the games. Xinhua in 
a review remarked that the "so-called Arunachal Pradesh" was territory 
occupied by India. The Indian move at Asian Games was made to assert India's 
effective sovereignty in the disputed region, and is not acceptable to China. 
China asserted that the Lion and Peacock dance by Arunachal troupe "now 
106 
made the border dispute and international affair and runs counter to the Game's 
principles of strengthening friendship among Asian people".*^ India retaliated 
to such caustic comments by cancelling the visit of its delegation to China that 
was to take part in a function in memory of Kotnis.*^ However, a five-member 
All-China Women Federation delegation visited India on December 18, 1982, 
which improve the atmosphere "spoiled" by the Xinhua's commentary. 
The Third Round of Border Negotiation: 
Against this background, the third round of negotiations was held at 
Beijing from January 29 to February 2, 1983.^ ^ The Indian delegations to the 
talks was led by Mr. K.S. Bajpai, Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs 
and former Indian Ambassador to China. The Chinese delegation was headed 
by Mr. Fu Hao Adviser to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs who also led 
his country's delegation to the second round of talks.^' Delegations from both 
the sides discussed the entire range of bilateral relations between India and 
China, and paid special attention to the various aspects of boundary problem on 
which they had "earnest and frank" exchanges of views. According to Xinhua, 
Chinese news agency, "both sides were positive in their attitude in negotiations 
on the boundary question, and the air was friendly. "^ ^ Inspite of all these good 
efforts, no substantial progress was achieved because of differences in 
positions.^' The familiar position of China offering a fair deal through its 
package and India rejecting it out of hand were made. Later on, the Ministry of 
state of External Affairs stated that, "at the official level talks both sides have 
been able to state their fundamental positions on the boundary question and to 
make an effort to deal with the differences between them, which remain wide. 
They have also been able to work out measures for cooperation in cultural and 
other fields.""^ 
In this round, on the boundary question, an attempt was initiated by the 
two sides to evolve a mutually agreed set of principle to serve as guidelines for 
future discussion. The two delegations had a serious exchange of opinions in 
order to seek common ground. The Chinese delegation put forward a draft 
containing points common to each country's approach to the boundary issue. 
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Both countries, the draft read, agreed on: Adherence to the five principles of 
peaceful co-existence; the desire for an early settlement through consultations 
in a spirit of friendship and equality; the need to consider the history, existing 
conditions and national sentiments of each country; and the maintenance of 
peace on the border before a settlement is reached. India termed the Chinese 
approach positive and constructive. India also put forward a draft that read: 
"China has constantly maintained that the two parties should arrive at a fair, 
reasonable and comprehensive settlement of their boundary issue through 
friendly consultations and in a spirit of mutual understanding". 
As for India's approach to resolve border issue from sector to sector 
basis, a Chinese official stated, "it is in favour of a comprehensive settlement, 
but does not oppose separate discussions on the eastern, middle and western 
sector of the boundary if this may lead to an over all settlement." Though 
both sides adopted a positive attitude during the discussions, no result was 
achieved. 
Problems in Negotiation of Sino-Indian border talks 1983: 
In this series of talks the problems that caused hindrances were almost 
the same as in the previous round of talks as -differences in positions, China-
Pakistan defence pact and India-Pakistan emerging tensions. Additionally, 
some other problems were also there in this round, (i) Political state (condition) 
of Indian home affairs. The leaders were reluctant to raise any issue regarding 
the settlement of dispute. The euphoria of forth-coming Lok Sabha election 
diminished their interest regarding negotiation with China. Mrs. Gandhi was 
particularly disturbed by Beijing's defence relationship with Pakistan, (ii) This 
association led to intensified India and Pakistan tensions, (iii) Economic 
competition between India and China focusing on foreign trade and 
competition for loans from international financial agencies manifested in 
coming years.'^ ^ 
Prospects: - In other domains, the bilateral exchange continued unhindered. 
A Chinese trade delegation led by Zheng Hongye participated in the first trade 
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and economic corporation conference in New Delhi from February 19-20, 
1983. Chu Tunan, member of the National People's Congress (NPC) Standing 
Committee, visited India in March at the invitation of Sino-Indian Association. 
In April M.S. Namboodripad, General Secretary of the CPI (M) visited China 
and was received by the top Chinese leaders including Deng Xiaoping. The 
visit of Namboodripad further affirmed that India no longer viewed China as a 
supporter of the insurgencies in India.^ ^ In June, Indira Gandhi met the Chinese 
Deputy Premier, Yao Li Yin, at the sixth UN Trade conference in Belgrade. 
Chinese Deputy Premier assured Mrs. Gandhi about Chinese Government's 
"positive attitude towards improvement of relations with India". These 
developments were pointer to the fact that the border question should not be 
hindrance in developing relations in the other domains. The chief justice of 
India, Y.V. Chandrachud said in Beijing that India-China must come closer as 
they can together constitute a bastion against in justified aggression. It is very 
apparent that Mrs. Gandhi carmot make any concession to China on border at 
the expense of annoying the Indian rank and file (in the light of forthcoming 
elections). The first two rounds were procedural in nature. Since the third 
round of talks at Beijing, serious and substantial discussions started on the 
sensitive yet pivotal question of boundaries. Hence since February 1983, an 
enhancement of political speculation started occurring at both the centres. 
Since then the twin parties have treaded on the path of meticulously 
cautious approaches. They hovered around the general principles to solve the 
boundary dispute in vague terms. Two crystal clear facts emerged that China 
stuck to its package plan as India harped on its sector to sector approach, which 
implied tackling the boundary in the Middle and the Eastern sector first, to be 
followed by the negotiations in the Western secrtor.^^ 
Prior to the fourth round of talks in New Delhi, the Chinese Foreign 
Minister, Wu Xueqian, was quoted as saying that he did not visualise a "very 
quick solution" to the boundary dispute. He said: "One has to resolutely work 
for a solution of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute and strengthen friendship so 
that both people come closer to each other".^' The Chinese Premier, Zhao 
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Ziyang, in his address to the National People's Congress, stated that 'the Sino-
Indian boundary question left over from the past can without doubt be settled 
through consultations." He ftarther added: "even if it [boundary question] 
cannot be settled for the time being, it should not stand in the way of improving 
our relations"."^** India also shared a similar view. Replying to a debate in the 
Lok Sabha on August 4, 1983, External Affairs Minister Narasimha Rao, while 
referring to the "wide" differences between the two sides in the last three 
rounds of negotiations on the boundary dispute, opposed the packaged deal of 
Deng Xiaoping.'^' 
The Fourth Round of Border talks: 
The fourth round of negotiation was held at New Delhi from October 
24-30, 1983. The Indian delegation was headed by Mr. K.S. Bajpai, Secretary 
(East) in the Ministry of External Affairs. His delegation includes: Mr. A P 
Venkataswaran, the then Indian Ambassador to China; Mr Prem Badhwar, 
Joint Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs; Mr. Ranjit Sethi who was 
heading the China desk at the South Block earlier and was ambassador to 
Malaysia; Mr. C.R. Garekhan who handles foreign affairs at the Prime 
Minister's office and Mr. Alan Nazreth, Secretary, Indian Council of Cultural 
Relations. Other members in the Indian delegation include: Mr. G.N. Rao, 
former ambassador to Mongolia and an old expert on China, and Mr. SN Rao, 
Director Policy Planning and officials form the Commerce Ministry and 
Department of Culture, and Science and Technology. 
The Chinese delegation was led by Mr. Gong Dafie, Vice-Foreign 
Minister, his team include; Mr. Liu Shu Qing, Assistant Foreign Minister and 
Director, Asia Department; Mr. Chen Songlu, Deputy Director, Asia 
Department; Mr. Tu Guowei, Head of office of Sino-Indian Boundary Affairs, 
Asia Department; Mr. Mou Young Mao, Deputy Director, Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade; Mr. Gao Zhengi, Deputy Head of Office of Sino-Indian 
Boundary Affairs; Mr. Zhou Gang, Division Chief, Asia Department; and Mr 
Guan Aimef, Deputy Division Chief Foreign Liaison Bureau, Ministry of 
culture.'"^ 
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During the fourth round of talks both the sides agreed to consider rival 
approaches for resolving the longstanding dispute between the two countries. 
In the light of the third round of talks, India in turn came out with a set of six 
principles of its own for the purpose. 
The Working Principles: The six working Principles for the conduct of 
negotiations of the boundary question were: 
1. A solution must be found as early as possible; 
2. It should be a just solution taking into account the legitimate 
interests of both sides; 
3. Both sides should find a commonly agreed upon approach and 
basis for discussions; 
4. The proposals advanced by either sides as constituting an approach 
to the problem, should be considered by the other; 
5. It is necessary to consider steps to create a propitious atmosphere; 
6. Efforts should be made to settle the border issue in each sector. 
India showed a definite intention to generate an atmosphere of 
cordiality, in order to thrash out solution to their respective problems.'°'' Both 
the sides were serious in working out a solution is evident from the fact that 
they extended the talks by one day. The six-days rotmd of talk centred its 
deliberations on the principles, on their validity, pros and cons of their 
applications, minor and major agreements or disagreements. The differences 
were left for the fifth round of talks to be held in Beijing in 1984. Unanimity 
was that the use of force in acquiring territory shall be avoided and all forth 
coming discussions shall be based upon historical evidence, custom and 
tradition. Different connotations, formulations and meanings were suggested 
for explaining fiirther the implications of the geographical features, watersheds, 
river valleys and mountain passes.'^^ 
A new element introduced in the fourth round of talks related to a 
general exchange of views on the international situation, which proved to be a 
pragmatic expression of views on the international situation, which resulted in 
improving mutual understanding.'°^ As the Ministry of External Affairs, Shri 
P.V. Narasimha Rao stated in Parliament: "On the boundary question, detailed 
discussions were held an attempt was made to evolve a mutually acceptable set 
of principles to serve as guidelines for future discussions. While some common 
ground was covered, differences on certain vital aspects remained which would 
be taken up in the next round of talks. On cooperation and exchanges in other 
aspects of bilateral relations, the ground was prepared for these contacts during 
1984. The exchanges of views on the current world situation were a useful 
exercise resulting in a better understanding of each other's perception of the 
international situation today."'"^ 
Undoubtedly, links between the two nations were picking up showing a 
more accommodative approach towards each others point of view. But so 
far as the border issue was concerned, there was no progress. Since a 
commonality and reconciliation on them could not emerge presently, they 
were also postponed for the next round of talks. The basis parameters of the 
talks included: 
1) Enlarged flexibility in their attitudes in general was the hallmark of 
these talks. An unprejudiced and thorough scrutiny of their agreed 
principles revealed that in China's case it was reiteration of its package 
plan and in India's case it was sector-to-sector approach. 
2) Massive improvement in trade links and programme of further 
exchanges was mooted. They agreed to provide a favoured treatment on 
trade, normalisation process in fields of cultures, science and 
technology. 
3) India produced a comprehensive documentary of the entire region, 
moimting tensions in the Eastern and Western blocks an ensuing entente 
and super power rivalries. 
4) Both had a near unanimity over global economic situations. 
5) The central issue, the boundary question shall not hinder the 
improvement of peripheral bilateral relations. 
6) Agreed to work on the questions of assets and properties of each in the 
other country and have also agreed to consider other proposals in 
details.'°^ 
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The New Delhi talks successfully bore the odium of "reasonable 
progress" towards greater understanding and reconciliation, over so far 
disagreed points throughout the talks, the congenial, cordial, bonhamie 
compact and friendly atmosphere, prevailed which was teeming with optimism 
with a base for further discussions. It left behind a note of encouragement, as 
the meet from the beginning to end, remained peaceful and fruitful. Enormous 
trust and goodwill was generated, which was an obvious hopeful sign. 
The perspectives and perceptions on regional and international scene 
remained poles apart. The talks should not substantially provide the solution of 
boundary tussle, though it loomed large on their heads and wanted preface in 
devising a rough framework, to be adopted in future. Extension of talks by a 
day speaks volumes of their mutual anxiety to narrow, if not close the gap. 
So far as long there was no unanimity over the question as to who has annexed 
how much of whose property? Now that headway was available, the impasse 
was over and the solid ground was prepared for future discussions. After the 
close of talks, Xinhua quoted the Chinese delegation in Delhi as saying, "China 
will go on actually and with good faith seeking further improvement with 
India." China has also said that it was not difficuh to solve the Sino-Indian 
border issue, "given good faith, a realistic attitude, adherence to the five 
principles of peaceful co-existence and continued, patient and relenting efforts 
on both sides."'" 
Fourth round of talks was "most specific" round in the series of talks so 
far held. This was because the two sides generated specific proposals towards a 
solution of the border problem."^ A retrospective analysis of the condemnation 
of use offeree theory implied negotiated settlement in future. It confirmed their 
firm resolve and conviction not to employ invectives or war. Their working 
propositions, principles and guidelines frame the mosaic upon which a future 
meaningful, negotiated settlement can be erected. Even if a decision on future 
modalities and their fruitful understanding constituted a great leap forward, 
the total solution remained a matter of time, involving serious speculation 
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in both the quarters. The approach of these "Asian Giants" in arriving at 
rapprochement in slow, nevertheless decisive and pregnant with hope."^ 
The exchange of visits continued after the talks were over. On January 
1984, Mrs. Gandhi received a Chinese delegation from the Chinese Academy 
of Social Science (CASS) led by Ma Hong, the director of the Academy. 
Mrs. Gandhi told the delegates that she was happy about the improvement in 
Sino-Indian relation, and hoped that these would continue to grow. 
On February 7, Rajiv Gandhi, General Secretary of the Congress (I), received a 
delegation of China Youth Federation led by Hu Jintao, present President of 
China and General Secretary of the CCP. Hu and his entourage stayed in India 
for 11 days. On February 20, Mrs. Gandhi received yet another delegation from 
China that was led by Huang Hua, Deputy of China's NPC Standing 
Committee. Huang, the former Foreign Minister of China, was also received by 
Vice President, J. Hidayatullah and Lok Sabha speaker Balram Jakhar. Trade 
and economic relations were also furthered. 
On August 15, 1984, Abid Hussain, Secretary of Commerce, visited 
China and signed a trade agreement with Lu Xuejian, China's Deputy Minister 
of Foreign Trade. Both countries agreed to accord most favoured nation 
treatment to either side. The agreement was unprecedented in the history of 
India and China after 30 years. The 1954 agreement was somewhat different as 
it primarily concentrated on Indo-Tibetan trade. Commenting on the agreement 
the Financial Express wrote on August 18, 1984 that the conclusion of the trade 
agreement between India and China reflected the "political maturity" of both 
sides, especially when the border problem remained unresolved and differences 
existed on many global and regional problems."'* 
All these facts show positive attitude of both sides. But on the other 
hand a few months before the fifth round of negotiations Chinese leaders told 
visiting West Bengal Chief Minister Jyoti Basu in May 1984 that there was no 
immediate possibility of a settlement of the border dispute."^ Against this back 
ground China published some books that depicted various parts of Indian 
territory as Chinese. The Encyclopaedia of Tibetan History, Red Annals, 
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China's Historical Links-these books have been officially approved and 
pubhshed by the highest authorities-pohtical consultative committee, shows 
many parts of India, Nepal, Bhutan all of Mongolia, the former Soviet Union, 
Myanmar (Burma) and Vietnam as China's territories."*' 
Preparatory Work: 
The Indian Government issued, a categorical statement, teeming with 
conciliatory overtones, which endeavoured to convey to the Chinese in broad 
terms, India's intention to keep the solution of boundary dispute crucial and 
central to the dialogue. The consensus on pertinent and plausible settlement of 
boundary was yet to evolve. 
In almost all political circles and diplomatic channels, there has been a 
lurking suspicion about the significance and validity of the fourth dialogue in 
making any "headway". It has been chiefly because of passivity, rigidity and 
dogmatic outlooks which prevailed during the earlier talks. Larger time was 
consumed by other areas of concern and interest and boundary dispute 
remained at the periphery that is why the talks remained unproductive. In the 
fourth round also concrete solution did not emerge, only their divergent 
attitudes were analysed in greater details. The Chinese were seeking a 
comprehensive solution where as India started from the eastern and then moved 
to the solution in the middle and western sectors. 
Problems: 
Fourth round of talks was "most specific" round in the series of talks so 
far held. But the border problem remained unresolved and differences existed 
on many global and regional problems. Large time was consumed by other 
areas of concern and interest and boundary dispute remained at the peripheries, 
was one of the reason of not having concrete solution. Secondly, the two sides 
differed on how far geographical features should be taken into account in 
negotiation on the boundaiy question. Available information suggests that 
Indian side tried to use the words "salient geographical feature" while the 
Chinese were opposed to the prefix "salienf. Neither side was being dull 
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witted or indulging in sophistry. The probabiHty was that by insisting on the 
word 'salient' the Indians were trying to rub the watershed principle for 
determining the boundary along the Himalayan slopes and the Chinese were 
taking care to prevent the water-shed principle from creeping in. They could 
not go over a large number of general principles because more differences 
would have been thrown up and apparently the two sides felt that these could 
not be resolved in this round. Thirdly, lack of political will i.e. leaders of both 
countries were not ready to make major moves to resolve the boundary 
question in near future because of their countries internal interests, such as 
China was busy with its modernisation plan and mending fence with Soviet 
Union. On the other hand India's Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi was busy, 
planning for next Parliamentary election and was not ready to face opposition 
attack by offering territorial concession to the Chinese to seek a settlement in 
an election year."^ Fourthly, improved Sino-Soviet relations posed a threat to 
Sino-Tndian smooth sailing. 
The Fifth Round of Border Talks: 
The fifth round of border talks was held in Beijing from September 
17-22, 1984.^'' The Chinese delegation was headed by Gong Dafei, adviser to 
the Foreign Ministry and the Indian delegation by Secretary of External Affairs 
Ministry, K. Natwar Singh. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi herself chaired a 
meeting to finalise the brief for Mr. K. Natwar Singh's visit to China.'^° 
The areas covered were trade, economic cooperation cultural and scientific ties 
and the border issue. Four sub-groups emerged: especially to deal with the 
boundary question, cultural cooperation, scientific and technical exchanges and 
question of property and assets. The boundary question, Xinhau said was to be 
"central". This sub-group was headed by Vice-Minister Liu Shu Qing of China 
and Joint Secretary of East Asia, P.K.Budhwar.'^' 
Discussions were held in a "frank, friendly and cordial atmosphere", and 
made some progress "so as to enable substantive discussions on the boundary 
question leading to an early and just settlement".^^^ It was decided at the 
meeting that "substantive" negotiations of the boundary question would be 
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conducted in the next round of talks.'^^ In this round it was reported that 
differences had been narrowed.'^'' What exactly this amounted to was not clear. 
There was a discernible attempt to find words and phrases more acceptable to 
both. Chinese Vice-Premier, Wan Li expressed his hope that before agreement 
was reached on the boundary question, China and India would continue to 
ensure the tranquillity and peace on the border of the two countries. He said the 
fifth round of talks progressed quite well and the two sides had reached 
agreement on several issues. It did not matter that there were still some 
differences existing between the two countries, he said, adding that they could 
be resolved later.'^^ 
Once again there was no solution and the dead lock over the dispute 
persisted.'^^ This is evident from the fact that on September 23, 1984, Defence 
Minister SB. Chavan stated, that "India would make no concessions on Aksai 
Chin or the other Indian territories occupied by China in 1962. Aksai Chin has 
always been a part of Jammu and Kashmir and there is no possibility of making 
any concessions on that front during the border talks." 
On account of this extended stalemate over the border negotiations, Mrs. 
Gandhi sensed the need for a political push to the talks. However, the border 
problem continued to constitute a serious obstacle in ftill development of 
Sino-Indian relations,'^^ and the problem was how to remove it at their earliest. 
The Chinese packages deal envisaged freezing the status quo on the 
Sino-Indian border. India expressed its inability to accept it as it would mean 
allowing China to occupy 14, 000 sq. miles of Indian territory. India insisted on 
sector by sector approach to settle matter, in sector, where no differences 
existed and to open comprehensive dialogue in areas, where differences 
existed. After these talks also no "substantive aspects" of solution to boundary 
dispute appeared in sight.'^' 
Later, the Minister of state for External Affairs, Khurshid Alam Khan 
informed the Parliament that on the boundary question, both sides had directed 
their efforts at evolving a set of common principles that could serve as a basis 
for reaching an understanding on a final settlement. Differences on certain 
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aspects had been narrowed down and both sides had agreed to commence 
substantive discussions on the boundary question during the next round of 
officialievel talks.'^° 
On the other fronts, diplomatic and cultural exchange continued 
as usual. On October 1, 1984 on the occasion of SS"" anniversary of the 
founding of People's Republic of China, Giani Zail Singh, the Indian President 
and Mrs. Gandhi separately congratulated Chinese President, Li Xiannian. 
Sino-Indian friendship association held a grand reception in New Delhi. 
On the other hand Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang in a message to his Indian 
counterpart said, that "India was one of the first countries to established 
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. I am pleased to note 
that in recent years marked progress has been made in relations between our 
two countries, thanks to our joint efforts". 
On the occasion of 115'*' birth anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi, the 
Chinese Association for goodwill, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
and the Institute of South Asian studies of Peking University held a ground 
commemoration meeting on September 27 and paid tribute to the great Indian 
freedom fighter and apostle of peace.'^^ 
The assassination of Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi on October 31, 
1984 "shocked" China.'^'' The Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang paid tribute to 
Mrs. Gandhi for her efforts to improve Sino-Indian relations. He further stated: 
"We hope that the two sides will make efforts to keep this momentum going 
and try to restore the friendly relationship to the level of the 1950s". Prime 
Minister, Rajiv Gandhi received Vice-Premier, Ya Yilin on November 4 and 
reiterated that his Government would continue to follow past policies. He also 
accepted Zhao Ziyang's invitation to visit China.''^ ^ 
Due to efforts from both sides, the process of normalisation of 
Sino-Indian relations was not halted by a change of India's political leadership. 
After Rajiv Gandhi's landslide victory in the Lok Sabha elections at the end 
of December 1984, Beijing again expressed its intention of improving 
relations with India. In his inaugural ceremony held on December 31, 1984 
Rajiv Gandhi spoke in general terms about maintaining friendly relations with 
all the neighbouring countries but with special references to China. In a 
statement made on January 15, 1985, Rajiv expressed satisfaction with the 
achievement made with regard to the 22 year long dispute over the boundary 
but he realised that he had to go a long way before the settlement was effected. 
The Chinese envoy Yao Hin was a little more optimistic. On January 17, 1985 
in a public address Yao extolled the improvement in relations between the two 
countries and assured that there was no conflict on major issues between the 
two sides except for some minor problems that had yet to be solved. In his 
annual address to the Parliament on January 17, 1985, the President stated: 
"Our relations with China have shown improvement. We shall preserve in 
seeking solution to the boundary question".'•^^ 
As regards the pending issues between India and China, Rajiv Gandhi 
wrote: "We sincerely hope that with our common efforts, we will be able to 
resolve the unsettled issues on the basis of five principles of peaceflil 
co-existence and restore and strengthen the historic relationship that existed 
between our two countries".'^^ In June 1985, China proposed that both sides 
should reciprocally reopen consulates in Lhasa, Shanghai, Bombay and 
Calcutta, which had been closed since 1961 and resume the long suspended 
Sino-Indian border trade.''*'' 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was on his part, also keenly interested in 
speeding up the process of normalisation of ties with China. His first meeting 
with the Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang was in New York in October, 1985 
where both had gone to participate in the 40"' anniversary meeting of the 
United Nations.''" Both agreed to resolve the border problem. Zhao stated that 
the border question was a legacy of history, but Mr. Gandhi interjected by 
stating that it was a key point in their relationship. Both the Premiers agreed 
that there was need to push forward the efforts to find a solution and to 
promote friendship between the two countries. Zhao reiterated his country's 
invitation to Rajiv Gandhi to visit China. Premier Gandhi welcomed the 
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suggestion but stated that such a meeting could be fruitful only if solid 
preparatory' work preceded it.'''^ The political trends in mid-eighties suggested 
that there was a desire among the leaders of the two countries to improve their 
relations. 
Problems: 
Indian domestic politics is considered to be one of the problem in 
negotiated settlement of Sino-Indian border talks is evident from the fact, that 
the Chinese position had softened somewhat and according to an Indian official 
closely connected with the talks, the Chinese appeared amenable to settling the 
dispute along the McMahon Line in the eastern sector with minor Indian 
concessions. They also wanted certain pieces of Indian territory in the Aksai 
Chin area led to an abandonment of the proposal. Secondly, Mrs. Gandhi was 
concerned about the forthcoming election in 1985 and did not wish to convey 
the appearance of Indian weakness. Mrs. Gandhi's assassination created a 
political turaioil in government, consequently decision making authorities 
appeared unwilling to take any major decision to resolve the border issues.'"* 
Lastly, the lack of proper preparatory work blocked the progress of 
normalisation of relations. 
The Sixth Round of Border talks: 
The sixth round of border talks was held in New Delhi from November 
4 -11 , 1985. Liu Xiaqing, Deputy Foreign Minister of China led the Chinese 
delegation''*'' and Indian delegation headed by A.P. Venkateswaran. The two 
delegation were divided into four sub-group after the plenary sessions in order 
to deal separately with the border question, cultural, scientific and 
technological cooperation and, finally, the issues relating to properties and 
assets taken over after the 1962 war.'''^ The main sub-group dealt with the 
border dispute. During this round, both sides adopted a sector by sector 
approach and explained their respective positions on the eastern sector of the 
Sino-Indian botrndary.'"*^ The two countries stated their views on the 
substantive issues relating to the eastern sector of the disputed border and 
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decided to discuss in detail, those related to the middle and western sectors in 
the next round. Further, the Chinese also put forward their long-standing claim 
that the traditional boundary line to the east ran well south of the McMahon 
Line that is, the Himalayan crest. Thus, far from the expected breakthrough, 
China introduced a new element by demanding territorial concessions by India 
in the eastern sector.''*^ The Chinese sources stated: "Both sides had substantive 
discussion on the boundary and elaborated their respective position on the 
issue. They agreed that the discussions were useful and conducive to seeking a 
solution to the boundary".'''^ The two sides removed an irritant and bilateral 
relations by resolving the issue of Indian embassy's properly in Beijing seized 
by the Chinese in 1967. The issue of compensation was also sorted out. 
In December 1985 the External Affairs Minister stated in the Rajya 
Sabha that the resolution of the border problem was a prerequisite for a 
complete normalisation of relations. In 1986, relations with China deteriorated. 
There were allegations of Chinese involvements in Pakistan's nuclear program, 
and the Annual Report of the Indian Defence Ministry, which had a new 
section on national security, included a discussion of the security threat from 
the Peoples Republic of China.'^° Political and military signals coming from 
China indicated that the Chinese governments claim on the eastern sector, 
namely areas in Arunachal Pradesh, was not a dead issue.'^ 
China was interested to strike deal with India as her main objective was 
to "break the Indo-Soviet encirclement".'^^ A detailed commentary on May 8, 
1986 on Sino-Indian border issue blamed the policies of British colonial regime 
in India, by creating the so called McMahon Line. The same policy was further 
adopted after Independence. China blamed India for having occupied the 
middle sector area during 1953-54. It reiterated that 2,000 km. long boundary 
has never been formally delimited and " a traditional customary boundary 
respected by the two peoples had long taken shape on the basis of the extent of 
each side's jurisdiction " . ' " Although no breakthrough was achieved 
during sixth round, both sides however, maintained that the talks were frank 
and candid. 
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At one point of time, the Chinese Government was keen to receive a 
high ranking Indian leader, preferably the Prime Minister, hidia on the other 
hand, thought of sending its Minister of External Affairs, Bali Ram Bhagat to 
Beijing. But this did not take place because India, it was said, wanted to end the 
current series of talks by completing the sector wise exchange of views before 
starting political level discussions on a comprehensive settlement of the border 
question.'^ "* 
Before the seventh round of negotiations, in June 1986, about 40 
Chinese, including some in uniform, had intruded 6 to 7 kilometres into the 
Kameng division of Arunachal Pradesh (Sumdorong Chu). Although 
accusations from both sides to intrusions into each other's territories were not 
new, this time the Chinese stayed back.'^^ Gradually, their number increased 
to about 200.'^^ In the same month, the leaders of the Chinese delegation, 
Vice Foreign Minister Liu Shuqing, in an interview with Indian 
correspondents, raised for the first time the issue of the eastern sector being 
"the biggest dispute and key to an over all solution" to the border question. 
He termed Chou En-Lai's 1960 offer as "a general idea" rather than "any 
specific proposal". He hinted that even after the "unfortunate war of 1962 
which resolved the dispute to some degree", India was still "in occupation o f 
the Chushul area. Giving vent to his feelings, he insisted that India should 
make "unilateral concessions." To elaborate, he contended: if the dispute in the 
eastern sector is not resolved, how can India ask for concessions in the western 
sector? It is unreasonable to say that the whole dispute should be resolved 
according to history and the customary and traditional boundary. That is not 
China's position. If India makes some readjustment and concessions in the 
eastern sector, then we could also make corresponding adjustments and 
concessions in the western sector [However], if India finds doing this 
difficult, then the border question can be left aside for the time being and we 
could develop relations in other fields.'^^ 
The Foreign Minister B.R. Bhagat explained to the Parliament, the 
details of discussion, which took place at sixth round of official talks. He told 
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that both sides clarified their respective position on eastern sector of the 
boundary. He again told that both sides agreed to continue discussions on the 
border issue to reach on early solution covering all dimensions of the border 
problem.'^^ 
Shortly, before the seventh round of talks there was news about Chinese 
intrusion in Arunachal Pradesh. In consonance with this on July 18, 1986, 
Minister of External Affairs P.V. Shiv Shankar informed the Parliament that 
Indian government strongly opposed Chinese response that it was a disputed 
area; the Government stressed that Sumdorong Chu valley was well within 
Indian territory. Ultimately the Chinese government agreed to discuss the 
matter intensively in forthcoming seventh round of talks. 
Progress in other areas: 
The sub-group on science and technology decided to exchange 
delegations in computer, industry, agriculture, education plasma, physics, laser 
technology and biotechnology. Some progress was made in the field of cultural 
exchanges as the two sides decided to hold exhibitions on contemporary art in 
New Delhi and Beijing. It was also agreed organise a joint seminar in Beijing 
on socio-economic planning in India and China.'^ "^ Another development of the 
post Indira Gandhi Sino-Indian contacts was China's willingness to establish 
relations with other political parties of India besides the communist parties.'^' 
Hindrances in Negotiated Settlement of Sino-Indian border talks: 
There were many reasons, which causes obstacle in Sino-Indian border 
negotiation. Some of them are-
1. China introduced a new element by demanding territorial concessions by 
India in the eastern sector. 
2. The Chinese put forward their long-standing claim that the traditional 
boundary line to the east ran well south of the McMahon Line. 
3. Chinese involvement in Pakistan's nuclear program. 
4. Security threat from the People's Republic of China. 
123 
5. The statement of the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister and leader of the 
delegation to the border talks i.e. lack of political will. 
6. Incursions in an area known as Sumdurong Chu in Arunachal Pradesh, 
an area of east-west mountain ranges that forms the trijunction of India, 
Bhutan and China. 
7. China was interested to strike deal with India as her main objective was 
to break the Indo-Soviet encirclement.'^^ 
The Suradorong Chu Crisis: 
Sumdorong Chu [Wangdong for China] is in Thagla Ridge in the 
eastern sector of Sino-Indian border. It may be recalled that the 1962 border 
war with China started off from the same area. Adhering to the watershed 
principle, India considers this area as Indian territory. China does not accept the 
McMahon Line and even if it does, since Sumdorong Chu falls north of 
McMahon Line, it is considered by China as Chinese territory. It accuses India 
of taking the opportunity of China's unilateral withdrawal north of McMahon 
Line and occupying the areas claimed by India. In view of the Indian ground 
action, asserts China resumed patrolling in this area in 1986. According to 
Sawhney, in 1984, Intelligence Bureau of India without informing the army set 
up a post in Sumdorong Chu area. The Chinese were continuously monitoring 
the routine of this small Indian detachment since then. It is still unknown that 
why did the Chinese act only in 1986 after a gap of two years? In mid June 
1986, the Indian detachment returned back from Nyamjang Chu after collecting 
their salaries and ration, they foimd their post taken over by the people's 
liberation army with helicopter support. India at once lodged a protest and 
openly condemned the Chinese action on July 15, 1986. China clarified its 
position by saying that the People Liberation Army (PLA) was in its own 
territory; it was India that had violated and crossed over the Line of Actual 
Control (LAC). 
On finding Chinese troops south of the Thagla Bumla line, the Indian 
army reacted by sending a task force to stop arry further Chinese intrusion.^^^ 
General Krishnaswamy Sunderjee, the Army Chief organised operation 
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chequer board (October 1986-mid March 1987) on the China border under 
which more than ten army divisions and the air force were involved. The troops 
fanned out all along the border and took positions. The Chinese reacted by 
taking positions in dangerous proximity to the Indians. Further China 
aiigmented its military presence in eastern Tibet. Almost all the ingredients of a 
major showdown were fast assembling. In fact, speculation about a second 
border war between India and China became common place and quite 
alarming.'^ '^  
Though precise details about operation checkerboard remain 
unavailable, some observers contend that its significance lay well beyond and 
attempt to test the responses of both the super powers in the event of a 
Sino-Indian border conflict. It may also have been an attempt to test the 
continuing vitality of the Indo-Soviet relationship in the wake of Mikhail 
Gorbachev's July 1986 Vladivostok speech in which he had attached greater 
significance to Soviet relations with China and Japan than with India.'^ ^ 
Sumdorong Chu episode was a potentially dangerous situation which 
touched off a border build up by both sides but was controlled by diplomatic 
action.'^ ^ Perhaps on account of this the Government seemed anxious to play 
down the Chinese intrusion into Arunachal Pradesh.'^ ^ Indian Defence Minister 
of state, Arun Singh and General Sunderjee told a press conference in early 
1987 that in case of crisis at border, 'the Indian forces will not fight with their 
hands tied' an indication to the Indian nuclear capability against any Chinese 
nuclear strike. It was a dangerous situation as the Indian army was heavily 
engaged in Siachin against Pakistan, and India had also committed 
considerable forces for operation 'Pawan' in Sri Lanka. The Sumdorong Chu 
incident however, did not escalate into war; neither did it stall the talks on 
border. 
The Seventh Round of Border Talks: 
The seventh round of border talks was held in Beijing from July 21-23, 
1986 during the heightening of the Sumdorong Chu incident. Indian Foreign 
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Secretary, A. P. Venkateswam represented the Indian side and Liu Shuqing the 
Chinese. While receiving the Indian delegates, the Chinese Foreign Minister 
Wu Xueqian told them that the boundary problem was left over by the history, 
the atmosphere in which previous rounds of talks were held was very good, and 
however, it was conducive during the seventh round. We obviously were 
referring to the Sumdorong Chu crises. Venkteswaram, on the other hand 
pointed out that there has been some true and some untrue reporting in the 
Indian newspaper. The resolution of Sino-Indian boundary problem is the 
comer stone of the friendship that both countries desire to build. The Indian 
representative also said that he was looking forward for carrying this new 
round of talks in a constructive atmosphere.'^^ Discussions held in a "friendly 
and frank" maimer covered cultural, scientific and technological cooperation 
and international issues of mutual concern.'^^ According to available 
information, the location of the area in dispute was discussed intensively, but 
without any resolution of the problem.'™ India's deep concern over the Chinese 
intrusion in Sumdorong Chu Valley area was conveyed to the Chinese side 
during the talks. India stressed that the Chinese side should do nothing to 
aggravate matters and disturb the status quo.'^' 
External Affairs Minister P. Shiv Shankar stated in Parliament that when 
the Indian delegation asked the Chinese to spell out precisely the alignment of 
the so-called Lines of Actual Control (LAC) in the eastern sector as they saw it, 
they declined to give the coordinate of this line.'''^ Later, Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi imderlined the difficulties in negotiation process. He explained that 
some parts of the border were in dispute. "We feel that the line is at one point, 
China feels it is at another point. It really needs to be sorted out across the table 
and it is time that we sit down and do it," he stated.'" In another instance, he 
pointed out the "basic differences in the attitudes" of both sides: India 
felt that the McMahon Line is referred to the geographical features. 
The Chinese feel that the longitude was more important". ''''* The interpretation 
of the LAC, if not the border itself, has thus become vague. This is further 
complicated by the Chinese argument that the LAC itself has been extended by 
the 'marching' Indian forces into the Chinese territory. Reflecting the official 
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Chinese position, a Chinese news agency argued: Although this actual line of 
control on the eastern part of the Sino-Indian border is unreasonable, China 
will respect it until the Sino-Indian border issue is settled at the talks...The 
problem is that the India's, taking advantage of the occasions when China has 
suspended its patrols, marched beyond the actual line of control in an attempt 
to nibble further at Chinese territory and to create more disputed territory. 
Regarding the problem of intruding Indian aircraft and military personnel, 
China has always shown restraint and repeatedly advised India not to do this. 
However, Indian activities across the line are increasing. What is even more 
intolerable is that the Indians refer to whatever part of Chinese territory they 
intend to annex as Indian territory. Naturally, China cannot accept this with 
folded arms. By doing all, the Indians have disrupted the peace on the border 
and made it difficult for the two countries to improve their relations and settle 
the boundary issue through negotiations."^ There was differences of opinion on 
both sides. 
According to KR. Narayanan, the Minister of state of External Affairs, 
substantive discussions were continued on the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian 
boundary, at the seventh round of official level talks, thereafter discussions 
commenced on the western sector. The Chinese side reiterated that the eastern 
sector was the area of 'largest dispute'. In response, the Indian side clearly 
enunciated its well-known stand that the Sino-Indian boundary in the eastern 
sector is the traditional customary line, which has received the additional 
sanction of treaty and administrative jurisdiction.'^^ 
Meanwhile, in December 1986, the Indian Parliament approved a bill 
that conferred full statehood to Arunachal Pradesh.''''' The Chinese government 
opposed this move and accused India of deliberately creating obstacles.'^^ 
India, on its part, accused China of interfering in India's internal affairs and 
reiterated Indian sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh. 
Irrespective of the 1986-87 border crises in eastern sector, India and 
China continued to talk, which was a positive development. To push forward 
process of normalisation, India's Minister of External Affairs, N D Tiwari 
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stated in Lok Sabha that it was necessary for both sides to find a solution to the 
problems in a manner that ensures the maintenance of peace and tranquillity all 
along the boundary.'^ ^ 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi stated on March 3, 1987 in Parliament 
that there has been tension on our border with China. We want a peaceful 
settlement of the border issue. It will need wisdom, statesmanship and 
finnness. Firmness is included in wisdom...It is this perspective that should 
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guide our t\\'o countries in seeking a solution to the problem. 
Thus Rajiv Gandhi tried to introduce a new approach in India's policy of 
improving relations with China. Rajiv Gandhi's new approach to China was 
part of the general trend of transition in world politics from hostility and 
confrontation to detente and dialogue. With a thaw in Sino-Soviet relations, the 
Soviet Leader Gorbachev, who initiated Perestroika and Glasnost in Soviet 
Union; emphasised China's role in Asian and World Affairs and encouraged 
India's efforts to improve Sino-Indian relations.'^' The ctmiulative effect of the 
change in the international and regional climate on India-China relations was 
distinctly positive. 
Progress: - On the other hand fruitful discussions on cultural, scientific and 
technological exchanges as well as on other issues of international mutual 
concern were held.'^ ^ India and China signed in Beijing on May 27, 1987 the 
second Trade Protocol. The two sides expressed satisfaction at the growth of 
trade between the two countries since the signing of their first trade protocol in 
November 1985 and noted the potential for further growth on a balanced 
basis. Desire for a peaceful settlement of the border issue, domestic political 
and economic changes in both the countries and relaxation in the tense 
international situation contribute greatly to understand each other. 
Problems in Negotiation: 
The period between the seventh roimd of talks in July 1986 and the eight 
round in November 1987 appears to have been an important learning exercise 
for both sides. Increased border patrolling in the summer of 1986 had brought 
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Chinese an Indian troops into close and more frequent contact charge and 
countercharged raised tension to a pitch so high that the Chinese used U.S. 
Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger- during his visit to the subcontinent to 
pass on a message to New Delhi's leaders that Beijing would have to "teach 
India a lesson" if it did not stop 'nibbling' at Chinese territory. 
1. The Indian decision in December 1986 to raise Arunachal Pradesh, 
which was disputed territor>', to the level of a state further increased 
Chinese irritation. 
2. Difference of opinion regarding the line of actual control. 
3. Launch of operation checkerboard in the spring of 1987, along the Sino-
India border raised tension. 
The Eighth Round of Talks: 
The eighth round of border talks between India and China was held as 
scheduled from November 15 - 17, 1987 in New Delhi. K P S Menon, Foreign 
Secretary of India led the Indian side, while Liu Shuqing headed the Chinese 
delegation. During this round of talks, India no longer pressed for the quick 
resolution of boundary issue. This was perhaps a policy change under Rajiv 
Gandhi. Indira Gandhi has attached the resolution of boundary issue to the 
development of relations in other domains. Rajiv Government now deviated 
from this position and emphasised that the improvement and strengthening of 
relations in other spheres such as trade, commerce, science, technology and 
culture should not be held hostage to the border issue. The Chinese side 
reiterated its earlier position that India must do some readjustments in the 
eastern sector for an overall resolution of the boundary issue. 
The Indian delegation wanted the western sector to be included in the 
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discussion. For the first time since the 1962 war, the two sides officially 
exchanged views on international developments, including South Asia. As 
regards the boundary dispute, the Chinese side proposed for the creation of a 
demilitarised zone in the eastern sector by mutual withdrawal of troops, and the 
Indian delegation reportedly expressed its reservations on the proposal given 
the recent Sumdorong Chu incident.'^^ Finally, it was agreed that both 
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countries would maintain peace all along the border, not just in the eastern 
sector alone. Significantly, they also decided to set up a Working Group to 
go deeper into the boundary issue.'^" The issue of involving political leaders 
in negotiations was also pondered over.' ' Nevertheless, China expressed 
its unhappiness over the delay on the part of India in agreeing to its 
disengagement proposal. The Chinese ambassador, Tu Guowei argued: Since 
China's disengagement proposal has not yet been responded in real actions by 
the Indian side, the border situation today is not so stable, and is even marked 
with certain hidden dangers ... We therefore should not neglect the gravity and 
urgency of this reality. The settlement of the boundary issue does not require 
political wisdom and statesmanship from both sides. Meanwhile, peace and 
tranquillity must be maintained... If tension along the border can be defused 
and the border problem is finally solved in a peaceful and reasonable manner, 
we shall be in a position to focus our attention on more important issues 
bilaterally and internationally.'^^ 
Here in lies China's principal position on the boundary dispute and, in 
the years to come, this would be one of the fundamental aspects of the 
Chinese's attitude towards the issue.'^^ Talks were held in a positive cordial 
and friendly atmosphere. No breakthrough was expected as a result of this 
round of talks but the stage was set for the threads being picked up at the 
political level.'^'* At the conclusion of talks, Rajiv Gandhi met the Chinese 
delegates and expressed his desire for further improvement of bilateral 
relations. The scale of diplomatic and other exchanges in the year 1987 
indicated that there was a genuine desire for the improvement of bilateral 
relations. 
By 1988, Rajiv Gandhi enunciated a new approach in India's policy 
towards China and replying to the debate in the Lok Sabha, he stated on April 
20, that "with China we have been endeavouring to improve our relations. 
We are building a climate of trust, looking for a new and productive phase in 
our relationships. We recognise that the process of normalisation is complex. 
The border question needs peaceful negotiations. It needs mutually acceptable 
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outcomes and we need to keep in mind the national sentiments in both 
countries. The maintenance of peace and tranquiUity on our borders becomes 
vital while we talk of long term settlement we are strengthening cooperation in 
many fields with China. We are glad that the efforts to normalise have been 
welcomed by all sections of the House. We have accepted in principle that 
I should visit China on their invitation."' 
The Chinese leadership responded with enthusiasm by early 1988 to the 
proposal for a visit by the Indian Prime Minister. Talking to the Indian External 
Affairs, P.V. Narasimha Rao in New York on October 4, 1988, his Chinese 
counterpart, Wu Xueqian told him that Rajiv Gandhi's visit would prove to be 
a turning point in the relations between the two countries. 
Later, the Minister of External Affairs, P.V. Narasimha Rao stated in the 
Parliament in November 1988: "The Dialogue is an ongoing one pending a 
lasting peaceful and mutually acceptable solution of the boundary question, it 
has been agreed that peace and tranquillity should be maintained all along the 
border. Further, talks will be held when the Prime Minister visit China". 
Rajiv Gandhi's China Visit: 
Rajiv Gandhi's five-day visit to China from December 19-24, 1988 was 
one of the main event in the history of Sino-Indian relations but also a 
landmark in the history of Asia and international relations, for it led a political 
breakthrough between India and China.'^^ The state visit of Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi to China was a definite step towards speeding up the sluggish 
process of normalisation and this was the first visit to China by an Indian Prime 
Minister in 34 years after Nehru's 1954 visit. Gandhi set the tone by declaring 
that, "it is now time to look to the future, I have come to renew an old 
friendship. "'^ '^  Deng Xiaoping, the top Chinese leader said that "China and 
India should forget the unpleasant past and set their eyes on the fiiture".^"" 
Premier Li Peng was Rajiv Gandhi's major interlocutor during the visit, 
and their discussions focussed on the substantive issue of the border, Tibet, 
bilateral relations and international situation. Premier Li accepted Gandhi's 
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invitation to pay a return visit to India. During the visit the two sides had " 
in-depth discussions" on the Sino-hidian boundary question and agreed to settle 
it through peaceful and friendly consultations. In his banquet speech, the 
Chinese Premier, Li Peng dealt with the boundary question by restarting the 
known Chinese position of seeking "a fair and reasonable settlement in a spirit 
of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation."'^^' 
In reply, the Indian Prime Minister observed that the boundary question 
needed an enduring solution based on an understanding of each other's point of 
view which would be in their mutual interest and to the benefit of both peoples. 
During first two days of Rajiv Gandhi's visit, it appeared that the visit would 
end up, merely in symbolism, for both sides were exchanging diplomatic 
pleasantries and merely reiterating their earlier positions. On December 21, 
1988 Indian Prime Minister had a 90 minutes meeting with 84 years old 
Deng Xiaoping. Deng pointed to the days of "Sino-Indian brotherhood" during 
the 1950s and said let us forget the past and do everything with an eye on the 
fiiture.'^ "^ On December 22, India and China decided to set up a Joint Working 
Group (JWG) on the boundary issue. The two sides also agreed to develop 
relations in other fields and to set up a joint group on economic relations and 
trade, as well as science and technology. The two countries signed three 
accords on cultural scientific and technological cooperation as well as civil 
aviation. 
But the real gains of Rajiv Gandhi's visit were perhaps more in the 
intangible category. The long handshake with Deng reflected the intangible 
new spirit that Rajiv and Deng were trying to infuse into the Sino-Indian 
relationship. As a result, there was a major push forward in the process of 
Sino-Indian normalisation. As Deng told Gandhi that "starting from his visit, 
China and India will restore friendship between the two countries, people and 
leaders.'^ '^' Rajiv Gandhi himself assessed his visit as a turning point in mutual 
relations. He admitted that differences still remained but India would like to 
broaden area of common interests. 
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In his annual address to the Pariiament February 21, 1989 the President 
stated that, "with the Prime Minister's recent visit to China, we have embarked 
on a new and positive place in our relations with that country. The cordial and 
constructive discussion held with Chinese leaders has opened the way for a 
stable, peaceful and mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries. 
This is a development of great significance for regional and world peace as 
India and China, together, represent a third of humanity."^^^ 
From the available sources it can be concluded that the period of 1980s 
proved to be the turning point in the history of Sino-Indian relations because 
from that year onward the process of normalisation had gathered momentum. 
During the late cold war period between June 1981 and November 1987, eight 
rounds of official level talks were held to resolve the border issue alternatively 
in Beijing and New Delhi at Vice-Minister level. But no breakthrough was 
made. Among these five were held during Indira Gandhi's regime and three 
during Rajiv Gandhi's Premiership. 
The first four border talks were concerned with "basic principles" and 
the last four the "situation on the ground". The fourth round was the most 
significant of the eight, in that the Chinese dropped their insistence on all 
encompassing proposal and substituted a sector-by-sector approach, and both 
agreed to the improvement of relations in other areas. The Chinese foreign 
policy since the 1980s placed an accent on a stable external environment for its 
internal economic reforms process. India also embarked on a similar concern 
for internal viability. 
There could be no doubt that a qualitatively different step has been taken 
towards the resolution of the border problem. But it is well known fact that the 
border problem between India and China was so complex and longstanding it 
was not possible to solve the problem in just one or two meetings. Many 
initiatives had been taken from time to time from 1962 onward to resolve the 
border dispute example opening of Hindu pilgrimage sites in Tibet Mansarovar 
and Kailash, maintenance of peace and tranquillity alone the border. 
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On the other hand due to certain problems both sides could not reach at 
the proper solution. Some of the major problem that come in the way of 
resolving the border problems are- conferral of fiill statehood to Arunachal 
Pradesh, Sumdorong Chu valley incident, lack of political will, differences of 
opinion on both sides, domestic problem lack of proper preparatory work, 
Chinese involvement in Pakistan's nuclear program, launch of operation 
checkerboard in the spring of 1987 along the border etc. A part from the border 
talks, fruitful discussion on cultural, scientific, technological, educational, trade 
etc were held. There was the need to change the mindset and keep patience on 
both sides. In the end of 1980s, P.M. Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China proved to be 
the landmark in the history of Asia and international relations which led to a 
political breakthrough between India and China. His visit was pragmatic step 
towards speeding up the sluggish process of normalisation. 
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Chapter-V 
Institutional Resolution of Conflict 
The Sino-Indian normalization process had picked up momentum in the 
late 1980s'. It may be recalled that the process of negotiated settlement of 
Sino-Indian boundary dispute had started during Indira Gandhi's regime in 
1981. Eight rounds of talks were held between 1981 and 1987. But as a result 
of those negotiated talks, no breakthrough was made. It was during Rajiv 
Gandhi's China visit in 1988, that both nations decided to set up a Joint 
Working Group (JWG), which was to forge a fair and reasonable solution to 
the border issue and to expedite negotiation between the two countries. The 
subsequent establishment of Joint Group on Economic Relations and Trade, 
Science and Technology (JEG) consisting of diplomatic and military officials 
under the JWG contributed to the deepening of understanding between two 
countries.'* The JWG was to be chaired by the Foreign Secretary on the Indian 
side and the Vice-Foreign Minister from the Chinese side. In some ways 
therefore, JWG was on advancement from the previous mechanism in that it 
enjoyed joint mandate. Furthermore, the JWG was also vested with the task of 
dispelling tensions along the border and initiating Confidence Building 
Measures (CBMs) designed to maintain peace and tranquillity along the border 
areas. ^  
During 1989-2005, fifteen rounds of talks had been taken place, out of 
which, ten JWG meeting were held from 1989-1997 except 1992. Remaining 
five was held after a brief breakdown in the process of Sino-Indian 
rapprochement in the year 1998 due to India's nuclear test. To facilitate the 
JWG's work, the 1993 treaty established an Expert's Group for the purpose of 
making a closer scrutiny of each side's position and clarifications on the Line 
of Actual Control (LAC). It comprises of diplomats, military officials, 
cartographers, etc. from both countries who advice the JWG on the boundary 
question and review the working of the CBMs. The Experts Group on both 
sides held twelve meeting by 2002.^ The JEG met eight times in New Delhi 
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and Beijing alternatively. Ail these were the efforts made by both countries in 
order to resolve the boundary problem. 
Wu Xueqian's Visit: 
The Chinese Vice-Premier Wu Xueqian's visit on March 12, 1989 was 
essentially part of the confidence building exercise that had set off in the wake 
of Rajiv Gandhi's visit in December 1988. He met several ministers to discuss 
some concrete ideas of cooperation and identify areas in which specific 
projects could be introduced. On the border issue, he said that the Chinese 
government was eager to reach a fair and reasonable settlement of the issue. He 
hoped that so long as the two sides conducted friendly consultations in a spirit 
of mutual understanding and accommodation, a mutually acceptable solution 
could be found to the boundary question.^  He said that the two sides would 
have to intensify efforts in the coming year because no meaningful negotiations 
on the border issue could be taken up before that. Referring to the meetings of 
JWG in the month of July, he further said that it would be unrealistic to expect 
o 
the problem to be solved through only one or two rounds. 
First Meeting of the Joint Working Group: 
The first meeting of JWG was held at Beijing from June 30 to July 4, 
1989 at the height of Tiananmen incident when the US and other western 
countries had imposed sanctions on China for ruthless suppression of the 
student movement.^  The meeting centred on the theme of working out 
measures to ensure peace and tranquillity along the LAC, and the two sides 
agreed that military experts from both the countries would work out measures 
to ensure this."^ Both sides exchanged views on the improvement of bilateral 
relations and regional as well as international issues of common interest." 
Considerable progress was made in the fields of science and technology. 
The border issue remained unresolved. The discussions were exploratory in 
nature but expected to balance the interest involved in it. The broad principles 
on which each side was expected to proceed have already been evolved in areas 
of mutual respect for Panchsheel, history, custom and public sentiments. What 
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they did not agree was the principle of "give and take". '^  The main focus was 
on science and technology. No specific discussion took place on the border 
issue. Inspite of that it was a good beginning in the direction of peace process. 
On July 8, 1989, it was announced that India and China had agreed to 
undertake confidence building exercise and push the process of normalization 
of relations between the two countries.'^ Joint group on Trade, Economic 
relations, Science and Technology (JEG) held its first meeting in New Delhi on 
September 18, 1989. Both sides stressed the vast potential ties and cooperation 
in the areas of science and technology.''' With a view to keep up the momentum 
generated by two high level political contacts, Chinese Vice-Premier 
Wu Xueqian came to New Delhi on October 11, 1989. He had extensive talks 
with External Affairs Minister, PV Narasimha Rao and Prime Minister, Rajiv 
Gandhi. Wu stated that, "we can not only strengthen our cooperation and make 
up for each other's deficiencies in many areas, including economy, science, 
technology, culture and education, but also enhance, our consultations on the 
North-South dialogue, South-South cooperation, and number of other 
international issues... as long as the two sides conduct friendly consultations in 
a spirit of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation, a mutually 
acceptable solution can be found.'^ 
In November 1989, there was change in Government. Janata Dal came 
to power, VP Singh become the Prime Minister of India. The Janata Dal 
government did not bring any change in India's China policy initiated by the 
previous governments. I.K. Gujral, the Indian External Affairs Minister, 
actively pursued a policy that would improve India's relations with its 
neighbour.'^ The change in governments did not affect the course of 
Sino-Indian ties. There were a series of high-level exchanges between the two 
countries. The President of India R. Venkataraman stated in his annual 
address to the Parliament on March 12, 1990 that, "the pace of diplomatic 
exchanges is being accelerated, contributing to the development of mutually 
beneficial cooperation on the basis of Panchsheel. The foreign Minister of 
China will be visiting India soon lo carry forward the dialogue. We will 
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continue our efforts to find a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable 
settlement of the boundary question, consistent with our national interests".'^ 
The Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen visited India in March 
1990.' Qian's visit coincided with the 40"^  anniversary of the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between India and China. In his talks with his Indian 
counterpan;, I.K. Gujral, Qian agreed that the development of bilateral relations 
in other fields would create a favourable climate and conditions for a fair and 
reasonable settlement of the boundary question.^ *^ On border dispute Qian 
repeated his country's desire to reach a settlement through mutual 
understanding and mutual accommodation.^' He told journalists that he was 
impressed by the consensus in India on the importance of maintaining good 
relations with China. The present government's position on China has also 
been appreciated.'^ ^ The most important point made by Qian on March 23 
related to Kashmir, he emphasised the need for a peaceful solution to the 
Kashmir problem through mutual consultations between India and Pakistan by 
avoiding the intemationalisation of the Kashmir issue. 
Speaking in the Parliament on April 9, 1990 Shri I K Gujral said that, 
"in the broader context, the visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister last month 
resulted in a better understanding of the perceptions of both sides on matters of 
international and regional concern. This was important because both of us face 
similar problem as continental societies Exchange of views and better 
understanding are themselves of no mean value". ^^ 
Second Meeting of the Joint Working Group: 
The joint working group (JWG) held its second meeting on August 
31-September 1, 1990 in New Delhi. Indian Foreign Secretary, Muchkund 
Dubey represented the Indian side, while China sent Vice Foreign Minister 
Qi Huaiyan. Both sides agreed on a mechanism under which their military 
personnel would meet from time to time at an appropriate level to maintain 
peace in the border area. At the end of the two days discussion, both side 
expressed the hopes that by working in a sincere and forward looking manner it 
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would be possible as well as for maintaining tranquility in the border areas.^ "* 
The two sides also discussed ways of further improving the bilateral relations 
and exchanged views on regional and international issues. They noted with 
satisfaction the growing interaction between the two countries in various fields, 
including exchanges at the political level. 
The overall outcome of the JWG's discussions was as follows - no 
appreciable progress on the boundary issue, and the emergence of a desire 
between the two countries to strengthen bilateral ties, besides maintaining 
peace at the border. They decided to increase the number of scholarships for 
Indian and Chinese students for higher education in respective countries. 
This, however, could not make a headway, nonetheless a shared understanding 
on border issue increased. 
The political upheavals in India did not break flow of diplomatic 
exchange between India and China. V.C. Shukla, the External Affair Minister 
in Prime Minister Chandra Shekar's government visited China. The scheduled 
meeting of joint committee for promoting Sino-Indian trade and technological 
cooperation JEG was held in Beijing. In order to promote bilateral border trade, 
both sides agreed to open Tiabian on Uttranchal - Tibet border as a trading 
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point. This was the first trading point being opened after the 1962 was. 
The Sikkim question, for example, has been a divisive issue between the 
two nations. The integration of the Sikkim state into India in 1975 was deeply 
resented by China. Beijing saw it as part of India's hegemonic intentions in 
South Asia and refiised to accept the integration. India saw this response as 
China's attempt to Intervene in the subcontinent. From the mid 1950s, India 
and China began to find a way of removing the mispercepfions about Sikkim. 
The nineties unfolded with profound transformation in international 
politics. Amidst the rapid changing world scenario, both India and China 
desired a stable relation to face uncertain and ever changing pattern of 
international politics. The combined effort of international circumstances. 
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regional politics and domestic compulsion, pushed India and China on a closer 
and irreversible path of rapprochement. 
On February 21, 1991 the President of India R. Venkataraman addressed 
a joint session of the Parliament and stated that, "we have continued the 
process of seeking a better understanding with China. Our bilateral cooperation 
has grown and we have also begun to consult each other more closely on 
international issues. Negotiations in the Joint Working Group are continuing 
with a view to resolving the boundary questions in a fair, reasonable and 
mutually acceptable manner. We believe that closer cooperation between India 
and China will be in the interest of peace and stability in Asia and the world. 
Third Meeting of the Joint Working Group: 
The third meeting of the JWG was held on May 13, 1991 at Beijing. 
The two sides further enhanced their understanding of each others positions 
and agreed to continue the process.'''* The two sides exchainged views on 
maintaining peace and tranquillity along the border under actual line of 
control.'^' The delegations were headed by Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Xu Dunxin and the Indian Foreign Secretary Muchkund Dubey. 
The State Councillor and Foreign Minister, Qian Qichan described on May 16, 
the third round sessions of the Sino-Indian Joint Working Group on the 
boundary question as "good and useful meeting" .^ ^ The Chinese govenunent 
reassured India, that it had no intention of upsetting the balance of power in the 
region. The discussions were held between External Affairs Minister, Madhav 
Singh Solanki and his Chinese coimterpart, Qian Qichan. The two dignitaries 
made an in-depth appraisal of regional security concerns. The talks reflected 
frankness and were, "candid and friendly". '^^  
Later in September, 1991 the Defence Minister, Sharad Powar stated in 
the Parliament that, "there was no tension on our borders with China. In the 
recent year, China had not taken any such step, which can create anxiety or 
doubt in our minds. Therefore, we would try to develop good relations with 
China also to ensure mutual development. As far as Chhia is concerned, there 
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was certainly peace on the border and efforts are being made to improve our 
relations with China.^ ^ 
This was generally stated regarding the Sino-Indian talks of 1991 that 
bilateral talks became possible at all because the two sides put the border 
dispute on hold. Instead of saying that the border issue has been put on hold, 
it is perhaps more justifiable to say that the two countries have realised that the 
issue is no longer crucial for regional stability and cooperation. Borders once 
again constructed the relation, but this time by their absence as a problem. ^ ^ 
The international political landscape was fast changing and India as well 
as China were left with no option but to adjust accordingly. With the 
disintegration of USSR as a nodal power centre, India lost a reliable friend in 
international political arena.^ ^ 
Li Peng's Visit: 
Chinese Premier, Li Peng paid an official visit to India from December 
11-16, 1991 and it was the first visit to India by a Chinese Prime Minister in 
31 years.^^ It was in return for the one undertaken by the Indian Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi to China in December 1988. The Chinese were anxious to see 
that the thaw reached in the relations of the two countries during Rajiv's visit 
should remain apparent. During the first round of talks, mostly international 
and regional issues were discussed and they were marked by convergence of 
views on the need to meet the challenges of the post-cold war era.^ ^ India used 
this opportunity to convey to China its concern at 'external inputs' to 
Pakistan's nuclear weapons capacity and missile technology. The Chinese side 
expressed concern about the continued activities in India by some Tibetans 
against their motherland and reiterated that Tibet was an inalienable part of 
Chinese territory. The Indian side again categorically sated its long-standing 
and consistent position that Tibet was an autonomous region of China and that 
it did not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in India.''° 
The problems of Kashmir and Tibet were common points of concern for 
India and China though the nature of their genesis was quite different.'" 
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The two countries had another source of trouble - Muslim fundamentalism. 
The border issue came in for detailed discussions in the second round of talks. 
The two sides decided upon periodic meetings between military personnel in 
the border areas on a regular basis to ensure peace.'*^ Narasimha Rao talked for 
a fair and reasonable solution which was inconsonance with the dignity and 
respect of each country and felt it was possible through peaceful means. He 
favoured a positive and practical approach, taking into account historical data, 
tradition, custom and present realities. On the whole the solution must be 
within the framework of national interests and sentiments of both sides. 
Li Peng spoke quite differently though apparently quite reasonably. 
He talked of a 'reasonable' solution which could easily be found through 
amicable consultations conduct in a spirit of mutual understanding and mutual 
accommodation was China's standard formulation, which by implication meant 
that China in a spirit of give and take would extend some territorial concessions 
in the east provided India did the same in the west. It was different from India's 
plea for mutual adjustment under which the border could be merely 
straightened. Li amplified mutual understanding thus; the border issue was a 
legacy of the past and each side, on the one hand, respect history and on the 
other, status quo, reality. By mutual accommodation he meant necessary 
compromise. 
In brief, what Li meant was maintenance of status quo implying that 
whatever territory China had occupied in 1962 war, which was about 8500 sq 
miles in Ladakh region, would continue to remain in its claim on those parts of 
India territory to which it laid claim but which were totally under Indian 
administration. This was a queer logic. Instead of being generous in 
abandoning fictitious claim, China wanted to retain all the war gains in its 
possession. How could it be called 'fair' or 'reasonable'? 
However the two sides were no closer to a solution of the substantive 
problem. But there was a slight advance in that as a result of the long talks a 
new sense of urgency for the settlement of the dispute was perceptible and a 
resolve to maintain peace along the border was equally evident. The Indian side 
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tried to convince their Chinese guests that the talks on border problem should 
be so expedited that the solution of the issue may not remain an 'uncertain 
possibility'; more indulging in long drawn talks would be an exercise in 
procrastination. However, in the joint statement issued on December 16 the two 
sides stressed that they would continue to work towards a mutually acceptable 
solution to the boundary question through meetings of Joint Working Group. 
Thus for all practical purposes there was no progress made on the border issue 
with China."^ 
However, to make the meeting a little meaningful, the two governments 
signed three agreements, i.e., resumption of border trade, reopening of 
consulates in Bombay and Shanghai, and cooperation in peaceful applications 
of other space sciences and technology.'*'' These documents were meant to 
increase contacts in different spheres which would develop further cooperation 
between the two countries.''^ The two Premier agreed to give political 
directions to the Joint Working Group in order to facilitate in resolving the 
border issue."*^  It was also agreed to hold a cultural festival of India in China 
and a cultural festival of China in India. The two sides believed that dialogue 
and exchange of visits between the leaders of the two countries were of major 
importance to greater mutual understanding and further development of 
bilateral friendship and cooperation in all fields. 
Both sides believed that the talks held so far by the Sino-Indian Joint 
Working Group on the boundary question had enhanced mutual understanding 
and agreed that the group should step up its work in search of an earliest 
possible solution to the boundary question. It was decided that the next meeting 
of the Joint Working Group would be held in New Delhi in early 1992 on a 
mutually convenient date. An important outcome of Li's visit was that both the 
leaders gave formal shape to the mechanism for maintaining peace and 
tranquillity in the area along the line of actual control pending a final 
settlement of the boundary question. They also agreed that the periodic 
meetings between the military personnel in the border areas should be held on a 
regular basis."*^ 
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On December 20, 1991, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao gave a long 
statement in Lok Sabha, on the visit of Prime Minister of People's Republic of 
China and stated: "that the visit gained added significance because it had taken 
place in the context of the ongoing rapid changes in international relations 
involving a fundamental transformation".''^ It was clear that both sides had 
taken positive steps to move forward, toward the solution of the Sino-Indian 
boundary dispute. India had suggested a step-by-step approach to resolve the 
boundary question. The first step was the stabilization of the situation on the 
Line of Actual Control and to delineate it more precisely in those sectors where 
differences of opinion existed between India and China. The second step was to 
come to a mutual agreement to maintain peace and tranquillity on the Line of 
Actual Control. The third step was to put in place expanding mutual 
confidence-building measures which would create an atmosphere of normalcy 
and peace on the Line of Actual Control, after which both sides could proceed 
to address the substance of the Sino-Indian boundary question. This approach 
was mutually agreed upon."*' 
As far as solving vexed border question was concerned, India and China 
were seriously engaged in confidence building measures. Undoubtedly the 
border problem was the key to fiill normalization of relationship between India 
and China. Indeed, it was due to matured handling of this issue by leaders of 
both sides that things were not allowed to deteriorate and process of 
rapprochement continued. Admittedly, the process was a slow one, with its 
phases of ups and downs, but it is important to note that important differences 
on border issue had not been allowed to cast their shadow on overall progress 
negotiated settlement. Considering the sensitivity and complexity of the 
problem, both sides were following a cautious and step-by-step approach to 
amicably resolve the border dispute. 
Fourth Meeting of the Joint Working Group: 
The fourth meeting of JWG was held in New Delhi from February 20-
21, 1992 during which India and China agreed to establish regular and closer 
contacts between military personnel of both sides as parts of their bid to build 
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mutual confidence and help in maintaining peace and tranquillity along the 
Line of Actual Control (LAC). A joint statement was issued at the end of two 
days meetings of JWG, which declared the discussions as "frank, positive and 
friendly". The talks undoubtedly set the ground for a "quantitative jump in 
interaction". ^ ° 
For the first time, a meeting of JWG was attended by a representative of 
the Defence Ministry and military officer of the rank of Brigadier from both 
sides to accelerate the pace of peace on the border. Both sides agreed to hold 
flag meetings between border personnel at Bumla in the eastern sector and at 
the Spanaggur Gap area in the western sector in June and October every year. 
The officials proposed direct telephone links between local commanders. 
Besides, the two sides would hold meetings and establish contacts whenever 
required at the designated points in the two sectors. The two sides also 
exchanged views on Confidence Building Measures in the areas along the Line 
of Actual Control, including prior intimation of military exercise, which would 
"reflect the state of improved relations between the two countries". They also 
exchanged views on further developing bilateral relations and on international 
issues of mutual concem.^ '^  There was greater emphasis on frequent meetings to 
develop mutual understanding so as to clear the misgivings. 
An important manifestation of intensified political interactions was the 
visit of the Indian President R. Venkataraman to China in May 1992. In his 
talks with the top leadership of China both nations expressed satisfaction at the 
working of the Joint Working Group, agreed to deepen economic cooperation 
and reiterated faith in the famous principles of peaceful coexistence. During the 
visit "emphasis was also laid on taking concrete steps to promote mutual 
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)".^^ It was yet another step towards 
normalisation between the two sides. The visit was symbolic and no 
agreements were signed between the two countries. Nevertheless, both sides 
exchanged views on the boundary question and progress being made in other 
areas. Yet it was during the first Indian President's visit that China 
'conducted nuclear test which generated Indian apprehension in some ways. 
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Later on the year 1992 also witnessed direct contact between the defence 
establishments of both sides, which heralded a new phase of confidence 
building measure. The Indian initiative of sending its Defence Minister Shared 
Pawar to Beijing in July 1992 was a milestone in 'security building measures' 
between the two neighbours. The historic visit of Indian Defence Minister to 
China and subsequent talks with his Chinese counterpart alongwith other senior 
officials of the people's Liberation Army "laid the basis for greater stability 
and predictability, as far as the military situation along the frontier of the two 
countries is concemed".^^ In course of talks, the Chinese hosts made "special 
efforts to impress upon Pawar the purely coincident nature and timing of its 
nuclear tests''.^* 
In economic sphere, two protocols were signed between India and 
China in the year 1992. The first dealt with Custom Regulation, Banking 
Arrangements and related matters for Border Trade. The year also saw signing 
of Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in Agriculture between the 
Ministry of Agriculture of ROI and the Ministry of Agriculture of PRC. 
These steps were in the right direction and contributed in consolidation of 
bilateral relations. Overall, these concrete actions were helpful in strengthening 
of friendly bond between both nations. Since India & China were parts of 
developing nation states, they were learning from each other in terms of 
experiences. Collectively it was a positive development in this direction. 
Fifth Meeting of the Joint Working Group: 
The fifth meeting took place in Beijing from October 27 to 29, 1992. 
During the meeting there was frank exchange of views on the border and both 
sides stated each other's positions.^^ No substantial progress was made. Both 
sides decided in principle to explore the possibility of moving backwards some 
border posts close to each other and to establish high-level defence contacts in 
order to maintain peace and tranquillity along the line of actual control. ^^  They 
also agreed to work sincerely to further the process of finding a mutually 
acceptable settlement of the boundary dispute and decided to open more border 
points to facilitate border trade. Undoubtedly, the meeting paved way for peace 
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and tranquillity on the border and mutual good will and understanding. 
The two countries resumed the border trade in July during the year after a gap 
of thirty years. However, only one trade point was officially opened. For the 
first time the JWG met twice in the same year.^" 
Sixth Meeting of the Joint Working Group: 
The sixth meeting of the JWG was held in New Delhi from June 25 to 
30, 1993 and discussions focused on mutual transparency on the location of 
military positions, prevention of air intrusion and redeployment of forces along 
the line of Actual Control. Furthermore, both sides also agreed to open one 
more border trade point at the Shipkila pass between Namgya in Inida's 
Himachal Pradesh and Jiuha in Tibet, in addition to the existing one at the 
Lipulekh pass opened in July 1992.^' 
The meeting proved a prelude to the forthcoming visit of Prime Minister 
Narasimha Rao to China. The 1993 agreement on the maintenance of peace 
and tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control could be regarded as a 
brainchild of the JWG border talks. During Rao's China visit yet another 
group that would include diplomats and defence personnel of both the countries 
was established under the JWG and was required to contribute to the CBMs.^ ^ 
Narasimha Rao's China Visit: 
Prime Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao paid a four-day visit to China from 
September 6-9, 1993 at the invitation of Chinese Premier, Li Peng. The visit of 
Prime Minister Narasimha Rao to China in September 1993 was a major step 
forward in consolidating the process of negotiated settlement of Sino-Indian 
boundary dispute. The purpose of his visit was to further promote Sino-Indian 
good neighbourly and friendly relations, and strengthen friendly exchange in 
other areas. Rao held two rounds of talks with his counterpart, and met the 
Chinese President and the CCP General Secretary, Jiang Zemin, Chairman of 
the NPC, Qiao Shi, Chairman of the NPPCC, and the CCP Politburo member 
Hu Jintao. Both sides reaffirmed their desire to solve the border issue through 
friendly consultation.^^ 
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On September 7, at conclusion of the talks, both premiers signed four 
agreements as follows: 
1. Agreement on maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the line of 
actual control in the Sino-Indian Border Areas; 
2. Agreement between the India's Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting, and Chinese Ministry of Broadcasting, Film and 
Television; 
3. Agreement on environmental cooperation between the Government of 
India and the Government of China; and 
4. Agreement, concerning broadening border trade in Shipki La. 
The agreement of 1993 was in accordance with the five principles of 
mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, 
non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefits 
and peaceful coexistence.^^ 
The most noteworthy feature of the summit meeting between the 
premiers of both the sides was the conclusion of the "Agreement on the 
Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the 
Sino-Indian border area", which comprises of nine articles. Article 1 declared 
that "the two sides are of the view that the Sino-Indian boundary questions 
shall be resolved through peaceful and friendly consultations." It further stated 
that "pending an ultimate solution of boundary question, the two sides shall 
strictly respect and observe the LAC". It also provided for "where necessary, 
the two sides shall jointly check and determine the segments of the LAC where 
they have different views as to its alignment." 
Article 2 stated that, "each side will keep its military forces in the areas 
along the line of actual control to a minimum level compatible with the friendly 
and good neighbourly relations between the two countries." Regarding 
reduction of military personnel and principle of security it further declared that 
"the two side agree to reduce their military forces along the line of actual 
control in conformity with the requirements of the principle of mutual and 
equal security to ceilings to be mutually agreed." 
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Article 3 provided that "both sides shall work out through consultations 
effective Confidence Building Measures in the areas along the line of actual 
control, neither side will undertake specified levels of military exercises in 
mutually identified zones. Each side shall give the other prior notification of 
military exercise of specified levels near the LAC " 
Article 4 stated that in case of contingencies or other problems arising in 
the areas along the Line of Actual Control. The two sides shall deal with them 
through meetings and friendly consultations between the border defence 
personnel of the two countries to sort out problems. 
Article 5 declared prevention of air intrusions and restrictions on air 
exercises in areas to be mutually agreed near the line of actual control. 
Article 6 of the agreement clearly pointed out that reference to the line 
of actual control do not prejudice the respective positions of India and China on 
the boundary questions. Nevertheless, it may be pointed out that the reference 
to the line of actual control was being used for the first time in a formal 
document signed by both the sides. 
Article 7 stated that the two sides shall agree through consultations on 
the form, method, scale and content of effective verifications measures and 
supervision required for the reduction of military forces and maintenance of 
peace and tranquillity in the areas along the Line of Actual Control under this 
agreement. 
Article 8 provided for the establishment of the Expert Group consisting 
of diplomatic and military experts to help the JWG and settlement of 
differences.^^ 
In short, the important features of 1993 Agreement were: troop 
reduction, conflict avoidance as well as notification measures and composition 
of the Expert Group. The agreement was first concrete achievement of the 
JWG. In some circles the agreement on the LAC was considered as the, "first 
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step towards a final settlement" of the border dispute between both Asian 
giants.^'' 
In the words of two seasoned Indian diplomats who speciaHze on China, 
the agreement "binds the two sides to a peaceful resolution of the boundary 
question through friendly consultation. It states that neither side shall use or 
threaten to use force against the other by a means The agreement also 
provides for retaining military forces along the Line of Actual Control to a 
minimum level compatible with friendly and good neighbourly relations 
between the two countries".^^ The 1993 agreement was undoubtedly significant 
development in the annals of bilateral relations between the two Asian giants. 
In the backdrop of Post Cold War world, it stabilized relations on the one hand 
and initiated numerous confidence building measures, on the other hand. The 
agreement in some ways was manifestations of China's good neighbourly 
policy and India's pursuance of pragmatic policy towards China. 
The positive outcome of historic Agreement of 1993 was logical 
culmination of the new chapter of diplomatic negotiations that began in 1981, 
and further carried forward by the summits at highest political level since 1988. 
All this shows that the Sino-Indian relations had reached a stage of maturity, 
which meant that the two countries would not allow their differences to hinder 
the development of their ties based on mutual benefit.^ ^ 
To further these goals a Chinese naval training frigate Zheng in 
November 1993, came on a goodwill visit to Bombay.^° The warship sailed 4, 
800 nautical miles from Shanghai to Mumbai, besides making port visits to 
Bangkok and Karachi. The process of Sino-Indian ties, now acquired a naval 
dimension.^' Later in November 1993, Chairman of CPPCC (Chinese People's 
Political Cosoltative Conference) Li Ruihuan visited India as part of ongoing 
exchange of high level political interactions and emphasized on good relations 
between two nations.^^ 
Thereafter in December 1993, the Chinese Vice Chief of General Staff, 
Lt General Xu Hui Zi, along with a high-powered army team had a meeting 
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with Lt General Surinder Wath, and his Indian counterparts, Air Chief Marshal 
SK Kaul and Admiral Shekawat. This is significant move to further military 
diplomacy considering the two countries can express hostility through the 
military medium towards each other. As a result, this strengthens the CBMs 
initiated at the political level between the two sides." 
Expert Group: 
The year 1994 witnessed the continuation of high level political and 
military exchanges. The two neighbours instituted an Expert Group that also, 
included cartographers and surveyors, to demarcate the LAC and discuss troop 
reduction.'''' The Sino-Indian Expert Group had been set up to assist the JWG in 
implementation of the Agreement on Maintenance of peace and tranquillity 
along the LAC in the India-China border areas. 
The first meeting of Sino-Indian Expert Group was held in New Delhi 
from February 3-6, 1994. The Indian delegation was led by Mr. Shiv Shankar 
Menon, Joint Secretary in the External Affairs Ministry, including 
representatives from the Ministry of External Affairs, Defence, Home Affairs, 
the Army Headquarters and the Surveyors of India. The twelve member 
Chinese delegation was led by Mr. Fu Xuezhang, Deputy Director in the 
Foreign Ministry's Asia Department and includes military experts.^^ The 
meeting discussed 'the scope of functions and powers, future tasks and 
modalities' to be foUowed.^ ^ Both sides adopted a 'constructive and forward 
looking approach'. The subjects broadly discussed were clarification of LAC 
between India and China, reduction of military forces along the line, other 
confidence building measures, such as prior notification of military exercise 
and prevention of air intrusions and verification methods. Sector wise approach 
had been adopted. Ground realities were taken into account while discussing 
the places where some differences exist." 
The second meeting ofSino Indian Expert Group was held at Beijing on 
April 21 to 23rd, 1994 and both sides agreed on the work regulation.^^ In some 
concrete manner both sides concurred that the mandate of the group meeting is 
159 
to include assisting the JWG in clarification of the LAC, redeployment of 
military forces along the LAC verification mechanisms and so on7^ 
Seventh Meeting of the Joint Working Group: 
The seventh round of JWG meeting was held at Beijing from July 6-7, 
1994, in which the Peace and Tranquillity Agreement of September 1993 got 
ratified. In addition periodical meetings of local levels between border officials 
was also discussed.^° The Indian delegation was led by Foreign Secretary K. 
Srinivasan, and the Chinese side by its Vice-Foreign Minister Jang Jiaxuan. 
Srinivasan called on the Chinese Vice Premier and Minster for Foreign Affairs 
Qian Qichen. 
India and China expressed satisfaction at the prevailing peace situation 
along the line of actual control. The two countries agreed to open trade via the 
Shipkila route on the Himachal Pradesh-Tibet border later in July. It was also 
decided that the two nations would carry out a joint study on enhancing the 
existing facilities for pilgrims to Kailash and Mansarover and the opening of 
additional routes for them.^' 
In July, the Chinese Vice Premier and Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen 
visited New Delhi and expressed satisfaction at the growing ties between both 
the nations.^ "^ General B.C. Joshi became the first Chief of Army Staff to visit 
China and met with his Chinese counterpart and other senior PLA officers in 
July. It was felt by both sides that exchanges at the level of services chiefs 
will increase the knowledge and awareness of each others capabilities and 
intention. Chinese Defence Minister, Chi Haotian led a defence delegation to 
India in September 1994, and discussed the modalities of implementing the 
agreement concerning maintenance of peace and tranquillity in border areas 
along the LAC with Indian defence personnel. The talks were said to be 
"constructive" and held in a frank and candid manner.^ "* 
Later in October India's Vice-President and old China hand Shri K. R. 
Narayanan visited China and reviewed bilateral ties with top Chinese 
leadership. The year also marked fortieth anniversary of enunciation of 
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principles of peaceful coexistence "Panchsheel", which was celebrated by both 
nations. Both sides emphasised the principles as the basic tenet of their foreign 
policies. Sino-Indian relations witnessed an exchange of visits throughout the 
year, which added to the momentum of the normalisation process. 
The Third meeting of Sino-Indian Expert Group was held in New Delhi 
from March 2-4, 1995, the two sides agreed to establish two additional 
designated points for meetings between military personnel at Nathu La in the 
Sikkim-Tibet sector and another point to be agreed in the middle sector. 
Eight Meeting of the Joint Working Group: 
The eight meeting of JWG was held at New Delhi from August 18-20, 
1995. It was during this round of talks that the Sumdorong Chu crisis of 
1986-87 was settled when both sides agreed disengage the four controversial 
posts in the area. The Sino-Indian forces in these posts were dangerously 
close; any misunderstanding could have triggered off a conflict. Both sides 
agreed to retain one post so as to facilitate dialogue on disengagement of troops 
along the entire line. It was also agreed to set up a meeting point at Nathu La 
in Sikkim state of India and Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) border. Another 
development was the recognition of "pockets of dispute" by both sides. These 
were Trig Heights and Demchok in Western Sector, Barahoti in Middle Sector, 
and Namka Chu, Sumdorong Chu, Chantze Aspahila and Longju in the Eastern 
Sector.^ ^ The meeting was originally scheduled for two days, but it was 
extended by a day to complete the task. 
The issue of transfer of Chinese M-11 missiles to Pakistan was also 
raised at the meeting but the Chinese response was a 'familiar' one. They said 
that, "the transfer conforms to the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR)" although China is not a signatory to it. The Chinese official 
also clarified that the quantum of arms supplied to Pakistan was too small and 
"will not disturb the regional balance".^ ^ Apart from the land based troops, 
their air force too developed close interactions, officers of People's Army-Air 
Force (PLAAF) have visited India's Air Force bases in 1995.^ ^ There was also 
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an emphasis on reduction and withdrawal of troops from military posts to 
ensure peace and tranquillity. MTCR and M-11 were also discussed from the 
security angle of both the countries. 
The year 1996 marked -another step forvs'ard towards CBMs, which 
would in the long term pave the way for resolution of the vexed border 
problem. The fourth round of Sino-Indian Expert Group meeting was held in 
Beijing from February 7-9, 1996. Both sides discussed concrete measures to 
implement the 1993 CBMs Agreement.^° 
Ninth Meeting of the Joint Working Group: 
The ninth round of JWG meeting held from October 16-18, 1996 in 
Beijing; both sides agreed to increase reciprocal visits by military officials with 
the rank of major general. Moreover, the agreed to establish two additional 
meeting places along the eastern sector (Bumal Dichu), and one in a mountain 
pass along the middle sector (Lipulekh near Pithrogarh) for border personnel 
regular flag meetings to be held twice a year.^' 
Jiang Zemin's India Visit: 
The Chinese President Jiang Zemin come to India on November 28, 
1996, along with high level delegation led by the Chinese Vice Premier and 
Foreign Minister, Minister for Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, 
Minister for Civil Affairs and the Chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region's 
Government. Jiang Zemin was the first de facto and de jure head of the Chinese 
government to visit India. During his four day visit, Jiang held cordial talks 
with President S.D. Sharma, Vice President K.R. Narayanan, Prime Minister 
Devgauda, External Affairs Minister I.K Gujral and other officials., Both sides 
discussed bilateral issues and reached common understanding on many 
international issue. ^ ^ Jiang said that though India and China still have "some 
outstanding problems left over from history but I can say for sure that our 
common interests far out weight our differences as neither of us poses a threat 
to the other". President Jiang urged both sides to solve the boundary issue in a 
peaceful manner and said that India should approach the problem "in a 
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forgiving and understanding manner so as to arrive at fair and reasonable 
solution".^^ 
During Jiang visit, another important step similar to 1993 Agreement 
was taken and both nations signed four important agreements-
1) The agreement on Confidence building measures (BMs) in Military 
Field along the Line of Actual Control in India-China border Areas; 
2) The agreement concerning the maintenance of the Consulate General 
of India in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of 
the People's Republic of China; 
3) The agreement on cooperation for combating illicit trafficking in 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substance and other crimes; and 
4) The agreement on maritime transport. Among all these, the 
agreement on CBMs was of foremost importance, and was signed by 
I.K. Gujral and Qian Qichen both Foreign Ministers of respective 
nations on November 29, 1996. 
The agreement pronounced that the suggested measures aim at "a fair, 
reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement" of the vexed boundary 
question.^^ The 1996 Agreement called for building a "long-term good 
neighbourly relationship" and "effective" CBMs by mutual reduction of forces 
on both sides.^^ About the agreement, Jiang said that it was a major step 
towards building mutual trust and setting the atmosphere for resolving the 
border problem.^^ The 1996 Agreement comprised of twelve articles. The 
preamble to the agreement mentions the five principles of peaceful coexistence 
and notes that "it serves the fundamental interests of the peoples of India and 
China to foster a long-term good neighbourly relations" .^ ^ 
The very first Article of the agreement is very significant, which says, 
"Neither side shall use its military capability against the other side". Article II 
stated that "the two sides reiterate their determination to seek a fair, reasonable 
and mutually acceptable settlement of the boundary question". Article III went 
into specific details about reduction of military forces "within mutually agreed 
geographical Zones" along the LAC, the exchange of data on reduction of 
forces and categories of armaments, and decisions on ceilings on military 
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forces and armaments to be kept by each side within these zones. The ceiling 
would be inconsonance with the principle of "mutual and equal security". 
Article IV to VIII dealt with various CBMs designed to stabilize the border 
areas and exchange of information etc. Article IX provided for "in case a 
doubtful situation develops... either side has the right to seek a clarification 
from the other side". 
The declaration of Article X was important. It recognised the need for 
the two sides to arrive at a common understanding of the aligrmient of the 
LAC, and to speed up the process of clarification and confirmation of the line. 
Initially, the exercise would be to clarify the alignment in those segments 
where both sides have different perceptions. There is also a stipulation for the 
exchange of maps indicating respective perceptions of the entire alignment of 
the LAC as soon as possible". Article XI was equally important and stated that 
detailed implement measures required under Article I and Article X of this 
Agreement, shall be decided through mutual consultations in the Sino-Indian 
Joint Working Group on the boundary question. The Sino-Indian Diplomatic 
and Militar)' Expert Group shall assist the JWG in devising implementation 
measures under the Agreements. According to Article XII, this agreement is 
subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of exchange of 
instruments of ratification. 
The Agreement of 1996 was based on the foundation of Agreement of 
1993 was undoubtedly as significant development in the bilateral Sino-Indian 
relations. The Chinese President, Jiang Zemin termed the agreement as a factor 
that would further enhance peace and security and eventually create a sound 
climate for the resolution of the boimdaiy question.^^ Over all, Jiang's visit was 
significant in political and economic level as both sides reiterated desire to 
further continue the process of rapprochement. Apart from ongoing efforts to 
resolve the border dispute, both nations emphasised on strengthening economic 
and trade relations and enhanced cooperation in Science and technology and 
other areas. The two sides also agreed to work towards a constructive and 
cooperative relationship oriented towards the ?1' ' century.'°' The momentum of 
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the exchange of high level visits by two countries enhanced mutual 
understanding and confidence. 
Sino-Indian relations in January 1997 commenced with the visit of an 
Indian Parliamentary Affairs delegation headed by Minister of State for law 
and Justice Ramakant D Khalap to China. Chinese political leader Wang 
Bingqian, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee met the delegation in 
Beijing. The Chinese Foreign Minister spokesman expressed hope that the 
1996 agreement would fructify into a final solution over the border dispute 
under the premiership of IK Gujral. The Indian Vice-Chief of Army Staff 
Lt General VP Malik met with Chinese Defence Mininster Chi Haotian in 
Beijing. The visit marked another step in the process of creating normally on 
the Sino-Indian border that began in 1993 with Rao's China visit. Apart from 
these visits, the two sides attempted to develop their bilateral trade ties with 
each other.'°'' 
The year 1997 saw the continuation of meetings. The fifth round of 
Sino-Indian Expert Group meeting was held in New Delhi from March 3-5, 
1997. Both sides discussed establishing an additional meeting site in the eastern 
sector and also rearrangement of meeting times.'"^ China wants to develop 
friendly relations with India as it is essential for peace and stability in the Asia-
Pacific region and in the world.'"'' 
Tenth Meeting of the Joint Working Group: 
The tenth round of JWG meeting was held in New Delhi, from August 
4-5, 1997. Agreements signed during the visit of Jiang Zemin in November 
1996 were ratified. The two sides focused on implementing the 1993 and 1996 
CBM agreements and pledged to continue dialogue on a mutually acceptable 
border.'"' Th( ;re was no substantive progress during the meetings. The JWG 
thus proved quite effective in building confidence measure along the LAC and 
restoring lost trust between the India and Chinese people. The border areas are 
said to be comparatively peaceful since the initiation of various rounds of talks 
by the JWG.'°^ 
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According to an Indian analyst the main obstacle was that both sides 
were still unable to narrow their differences on troop reductions along the 
border. Further because of domestic compulsions, the Government of ROI 
faced constraints in moving ahead without much Chinese support on the issue 
of border dispute. Recognizing this fact both sides pursued step-by-step 
approach. Nonetheless, the positive factor of peaceful border was recognized 
by both nations. In the words of a Chinese Analyst, "with the signing of the 
LAC agreement, the legalistic and historical framework of the border claims 
has been thrown on the remotest back burner, or even behind the burner shelf 
There is widespread support to the LAC agreement in both India and China, 
which will further strengthen the determination of Indian and Chinese leaders 
to boost the momentum for exploring a final solution". The Agreements were 
seen as steps based on "rational politics and objectives realities" in the course 
of the comprehensive border settlement. 
Later in October 1997, Gen. VP Malik the Vice Chief of the Army Staff 
visited Beijing. Both sides in some ways concurred that these visits would give 
an impetus to the ongoing military confidence building and would result in the 
establishment of a regular communication channel between the two armed 
forces. The net affect of regular political interactions and military exchanges 
were positive. Indeed till the year 1997 the bilateral relations registered upward 
momentum. Overall the pace of Sino-Indian negotiations witnessed certain 
dynamism and indeed brought about stable ties between these two important 
rising powers. But on the other hand some circles in India were not totally 
satisfied with the overall pace of negotiations to resolve border issue with 
China. However, in India there was "a palpable under lying reality, namely that 
It was not relationship between equals". 
China by mid nineties had grown both in economic and military terms 
into a fast rising regional power with aspirations towards global power as such 
being its neighbour India right fully head anxiety about behaviour and intention 
of substantive rise of China as well its implications for India's security. 
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As two noted diplomats wrote that "it is a fact however, that progress in 
their implementation has been rather slow".'"^ Still India pursued the policy of 
continuation of talks and serious engagement. At the same time being a rising 
power itself India in its rightful search for power was also looking for building 
leverages with China. India perceived that leverages would enhance its position 
including acceleration of pace of negotiations to resolve border issue as well as 
better understanding of its security concerns by China. Therefore, India 
continued to pursue two pronged policy viz., engagement and building 
leverages with China. "'^  This shows that India acted as a matured nation in the 
interest of peace and stability. 
The first important bilateral contact of the year 1998 was in April when 
the Chief of General Staff of PLA, General Fu Quanyou visited India as part of 
exchange of high level military visits. It was for the first time that the Chief of 
PLA was in India as such it was important development."° General Fu told 
media persons that it was important for both sides to carry out gradual and 
early demarcation of the Line of Actual Control. In talks with the PLA Chief, 
the ministry of defence, GOI raised the contentious issues of Sino-Pak missile 
and nuclear collaborations, wrong projection of the Chinese maps and the 
border disputes along with the issue of the LAC.'" More specifically, India's 
Defence Minister George Femandes in talks with the PLA Chief of staff made 
clear India's concern and objections to China's transfer of missile and missile 
technology to Pakistan. To this General Fu emphasised the Chinese viev^oint 
that the relations among nations be based on the five principles of peaceful 
co-existence as agreed by both the sides. Finally, Prime Minister Vajpayee 
cleared India's position by stating that improvements in Sino-Indian relations 
"should be based on the recognition and respect for each other's concerns". 
At the end of the talks India and China committed themselves to peaceful 
resolution of bilateral disputes."^ 
Later, the Defence Minister George Femandes called China a "bigger 
potential threat" than Pakistan. He stated that a massive electronic surveillance 
establishment by Beijing in CoCo Islands near Andaman and Nicobar Islands 
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was monitoring everything in India. He further stated that there were moves by 
China to convert the surveillance set up into a major naval base which could be 
a direct threat to us."'* Femandes reiterated that "China has provided Pakistan 
with both missile as well as nuclear know-how". He also stated that China has 
its nuclear weapons stockpiled in Tibet right along India's borders, where a lot 
of elongation of air fields is going on to station Russia made Sukhoi. Further on 
the eastern frontier with Myanmar, he said that Chinese have trained and 
equipped the Burmese army. These factors point out that the potential threat 
from China was greater than that of Pakistan."^ 
China on its part expressed utmost regret and resentment over the 
statement by India's Defence Minister and stated that it has "seriously 
destroyed the good atmosphere of improved relations between the two 
countries". The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Zhu Bang Zao, termed 
Fernandes statement as absolutely ridiculous and unworthy of refutation. He 
described Femandes "criticism of China's relations with other countries" as 
absolutely fictitious and entirely baseless. The spokesman stated that "China 
does not constitute any threat to other countries" and it has no basis in fact, 
therefore, 'the Chinese side has to express extreme regret and indignation over 
this"."^ The Chinese side first signalled in a nuanced way the mild break down 
when its spokesman stated that Femandes statement has "seriously destroyed", 
atmosphere of improved bilateral relations. India on its part continued to 
reiterate its faith in the dialogue mode and later on the Ministry of Extemal 
Affairs stated that New Delhi "remains committed to the process of dialogue 
for the development of a friendly, cooperative, good-neighbourly, mutually 
beneficial relationship with China, our largest neighbour". 
It appeared in April 1998 that the normalisation of relations between 
India and China was going in the right direction. However, India 11 days after 
the Chinese Defence Minister Fu Quanyou's departure from India, exploded its 
nuclear devices."^ Consequently on May 11 and 13, 1998 India tested five 
nuclear devices, including one hydrogen bomb and the tests brought about an 
end to ambiguity and uncertainly about India's nuclear posture. 
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China's response to the Indian Nuclear Test: 
The Chinese government was deeply shocked by the Indian nuclear tests 
and thereby expresses its strong condemnation. China voiced its concern by 
pointing out that the explosions ran against the international trend and were 
detrimental to the peace and stability of the South Asian region."^ Further, the 
official media like People's Daily reported: Indian today conducted three 
underground nuclear tests in the Pokharan area of Rajasthan. Twenty-four 
years ago, in May 1974, India carried out its nuclear explosion at the same 
location. According to reports, India's major opposition parties, the Congress 
and the United Front, and other parties have expressed support for this nuclear 
tests.'^° 
China's initial reaction to the Indian tests was somewhat measured; 
however, China's reaction and condemnation to India was strongest when 
Indian Prime Minister, A.B. Vajpayee's letter to the US President, Bill Clinton, 
appeared in the media citing "China threat" in defence of India's nuclear tests. 
Vajpayee had cited "deteriorating security environment" in India's vicinity is a 
matter of concern for India as in China, India had an "overt nuclear weapons 
state" on its borders which was "materially helping another neighbour" of India 
to become a covert nuclear weapon state. This in the words of Vajpayee created 
"an atmosphere of distrust" and remains so due to the unsettled border 
problem. The letter was leaked and appeared in the New York Times on May 
13, 1998 itself'^' Now, partly bitten by Indian Defence Minister, George 
Femandes's China bashing and more so by Vajpayee's letter to the US 
President, China's reaction to the second series of nuclear explosions of May 
13 was harsh. It accused that the Indian detonations reflected an "outrageous 
contempt for the common will of the international community", and further 
accused India of seeking "hegemony in South Asia". China also called on the 
international community that it should adopt a common position in strongly 
demanding India to immediately stop its nuclear development program. 
Undoubtedly Indian nuclear tests of May 1998 and subsequent strong 
Chinese response both caused 'major set back' in bilateral relations. China had 
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carried out an anti-India campaign world wide demanding New Delhi surrender 
its nuclear option and unconditionally sign non-proliferation treaties like the 
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT). This had vitiated Sino-Indian ties with many other official 
interactions along being either postponed or delayed. Moreover the few 
interactions that held were also not as friendly as they could have been.'^^ 
In short there was brief breakdown in Sino-Indian negotiations in the year 
1998. 
Despite the negative atmosphere, India continued the policy of 
engagement and went ahead with the sixth meeting of Sino-Indian Expert 
Group was held at Beijing on June 8-9, 1998. The meeting of India-China 
expert group was eclipsed by Indian nuclear test (May 1998) therefore, 
no concrete progress could be made. The frequent emphasis on early solutions 
of boundarj^ issue from India's side was not liked by Chinese officials. 
The Chinese foreign ministry spokesman expressed his reaction that the Indian 
government's statements against China had infringed the normal peace process 
between India and China. Moreover, he suggested that India should refrain 
from giving negative perceptional remarks against China so that the bilateral 
relations might be strengthened on the track of normalcy and harmony.'^'' 
India on the other hand, kept on trying to fix a date for the Joint 
Working Group meeting throughout the second half of the year but China did 
not agree.'^^ The joint mechanisms failed to materialise in 1998 and there was 
break-down in the process of Sino-Indian negotiations despite India's sincere 
efforts to continue with it. The summer of 1998 witnessed the lowest ebb of 
Sino-Indian bilateral relations after a long period of time. 
The Chinese ambassador, Zhou Gang in India on July 9, 1998, in an 
interview to The Hindu reiterated that China was committed to "develop 
construcfive partnership with India oriented towards the 21^' century." Zhou 
Gang also emphasized that India immediately stop some baseless allegations 
towards China and give responsible explanation to anti-China remarks made by 
some people. The first opportunity for rapprochement came in July 1998 in 
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Manila during the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional 
Forum meeting from July 25-28. After May nuclear detonations this was first 
major encounter of India with the world leaders. 
Jaswant Singh, India's External Affairs Minister explained to the forum 
that nuclear tests were conducted out of India's security concerns. He refrained 
from citing China as a threat. During the conference Jaswant Singh also 
had a meeting with his Chinese counterpart, Mr. Tang Jiaxuam. This was the 
highest-level contact both countries had made smce the May 1998 nuclear 
explosions.'^ ^ 
In fact throughout the year India showed it willingness to continue the 
policy of engagement with China and attended meetings of various bilateral 
mechanisms. Despite refusal from Chinese side, India made 'consistent 
overturns' and 'conciliatory statements' to assuage perceived Chinese ruffled 
feeling in a bid to reduce bilateral tensions. The Prime Minister Vajpayee in a 
concrete statement to Parliament in September 1998, emphasised 'the 
fundamental Indian desire to have friendly relations with China' and 'a 
satisfactory solution to the border dispute through negotiation.' Another step 
taken in September was to instruct diplomats to 'avoid any mentions of China 
in their dealings with the other four permanent powers.''^^ Furthermore, the 
statement in October 1998 by the Chief of the Indo-Tibetan Border police that 
the Chinese were amassing troops along the LAC was also 'termed as 
inaccurate' by the government of India.'^' Carrying this further forward, in 
October, Brajesh Mishra, Principal Secretary to Prime Minister stated that India 
did not see China as "an enemy" and that it would like to solve all problems 
through substantive dialogue.'^ ° Finally in December 1998 when Jaswant Singh 
was appointed as India's new Foreign Minister, the Chinese counterpart. Tang 
Jiaxuan sent a congratulatory message to him. Jaswant Singh stated that China 
should help India "untie the knot" through frequent consultation.''" Thus atleast 
by the year end both sides showed willingness in some ways to restart 
engagement policy. India's diplomatic relations with China remained estranged 
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for 9 months. By February 1999, both appeared to be tying to reconcile their 
differences.'^^ 
Eleventh Meeting of the Joint Working Group: 
The eleventh Joint Working Group meeting held on April 26 and 27, 
1999 formed the first institutional contact between the two countries after 
India's nuclear tests in May 1998, which disturbed the rotational cycle of the 
meetings.'" This marks a u-turn in Sino-Indian ties. The meeting was chaired 
by the Indian Foreign Secretary, K. Raghunath and Chinese Vice-Foreign 
Minister, Yang Wenchang. Both sides argued that the Panchsheel 
(five principles of peaceful coexistence) policy should form the basis for 
strengthening relations between the two countries.'^'' It discussed the ways and 
means of developing "friendly, good neighbourly relations" and expanding 
understanding on issues of mutual concern.'^^ As this was the first meeting of 
the JWG after Pokharan II tests, India assured the Chinese side that it did not 
regard China as a security threat. In the meeting both sides decided to further 
expand ties in other fields and opined that there was considerable scope for 
developing bilateral relations in economic, commercial and other fields. 
Further both, sides agreed that India and China have to play an important role 
in "shaping the emerging new world order".'•'^Thus this round of talks was 
confined to improve the general tenor of relations rather than discuss the border 
issue. There was no progress in delineating the LAC at this meeting but 
Sino-Pak nexus in the nuclear field came up for discussion. Interestingly, on 
the eve of the meeting, the former Chinese Ambassador, Chan Ruisheng, 
suggested that China should recognise Sikkim as an integral part of India if the 
latter opens up trade routes in the Indo-Tibetan regions.'^^ During External 
Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh's visit to Beijing in June 1999, it was decided 
that both sides would make clarifications on the LAC along the border in the 
subsequent JWG meetings. ''"^  The visit marked the resumption of high-level 
dialogue. Both sides stated that they were not a threat to each other. Both sides 
agreed on a need for a bilateral security dialogue.'"" Under the joint effort of 
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both governments, the current Sino-Indian relations began to move out of the 
shadows and return to a healthy orbit.'''^ 
Later in November 1999 the seventh meeting of Sino-Indian Expert 
Group was held in New Delhi. In the meeting both sides reiterated their 
commitment to maintain peace and tranquillity as envisaged by the agreements 
of 1993 and 1996.'''^ Though no concrete progress was registered still the fact 
that China considered the meeting as forward movement was notable and 
signified the continuity of efforts to resolve the issue.''*'' 
The momentum of visits continued as India and China moved ahead in 
different areas of bilateral relationship such as trade, cultural exchanges, 
military exchanges, security dialogues, science and technology cooperation 
etc.'''^ The year 2000 was an important year for India and China, for it was the 
50'*' anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between these two 
countries.'''^ Commerce and industry Minister, Murosoli Maran visited China 
for the meeting of the Sino-Indian Joint Economic Group on economic 
relations and trade, science and technology in Beijing on February 21-22; 2000. 
During this visit, the two sides signed an agreement on issues relating to WTO 
and signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for setting up a Joint 
Working Group in the field of steel. Both sides agreed to facilitate the 
exchange of visits between the business communities; establishment of 
business representative offices in each other's territory; organisation of 
exhibitions and trade fairs, encouraging greater participation in them, etc. They 
also agreed on the need to improve bilateral direct banking, shipping and air 
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services. 
The first round of the Security Dialogue was held in Beijing on March 
6-7, 2000."'*^ During the first roimd, India sought Chinese understanding for its 
nuclear weapons programmes. But China on the contrary, asked India to 
renounce its nuclear weapons programme and abide by the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1172. India rejected Chinese plea for implementation of 
Security Council Resolution and reiterated that every nation has a right to 
determine its own security requirements. More importantly, India took up the 
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issue of Chinese assistance to Pakistan's nuclear and missile programme. The 
Indian officials conveyed to their Chinese counterpart that this had an adverse 
impact on regional stabilit}' to which we have been obliged to respond in a 
'responsible and restrained' manner.''*^ As was the usual practice, China replied 
that its relations with Pakistan were normal relations between two states and 
were not directed against India.'^"Thus, the first meeting in which security 
specific issues were raised was a notable development in Sino-Indian relations. 
Viewed in the long-term of bilateral relations, to expect concrete result in one 
or two meetings was unrealistic as well. As such, this development of security 
dialogue symbolised the continuation of Sino-Indian rapprochement. On April 
1, 2000, India and China jointly commemorated the 50"^  anniversary of the 
establishment of diplomatic relations Heads of State and Government and 
Foreign Ministers of the two countries exchanges congratulatory messages, and 
embassies in both countries held commemorative receptions. 
Twelfth Meeting of the Joint Working Group: 
The twelfth meeting of the JWG on border talks was held in New Delhi, 
on April 28 and 29, 2000. The Indian side was led by Foreign Secretary Lalit 
Man Singh and Chinese side by the Vice Foreign Ministers, Yang Wenchang, 
including the Director - General of the Asian department, Zhang Juihuan and 
officials from the PLA.'^' They discussed the border issue and the President 
Narayanan's upcoming visit to Beijing.'^^ It was decided during the meeting 
that the Experts Group would meet "as frequently as required" to discuss about 
the LAC.'^^ Adopting a "forward looking" approach, both sides agreed to 
exchange maps as a further step towards working on the identification of the 
LAC.'^'^ Thus they agreed to conduct "maps exercise", which basically meant 
exchange and comparison of their respective maps on the LAC and was step 
forward in 'identification of the line'. Accordingly, both sides close the middle 
sector as the first section to determine, as it was less disputable in comparison 
with the other two sectors of border.'^^ The discussion also included 
clarification of the LAC and CBMs between the militaries.'^^ 
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After the JWG meeting, it seems that India has 'stepped up its efforts 
to find an early resolution' of the intractable border issue. In April 2000, 
the Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh conveyed to the members of Chinese 
delegation of the JWG that India strongly desires "result oriented 
negotiations".'^' The year 2000 was an important years for India and China, for 
it was the SO"' anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between 
these two countries. Another positive development was the visit of Indian 
President, KR Narayanan in May-June 2000 to China.'^^ 
K.R Narayanan's China Visit: 
The President of India, KR Narayanan visited China from May 28 to 
June 3, 2000 at the invitation of President Jiang Zemin. This was the first visit 
by the highest level leader since the May 1998 test and reciprocated Jiang 
Zemin's 1996 visit to India.'^' China attached great importance to Narayanan's 
visit. Two weeks prior to Narayanan's Beijing visit, China said it "consider the 
upcoming visit of Mr. Narayanan as a big event". Dai Bingguo, member of the 
central committee of the CCP and Minister for International Department, 
describe Indian President as "a friend of China" and praised Narayanan's 
contributions for promotion of Sino-Indian relations. The official fiirther 
remarked that China admires and respects him and hopes the upcoming 
visit will make great contributions to the improvement and development of 
state-to-state relations between the two countries. 
During his visit, it repeated its position that border issue is left over by 
history, Narayanan correctly stated that 'inherited problems' needed to be 
resolved and must not be left over for history.'^' Narayanan had usefiil and 
constructive discussions with the top Chinese leadership including President, 
Jiang Zemin, Premier, Zhu Rongji, NPC Chairman, Li Peng and CPPCC 
Chairman, Li Ruihuan. The two Presidents agreed to enhance bilateral 
interaction, including at the highest level, and to enhance bilateral cooperation 
m all areas. All the meetings were characterised by warmth and friendliness 
and marked by expressions of goodwill and hopes for a close, cooperative 
relationship. A significant agreement was signed on the establishment of an 
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Eminent Persons Group (EPG), which would further assist the process of 
bilateral understanding and amity.'^^ During the visit, the Chinese President 
Jiang Zemin advanced a four-point proposal for solving bilateral issues as 
follows: -
1. Increase bilateral visits at various levels to enhance mutual confidence; 
2. Expansion of trade and economic cooperation that would include 
encouraging entrepreneurs of both countries to invest in each other's 
country; 
3. Strengthening of cooperation and coordination in world affairs; and 
4. Proper, handling of issue left over from the past in the spirit of seeking 
common ground, while reserving differences. This does not mean 
shelving the disputes forever, nor does it mean developing bilateral 
relations only after all disputes are completely resolved.'^'* The proposal 
also called for strengthening "coordination and cooperation in 
international affairs, and make joint efforts for the establishment of a 
just and reasonable new international political and economic order. 
Thus, the visit symbolised the continuation of beneficial political 
interactions at the highest political level. 
As a result of India's stepped up efforts to find resolution of the border 
issue, China in some ways agreed to 'quicken the pace of the negotiations'. As 
the Indian sources pointed out, the first ever exchange of maps took place only 
after the Indian Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh wrote to his Chinese 
counterpart and urged him to expedite the process of clarification and 
confirmation of the L.A.C. in the Sino-Indian border areas.'^^ In the words of 
an analyst, "However, this does not imply any shift in China's management of 
the border problem".'" 
The eighth round of Sino-Indian Expert Group meeting was held on 
November 13 and 14, 2000 in Beijing. For the first time both sides exchanged 
maps on the 545 km long middle sector of the Sino-Indian border.'^^ On the 
one hand, this process continued but China on the other hand also continued to 
emphasis the need for, "patience and right conditions" to settle the vexed Sino-
Indian border issue. 
In January 2001, Li Peng, Chairman of the Chinese National People's 
Congress (NPC) standing committee, outlined some 'basic tenets' of China's 
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policy towards India, which included "a pohticai commitment at the top in 
Beijing to intensify the relationship, expansion of economic cooperation, 
enhancing mutual understanding by addressing outstanding issue such as the 
border dispute, and an assurance that China stood for peace and stability in the 
subcontinenf .'^ ^ Li Peng emphasised the point that "developing good-
neighbourly and friendly relations with India is our permanent guideline as 
well as the important content of China's foreign policy of peripheral peace".'^^ 
The visit of Li Peng to India was a major step forward in Sino-Indian 
rapprochement. The visit was first by 'a top-level Chinese visitors since the 
May 1998 tests, and the first since Jiang Zemin's 1996 visit.'^' Li Peng stated 
that "in the spirit of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation, the 
boundary dispute can be resolved.'^^ 
Li touched on various issues and elaborated China's thinking on various 
regional and international issues. Li echoed Chinese leadership's worry about 
the challenges posed by globalisation and the current reality of a unipolar 
world. While accepting globalisation as "an unavoidable reality in the world 
today", he, added that the international community "should work hard to ensure 
that globalisation leads to a balanced stable and sustainable development of the 
world economy". On the question of international terrorism, Li for the first 
time clarified China's position and expressed China's willingness to cooperate 
with India. He said, like India, China views international terrorism as a big 
threat to its national security. Li's India visit was regarded as yet another step 
in the direction of deepening understanding and building trust between India 
and China.'^^ 
The second round of security dialogue was held in New Delhi on 
February 8, 2001. India again conveyed its concern to China over Beijing's 
supply of nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan.'^'' As was the usual 
Chinese reply, it again stated that Sino-Pakistan relations were not aimed 
against India. 
The other feature of the normalisation process was that of military 
diplomacy wherein an Indian three star General HRS Kalkat and an army 
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delegation met the PLA Chief of staff General Fu Quanyou and the deputy 
PLA Chief Xiong Guangkai in April 2001.'" They emphasized on the fact that 
both sides should resolve their existing problems with 'mutual understanding, 
mutual concession and mutual adjustment'.'^^ In May, the Chief of staff of 
Indian Air Force on its part stated that "it is primarily a goodwill visit and an 
opportunity to strengthen bilateral military relations".'^^ Further in May, two 
Chinese naval ships Harbin, a Luhu class destroyer and Tailing, a fuquing class 
replenishmentship visited Mumbai in a goodwill mission.'^ 
Another important Chinese dignitary to visit India was Li Changchun, 
member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party and Party Secretary 
of Guangdong province. Li visited India at the invitation of External Affairs 
Minister, Jaswant Singh, from May 12-18, 2001. He called on the President of 
India. Narayanan, and met External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh and 
Pramod Mahajan, Minister for Information Technology and Parliamentary 
Affairs. Li on his part said that China and India, as the two largest developing 
countries, had a common responsibility to promote economic development, 
promote the well being of the two peoples and also further strengthen bilateral 
ties. Li also said that the commonalities between India and China for 
outweighed the differences.'^^ 
Later on June 28 and 29, 2001, the ninth meeting of Sino-lndian Expert 
Group was held in New Delhi. The delegations of both sides reviewed the other 
side's maps and exchanged views about differences.'^^ Dr. Najma HepatuUa, 
Deputy Chairperson, Rajya Sabha led a Parliamentary-cum-business-cum-trade 
union delegation to China from July 1-7, 2001 at the invitation of Li Peng, 
Chairman of the National People's Congress. During her visit. Dr. Hepatulla 
called on Li Peng and Zhu Rongji, the Chinese Premier. The Chinese leaders 
conveyed satisfaction at the improving Sino-lndian relations and their sound 
development in recent time. Both sides expressed their desire to strengthen 
bilateral economic relations, and the need for further contacts between 
businessman of two countries to enhance their understanding of each other's 
economy and market.'^' 
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Thirteenth Meeting of the Joint Working Group: 
The thirteenth meeting of JWG was held on July 31-August 1, 2001 at 
Beijing. During meeting both sides adopted a constructive and forward-looking 
approach. Both sides agreed that the present momentum in bilateral relations 
should be maintained and enhanced through further high-level exchanges. Both 
sides reviewed the work being done by JEG on the clarification and 
confirmation of the LAC, and on the implementation of CBMs. In the JEG 
meetings, views are being exchanged on the maps depicting the LAC as 
perceived by the two sides. The Indian Foreign Secretary, and Vice Foreign 
Minister of China, Wang Yi, also exchanged views on the international 
situation. There was agreement that the improvement and further development 
of Sino-Indian relations will make an important contribution to peace and 
stability in Asia and the world. The Foreign Secretary also called on the 
Chinese Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan and Dai Bingguo, Minister of 
International Department of the CCP on August 1, 2001.'^^ 
After the September 11 bombings of twin towers in New York, both 
India and China expressed their desire for greater cooperation. Suresh Prabhu, 
the Minister of Power visited China from September 17-23, 2001 and 
Jagmohan, the Minister of Tourism visited China from November 8-11, 2001. 
During his meeting with his Chinese counterpart, both sides agreed to explore 
the vast potentials in the tourism industry.'^'' Furthermore, on December 17 and 
18 the tenth round of Sino-Indian Expert Group was held in Beijing. Both sides 
continued to exchange opinions on clarifying and confirming the middle sector 
alignment.'^'' 
Zhu Rongji's India visit: 
The year 2002 witnessed the continuation of mutual interaction at the 
highest political level. Chinese Premier, Zhu Rongji visited India from January 
13-18, 2002 has been hailed as a new milestone in the Sino-Indian relations. 
It was significant, as the Chinese Premier was visiting India after a gap of 
eleven years since Premier Li Peng's visit in 1991 and returned the visit of 
India's Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao in September 1993. As such, the visit 
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was significant and showed the positive outcome of continuation of political 
interactions at the high level. The Chinese Premier expressed confidence that 
his visit would help in promoting mutual trust and cooperation between the two 
countries and "inject new vitality" for a sound development of the Sino-Indian 
constructive partnership in the new century.'*^ The Chinese Premier stressed 
that China was "willing to work with the Indian government and people to 
continuously push forward Sino-Indian relations on the basis of the five 
Principles of Peaceful Co-existence".'^  
During his visit. Premier Zhu put forward five-point proposal to develop 
bilateral relations: 
1. Maintaining high-level mutual visits, and exchanges in different fields; 
2. Strengthening mutual beneficial cooperation in economic and trade 
fields; 
3. Improving the exchanges and cooperation in scientific and technological 
fields; 
4. Promoting regional economic cooperation, and 
5. Properly resolving problems in the bilateral relations. 
During Chinese Premier's India visit, significant progress was made in 
the economic sphere. On January 14, 2002, India and China signed six major 
agreements in New Delhi, dealing with economic cooperation, tourism, and 
peaceful developments of outer space, water conservancy, science and culture. 
Zhu also announced that in order to facilitate persormel exchanges between the 
two sides, the Chinese side have decided to open a regular flight from Beijing 
to New Delhi fi-om late March 2002. Further, Premier Zhu met with the top 
Indian leadership and exchanged views on bilateral, regional and international 
issues. He stated that there is more consensus than division, more interest than 
friction, and problems between the two nations can be solved through 
consultation. Agreeing with his Chinese counterpart, the Indian Prime Minister 
said China does not pose any threat to India, nor does India believe that China 
regards India as a threat. The President, K.R. Narayanan and Foreign Minister 
Jaswant Singh shared the same view and said that the existing problems 
between the two nations should not hinder the development of Sino-Indian 
ties.'^ ^ 
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On border issue, Zhu remarked that after years of efforts, both sides had 
reached consensus on the important principle of "mutual understanding, 
accommodation and adjustment" and had signed two important agreements on 
maintaining peace and tranquillity and taking CBMs along the LAC in the 
border areas. Vajpayee hoped India to establish dialogue mechanism with the 
Chinese side in various fields and also expects the annual consultation of the 
JWG on the border issue to continue Vajpayee underscored the need to resolve 
border issue in a "just, reasonable and mutually acceptable way". Both sides 
expressed satisfaction on the work being done by the JWG and Expert Group 
for the resolution of border issue. Both sides agreed to accelerate the process of 
clarification and confirmation of the LAC along the Sino-Indian boundary. On 
relations between India and Pakistan, the Chinese Premier repeated China's 
position on the issue, noting that as a friendly neighbour of both countries, 
China sincerely hoped that both sides could resolve their disputes through 
consultation and other peaceful methods.'^ ^ 
Zhu further proposed that India and China work together to promote 
each other in the Information Technology sector and "make progress together". 
In short, the visit of Zhu Rongji was a major step forward in the peace process 
of Sino-Indian negotiations. The visit has enhanced the friendship between 
India and China, increased bilateral understanding and trust, and promoted 
exchange and cooperation in wide ranging fields.'^' Therefore, the visit of 
Chinese Premier, Zhu Rongji was an important step forward in further 
improving the bilateral relations between both sides. 
The meeting of Sino-Indian Joint S & T committee on Scientific and 
Technological cooperation was held in New Delhi on February 8, 2002. 
On March 5, the eleventh meeting of Sino-Indian Expert Group was held in 
New Delhi. During the meeting both sides exchanged opinions on clarifying 
and confirming the LAC alignment establishing more CBI's and general 
improvement of over all relationship.'^' Later in March, Jaswant Singh, 
External Affairs Minister of India paid a five-day visit to China from March 29 
to April 2, 2002. The visit was marked by his assertion that India and China, 
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in a major step towards an eventual resolution of the vexations boundary 
dispute, have agreed to complete the delineation of the line of Actual Control 
(LAC) on their contested border within a reasonable time frame. Jaswant Singh 
stated that the accelerated schedule for talks on the LAC "is something India 
has not been able to achieve for the last fifty years". '^ ^ He said that after the 
successful conclusion of the exchange of maps on the middle sector of the 
border, earlier in March 2002, the two sides would begin an exchange of maps 
on the western sector in June.'^'' Both nations hope to conclude the process of 
clarification of the western sector by the end of this year. Maps relating to the 
eastern sector will be exchanged early next year. In the words of Minister, once 
the exchange of maps is complete, there will be "very little scope for 
confusion" and the process of delineation will begin. This development, 
according to Jaswant Singh will help both sides to reach a settlement of the 
dispute.'^ ^ 
In course of interaction with the Chinese academic community at the 
Shanghai Institute for International Studies, the Foreign Minister was asked 
whether it was possible to resolve the boundary dispute. The Minister said, "it 
can and must be resolved. The shadows of the past should not be allowed to 
affect the future" of bilateral relations. It would be "a crime against our people 
and humanity if we allowed it to happen". He added that both the Governments 
were addressing the issues relating to the boundary in a "purposeful manner 
and will continue to do so in the future.'^ ^ The Minister's statement underlined 
more keenness on the part of India to resolve the border issue in the face of 
China's insistence on patience to resolve the issue. The twelfth meeting ofSino-
Indian Expert Group was held in Beijing on June 17, 2002. Both sides 
exchanged views on the building up of trust and implementation of the CBMs, 
but did not exchange western sector maps as planned. Commenting on the 
ongoing round of meetings to resolve the border issue, one analyst wrote that 
"Given the current tempo of the talks, however, the clarification of the entire 
LAC will not be a short term process; there will be great leap forward to a final 
settlement about the alignment of the entire border. Moreover, China's 
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reluctance to set a time frame to clarify and confirm the LAC may result in a 
delay of the border resolution". '^ '' 
Fourteenth Meeting of the Joint Working Group: 
Fourteenth meeting of the Joint Working Group was held on November 
21, 2002 in New Delhi. China's Vice-Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, led the 
Chinese delegation, while Foreign Secretary of India represented the Indian 
side. It was decided that the exchange of maps in the western sector of the LAC 
would be discussed at the next meeting. Since 1960 no maps were exchanged 
in the contentious western sector. It has been considerable time since the maps 
of the middle sector were exchanged. According to a spokesperson of the 
Ministry of External Affairs, these were "complicated issues" and both sides 
were approaching these in a "constructive manner". The spokesperson also 
revealed that the dates for a visit by the Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, 
to China, were "under discussion". In a statement, the spokesman said that "a 
detailed review of bilateral relations between India and China since the 13' 
meeting of the JWG on July 31, 2001, took place" during the fourteenth round 
of talks. According to the statement, "both sides also viewed the functioning of 
the existing dialogue mechanisms such as on counter terrorism and security. 
The usefulness of these dialogues and need to sustain and broaden them was 
reaffirmed". Regional issues were also discussed and China said it did not 
judge relations with India simply from a South Asia perspective. The JWG has 
generated remarkable results in initiating the CBMs. Its achievement on the 
alignment of the LAC has been limited. 
In January 2003 the speaker of Indian Parliament, Lok Sabha, Manohar 
Joshi visited China as part of high-level contacts. Defence Minister, George 
Femandes paid a weeklong official visit to China from April 21-28, 2003 at the 
invitation of Chinese Defence Minister, General Cao Gangchuan. George 
Femandes was only the second Defence Minister of India to visit China; 
Sharad Pawar was the first (1992). There is not much defence cooperation 
between India and China; however, since the inking of 1993 and 1996 
agreements on building CBMs, the defence ties have become pertinent for 
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building any "mutual trust and understanding". '^ ^ It was after an eleven years 
gap and first since Pokharan-II tests '^ ^ that an Indian Defence Minister visited 
China. During his visit, both sides decided to step-up military-to-military 
exchanges hold a counter terrorism dialogue and increase CBMs to maintain 
peace along the LAC, paving the way for the final resolution of the boundary 
dispute. •^ ^^  The two countries have had a friendly relationship for 99.9 percent 
of their mutual interface and that only 0.1 percent was unpleasant-an oblique 
reference to the negative events of 1962 and 1998. 
No concrete breakthrough accrued from Femandes's visit, the visit, 
however, was a forward looking one, essential for building CBMs between the 
two countries. The visit symbolized continuation of amicable high-level 
polifical contact between the two Asian giants. It also laid background for up 
coming visit of the Indian Prime Minister.^°^ The new central leadership in 
China attached great importance to relations with India and would like to work 
with India to greatly strengthen cooperation in all areas and bring bilateral 
constructive and cooperative partnership to a new level. 
Fifteenth Meeting of the Joint Working Group: 
The Joint Working Group (JWG) held its fifteenth round of talks in 
Beijing towards the end of March 2005. The heads of the delegations - Foreign 
Secretary Shyam Saran and Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei 
expressed satisfaction over the resumption of the process after a hiatus of about 
two and a half years.^°'' The Indian Embassy said in a statement in Beijing after 
the conclusion of the Expert Group meeting as well as the Joint Working 
Group, that the discussions in JWG-15 were held over three sessions and were 
positive and forward-looking. Both sides reviewed the on-going process of 
Line of Actual Control (LAC) clarification and confidence building 
measures. No maps were exchanged during the three sessions of the J.W.G. 
Eventually this can be perceived that despite fifteen meetings of Joint | 
Working Group and close discussions on boundary dispute between the two ' 
countries, they could not reach to the final solutions. Still great expectations ! 
were attached with Vajpayee's forthcoming visit to China. 
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Chapter-VI 
Resolution through Special Representatives 
The Indian Premier A.B. Vajpayee's visit from June 22 to 27, 2003 
possessed an outstanding significance in the negotiated settlement process 
between India and China. Among the PM's he was the fourth who visited 
China in five decades of India's independence. He was not new to China; he 
had visited China in 1979 as the External Affairs Minster of the Janata 
Government, and in 1993 as a part of the Parliamentary delegations. The visit 
was significant as the Indian Prime Minister was visiting China after a gap of 
10 years. More importantly, it was first visit at the highest level since 1998 
nuclear detonations.' 
During his visit (June 2003), the Prime Minister held extensive talks 
with President, the Hu Jintao, Chairman of the Central Military Commission 
and former President, Jiang Zemin and Vice President, Zeng Qinghong. During 
his talks with Wen, various issues including border, Sikkim and cross-border 
terrorism figured. The talks and meetings were said to be held in a "sincere and 
friendly atmosphere." Both sides expressed "satisfaction" on the progress made 
over recent years in bilateral relations, and noted that the sustained economic 
and social development in the two counties, representing one third of humanity 
was vital for ensuring peace, stability and prosperity not only in Asia but also 
in the whole world.'^  
During Vajpayee's China visit, India and China signed a joint 
declaration and nine documents on cooperation in economy, law and justice, 
science and technology and culture. The documents include: 
1. Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation between the 
Supreme People's Procuratorate of the People's Republic of China and 
the Ministry of Law and Justice of the Government of the Republic of 
India. 
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2. Executive Programme on education cooperation and exchange between 
the Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China and the 
Ministry of Human Resource development of the Government of India. 
3. Protocol of Phytosanitary Requirements for Exporting Mangoes from 
India to China between the General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of the People's Republic of 
China and Ministry of Agriculture of India; 
4. MoU on Simplifying Visa Procedures between the Government of the 
People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of 
India. 
5. MoU for Enhanced cooperation in the field of Renewable Energy 
between the Ministry of Water Resources, the Government of the 
People's Republic of China and the Ministry of Non-Conventional 
Energy sources, the Government of the republic of India; 
6. MoU of Cooperation in the field of Ocean Science and Technology 
between the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) of the People's 
Republic of China and the department of Ocean Development of the 
Government of the Republic of India; 
7. MoU between the National Science Foundation of the People's Republic 
of China and the Department of Science and Technology of the Republic 
of India. 
8. MoU between the Government of the People's Republic of China and 
the Government of the Republic of India on the Reciprocal 
Establishment of Cultural Centres in their capitals; and 
9. Executive Programme of the Cultural Exchanges between the 
Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of 
the Republic of India for 2003-2005. 
Most significant of all documents was the Joint Declaration on 
Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between the People's 
Republic of China and the Republic of India.^ The joint declaration was the 
first of its kind between India and China. Further, according to the joint 
declaration, India and China exchanged views on the boundary question and 
"expounded" their respective positions. Both sides reiterated their readiness to 
seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the boundary issue 
through consultations on an equal footing. Moreover, "the two sides agreed that 
pending an ultimate solution, they should work together to maintain peace and 
tranquillity in the border areas, and reiterated their commitment to continue 
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implementation of the agreements signed for this purpose, including the 
clarification of the Line of Actual Control"/ Apart from these both nations 
agreed to the nomination of special representative who will try and work 
out a framework for a boundary settlement from an overarching political 
perspective.^ 
The Prime Minister after he returned stated that the boundary issue will 
be taken up soon on "the basis of the principles discussed which were to be 
followed for an eventual settlement." He elaborated; the exploration will be for 
a boundary settlement "from the perspective of the overall bilateral relation."^ 
India named National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra as its Special 
Representative to explore from the political perspective, settlement of the 
protracted border issue with China within the overall bilateral framework. 
China on its part appointed Dai Bingguo, its senior most Vice Minister in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs as its Special Representatives, signalling a strong 
desire on both side to expedite resolution of the vexed boundary question. Both 
sides agreed to continue maintenance of peace and tranquillity on the LAC, and 
to have high-level dialogue architecture and decided that foreign ministers of 
the two countries would meet annually.^ 
Obviously, the declaration would mean frequent and regular high-level 
exchange between the two countries in all fields including defence. 
The frequent visits are believed to greatly enhance mutual understanding and 
expand bilateral relations. Work done by the JWG and JEG are reaffirmed, and 
yet another expert group named as Joint Study Group (JSG) was established. 
The Group is led by the Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, 
Dr. Rakesh Mohan, from the Indian side and by Vice Minister of Commerce 
Mr. An Min on the Chinese side. The JSG will be composed of officials and 
economists who will examine the potential complementarities between the two 
countries in expanded trade and economic cooperation. The JSG would also 
draw up a programme for the development of Sino-India trade and economic 
cooperation for the next five years, aimed at encouraging greater cooperation 
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between the business conamunities of both sides.^ Now economics has begun to 
drive the relationship. 
The phrase "equal footing" used in the declaration could indicate that 
Beijing will negotiate on the basis of "give and take" as has been done with 
regard to Tibet and Sikkim, New Delhi and Beijing are aware that history has 
stood still after the 1962 conflict in the matter of resolving the border dispute. 
Aksaichin, the territory ceded by Pakistan to China in the early 1960s and 
Arunachal Pradesh, remain the bone of contention. Clearly, Mishra and Dai had 
a tough task on their hands.'" Though the fact of complex nature of the border 
issue is indisputable but the step-by-step approach pursued by both sides in a 
forward looking manner would go long way in eventually resolving the issue. 
In the words of an eminent expert, "with the adoption of a political approach to 
the problem, it has become easier to surmount this obstacle." 
India for the first time officially recognised Tibet Autonomous Region 
(TAR) as a part of the territory of the People's Republic of China and reiterated 
that it will not allow the Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in 
India. The Chinese side expressed its appreciation for the Indian position and 
reiterated that it was "firmly opposed to any attempt and action aimed at 
splitting China and bringing about independence of Tibet."'^ On the MoU on 
border trade reached by the two sides, Nathu La between Sikkim and Tibet that 
was closed after the 1962 conflict was opened for trade. The MoU said: 
"Desirous of opening another pass on the Sino-Indian border and setting up an 
additional point on each side for border trade the Indian side agrees to 
designate Changgu of Sikkim state as the venue for border trade market; the 
Chinese side agreed to designate Renquiggang of the Tibet Autonomous region 
as the venue for border trade markef .'^ 
China's recognition of Sikkim as an integral part of India in an indirect 
way by the agreement on expanding border trade was a positive development. 
The Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha described the accords reached by both 
sides as a win-win situation for both the countries. On the decision to upgrade 
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talks on border issue with the appointment of Special Political Representatives, 
the minister described the step as a "very big development.""'' 
Despite all these anticipations and positive views differences on LAC 
have been located and identified in the areas in East-Namka Chu, Chenju, 
Tulang La, Asaphila, Longju and Che Dong. In middle sector - Bara Hoti and 
four other ai-eas and in West Trig Heights, Chushul, Konkga Pass, Pangong 
Lake and Demchok in the South, traversed by the Indus and three others.'^ 
Border issue cropped up again, it was incident of June 26, 2003, 
when 10 man Indian party was detained and captured in Arunachal Pradesh and 
were lately released near Yume Chu river three kilometres deeper inside the 
Line of Actual control.'^ in reaction, the Indian government resented and 
expressed that Chinese are not following the 1996 provisions. Mr Sinha 
retaliated that this area was the 'bone of contention', and those sporadic 
incidents would lead to enhanced complexity. ^ ^ Inspite of such set backs by the 
Chinese government use of CBMs, exchange of maps, clarification of positions 
and appointing Special Representatives - are collectively good reflections in 
the direction to resolve the issues. 
Special Representatives to address Border issue: 
Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to China as the Minister of External Affairs 
in 1979 opened up a new chapter in Indian thinking about the relationship with 
China after 1962 war. His visit to China in 2003 as a Prime Minister added 
new dimension to the process of negotiation between India and China. 
He added a new feather to his cap by initiating a more purposeful negotiation 
on the boundary dispute and a more imaginative approach to future economic 
cooperation. 
Fundamentally, both Rajiv Gandhi and A.B. Vajpayee were instrumental 
in burying the 'victim mentality' that India carried since the 1962 war with 
China. A new generation in India with greater self-confidence about its own 
future was now capable of thinking about the difficult issues with China in a 
more relaxed manner. The initiative for recasting the relationship with China 
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stemming from both the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party is reflective 
of national consensus, essential to deal with the emotive boundary question 
with China. Just as a new national consensus has emerged in India on the need 
for a broader and deeper relationship with China, Beijing too has demonstrated 
considerable pragmatism in recent years to take the relationship forward.'* 
The biggest political outcome from the Prime Minister, Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee's visit to China was that both India and China decided to explore the 
political scope for evolving the frame work of a boundary settlement. For this 
purpose, in a new zone of realism, both sides agreed to appoint a 'Special 
Representative' each to "explore, from the political perspective of the overall 
bilateral relationship, the framework of a boundary settlement". Dai Bingguo, 
the senior Vice-Minister of China and Brajesh Mishra, the National Security 
Adviser of India were nominated to undertake this exercise.'^ The work of 
Special Representatives is to set the "political principles" to resolve the issue. 
Unlike the earlier mechanism, the Joint Working Group at the Foreign 
Secretary level which met once a year, the boundary talks between the special 
representatives are expected to be purposeftil and result-oriented. It was 
expected that the new initiative would accelerate the search for a solution to the 
vexed problem.'^ ^ Between 2003 and 2007, special representatives has held 
eleven rounds of talks. 
The First Round of Special Representatives to address the Contentious 
border dispute: 
India's special representative on Sino-Indian boimdary question and 
National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra held the first round of talks with the 
Chinese Special Representative and Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo on 
October 23, 2003 in New Delhi. The objective was to enhance bilateral 
cooperation in the non-traditional security sector.^^ According to a Chinese 
Foreign Ministry official, both sides held a useful discussion on the guidelines 
and principles for solving the border issue.^" Inspite of all these efforts, the two 
side could not reach at any positive result. Although the motive of Special 
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Representatives was almost the same as of Joint Working Group and Expert 
Group etc i.e. to help in resolving the border issue. 
The Second Round of Special Representative to address the Contentious 
border dispute: 
The second round of Special Representatives was held on January 12 
and 13, 2004 in Beijing. The discussion was held in a friendly and constructive 
atmosphere between the special representative of India and National 
Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra and the Chinese Special Representative and 
Vice-Foreign Minister, Dai Bingguo.'^ ^ 
Positive progress was made during two rounds of Sino-Indian border 
talks at the political level to find a comprehensive boundary settlement.'^ ^ 
A part from political perspective India and China discussed economic 
cooperation and showed possibility of signing a Comprehensive economic 
Cooperation Agreement (CECA) and a Free Trade Agreement (FTA).^^ The 
Sino-Indian Joint Study Group (JSG) on trade and economic cooperation held 
its first meeting on March 22-23, 2004 at Beijing. Further both coimtries agreed 
to increase contacts and interactions between their defence establishments and 
armed forces. During the meeting between visiting Defence Minister of China 
Cao Gangchuan and Defence Minister, George Femandes on March 28, 2004 
in New Delhi, measures agreed upon to improve bilateral ties included 
increased friendly interaction between personnel at the line of Actual Control 
and granting of the observer status to the military officers at each other's 
military exercise. On the boundary question both sides expressed themselves in 
favour of an early resolution and examined new proposals to strengthen and 
develop defence exchanges and confidence building. This gave rise to new 
hopes of a "bright future" in bilateral economic front and indirectly helps in 
resolving boundary question. 
China for the first time officially showed Sikkim as a part of India. 
The world map in the first published "World Affairs Year Book 2003/2004" 
stopped showing Sikkim as a special country in Asia and does not mention 
Sikkim separately in its index of countries.^^ Flourishing political interaction 
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uninterrupted dialogue channels and stronger mutual trust between India and 
China in 2003 helped in making "progress" in dealing with problems left over 
from history. China on May 31, 2004 took another significant step to recognise 
Sikkim as a part of India by not showing the North-Eastern state as an 
independent country in the Annual Year Book of the Foreign Ministry. 
With the commencement of Congress led United Progressive Alliance 
(UPA) Government after Lok Sabha election in May 2004, JN Dixit was 
appointed as New Sectirity Advisor in place of Brajesh Mishra?^ Referring to 
Rajiv Gandhi's diplomatic odyssey that helped "improve and normalize" ties 
with China, Prof Wang Hongwei felt that Ms Gandhi will continue the trend 
started by her husband. This means that the latest political change in New Delhi 
could produce positive effect on the Sino-Indian equation. In fact, the pace may 
be faster, not slower under a government led by Ms Gandhi.^ '' 
During third Asia Cooperation Dialogue meeting (ACD) India, China, 
Pakistan and leaders from 19 other countries on June 22, 2004 agreed to move 
"hand-in-hand" to build a better Asia and pledged to resolve disputes among 
them through dialogue to preserve peace and security in the region. '^ From the 
above discussion, it is understood that both sides have managed to narrow 
down the differences in perception and their approaches to the problem. They 
also acquainted each other with some technical irritants such as the marking of 
contours on the maps.''^  
The Third Round of Special Representatives Negotiations: 
The third round of Sino-Indian talks to address boundary dispute was 
held on January 27, 2004, The India side was led by India's Special 
Representative and National Security Advisor, JN Dixit and the Chinese side 
was led by Executive Vice-Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo. According to an 
External Affairs Ministry news release the talks were held in a fi-iendly, 
constructive and cooperative atmosphere. The talks involved reviewing the 
guiding principles for the talks that had been formulated in the previous two 
meetings. The two sides agreed to hold the next meeting in Beijing on a 
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mutually convenient date.^ ^ China appreciated the positive stance of the UPA 
government towards China.^ "* As a part of CBMs, India and Chinese border 
personnel met in Ladakh frontier region on October 20, 2004 and discussed 
issues like border violations, smuggling construction of roads and other 
defence related work.'^ ^ 
The Fourth Round of Special Representatives: 
To find an early and mutually acceptable solution to the vexed border 
issue the next round was held in Beijing on November 18 & 19, 2004, again 
between National Security Advisor JN Dixit and Chinese Executive Vice-
Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo. The Indian delegation comprised of India's 
Ambassador to China, Nalin Surie, senior officials from the Ministry of 
External Affairs and the PMO.^ ^ ' 
During meeting both sides have frank and detailed discussion on 
exchange of views regarding principles, in a friendly, constructive and 
cooperative atmosphere.''^  Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhang 
Qujue said that, "we hope that the two representatives will, proceeding from 
the common understanding reached by the two leaders (PMs) and also 
proceeding from the over all relations between our two countries, further 
TO 
explore the guiding principles regarding the solution to the border issue". 
On January 6, 2005, India and China decided to maintain positive 
momentum in bilateral ties with a long-term strategic perspective covering 
resolution of the vexed border issue. The sudden death of J.N Dixit in early 
January 2005 created a vacuum in the galaxy of Indian "Foreign Services". 
The Chinese state Councillor Tang Jiaxuan an as well Beijing's Special 
Representative on Sino-Indian boundary question appreciated Dixits 
contribution in the direction of bilateral relations. The Chinese government 
send condolence message to K Natwar Singh, External Affair Minister, 
Chinese Special Representative, Dai pointed out that during Dixits period, both 
counfries made fruitful progress and formulated the political guiding principles 
for the solution of the boimdary question. Mr. Dai further anticipated that 
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the unfinished task would undertaken forward. The meeting of Special 
Representatives on boundary question between India and China would continue 
to explore new frontier in this direction.'^ ^ During January 2005, India and 
China held their first ever "strategic dialogue" at the official level, with 
the Foreign Secretary, Shyam Saran, heading the Indian delegation, and 
the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister, Wu Dawei, leading the Chinese side. 
The meeting reviewed the current state of bilateral relations, the role of 
international institutions and situation in Iraq. There was no fixed agenda, as it 
was for the first time that the two countries negotiated such a dialogue.'^ ^ 
The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan said: "We hope 
that with India's cooperation we will be able to solve the border issue so 
that bilateral relations will witness faster development on a new basis"."" 
The upcoming visit of the Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao to India was also 
highlighted. Both side discussed the border issue and appreciated the work so 
far done by special representatives. The Joint Working Groups headed by 
Foreign Secretaries could not meet for last two years the real focus had been on 
the 'Special Representatives' on the border question. India and China had 
shown considerable maturity in advancing their relations and diversifying their 
bilateral discussions over the years while continuing to discuss their differences 
on the boundary question."*^ 
On February 1, 2005 China welcomed the resurgence in Sino-Indian 
relations and expressed its willingness to forge stable and sustained 
development of ties .with India.''^ Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing while 
meeting with Indian Ambassador Nalin Surie on February 10, stated, that 
China was willing to "unswervingly" push forward the friendly and mutually 
beneficial cooperative ties with India.'*'' India and China had adopted a 
pragmatic approach to resolve their boundary as well other disputes through a 
sustained dialogue process by appointing Joint Committee. China and India 
are not competitors, but are friends. Such a robust view of the state of play on 
the bilateral front was articulated by Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao at a 
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media conference in Beijing in March, several weeks ahead of his significant 
visit to India. 
The Joint Working Group (JWG) held its fifteenth rounds of talks in 
Beijing towards the end of March 2005. The heads of the delegations - Foreign 
Secretary Shyam Saran and Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei 
expressed satisfaction over the resumption of the process after a hiatus of two 
and a half years.''^ The Indian Embassy said in a statement in Beijing after the 
conclusion of the Expert Group meeting as well as the Joint Working Group, 
that the discussions in JWG-15 were held over three sessions and were positive 
and forward-looking. Both sides reviewed the ongoing process of Line of 
Actual Control (LAC) clarification and confidence building measures.''^ 
No maps were exchanged during the three sessions of the JWG. 
The interplay between the Joint Working Group and the Special 
Representatives may become important as the process to evolve a boundary 
settlement gathers momentum. However, there is no authoritative indication 
from either side at this point about the possibilities on this front."^ Describing 
the latest round of boundary talks with China as "positive and forward 
looking", India on March 31, 2005 said that the two sides had agreed to 
schedule another crucial meeting at the Special Representative level to address 
the issue from an "over all perspective" prior to Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's 
India visit.'*' 
The fourth coming visit by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to India was 
seen by both the countries as new buoyancy in several spheres, especially trade, 
during the cordial phase of Sino-Indian relations. While the visit acknowledges 
the changing global and regional dimensions of international diplomacy, both 
countries are now equally convinced of each other's strategic concerns. This 
affords new hope to an amicable resolution of past disputes that have long 
mired in suspicious relations between the two countries.^ 
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The fifth Round of Special Representatives Negotiations: 
The fifth round of talks was held on April 9-12, 2005 in New Delhi, 
during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India.^' The Indian side was led 
by India's Special Representative and National Security Advisor, M.K. 
Narayanan and the Chinese side was led by Senior Executive Vice-Foreign 
Minister Dai Bingguo. This was the first formal meeting between M.K. 
Narayanan and Dai since being appointed as Special Representatives of India. 
During the fifth round of talks, the "guiding principles" which have been made 
under negotiation for several months, were given finishing touch.^^ Both 
Special Representatives, signed the accord which said the two sides will take 
into account "historical evidence nafional sentiments, practical difficuUies and 
reasonable concerns and sensitivities of both sides and the actual state of border 
areas. "^ ^ 
The two countries were seeking a political settlement of the boundary 
question in the context of their overall and long-term interests. They decided 
not to use or threaten to use force against the other by any means.^ "* The two 
sides expressed satisfaction over the progress made in the discussions between 
Special Representatives of the two countries and welcomed the conclusion of 
the Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the 
settlement of the boundary question. Further both sides revealed the desire for 
an early settlement of the border issue.^ ^ That the two sides would give due 
consideration to each others "strategic and reasonable interests", and the 
principle of mutual and equal security was duly emphasised by the Special 
Representatives of both the countries.^^ 
India's special representative to China M.K. Narayanan told a television 
channel that India and China were ready to move forward in a spirit of give and 
takes, forgetting past mistakes. Both side could produce a new "Asian age". 
The talks were held in a friendly and candid manner. The engagement with 
China was progressing in the right direction. 
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Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India: 
Mr. Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic 
of China, paid a state visit to India from April 9-12, 2005.^^ The four-day visit 
by Mr. Wen Jiabao, was the fourth by a Chinese Premier, after Chou En-Lai in 
1954 and Li Peng in 1991, and Zhu Rogji in 2002 in 55 years of diplomatic 
interaction to visit India.^ ^ During the visit, premier Wen Jiabao held talks with 
Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh, called on President Dr. APJ Abdul 
Kalam and Vice President Shri Bhairon Singh Shekhawat also and met 
Chairperson of United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Smt. Sonia Gandhi, 
External Affairs Minister Shri K Natwar Singh and leaders of the opposition, 
Shri L.K. Advani. The leaders of the two countries had an in depth exchange of 
views and reached broad consensus on bilateral relations and international and 
regional issues of common concern.^" 
A "new chapter" in the friendly relations and cooperation between the 
two countries was opened by Wen's visit which had marked a new level in 
Sino-Indian relationship. Twelve accords were signed to bolster trade and 
economic cooperation, aviation and cultural links.^' While addressing the 
students of the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) in New Delhi, the Chinese 
Premier said that the 21^' Century belong to Asia if India and China developed 
close relations and worked together. By giving several instances of great Indian 
leaders he quoted from the writings of Mahatma Gandhi, Rabindranath Tagore, 
Jawaharlal Nehru and even Amartya Sen. He ended his speech by reinforcing 
the slogan of the 1950s, "Hindi-Chini, Bhai-Bhai". Reviving the five decades 
old slogan, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao asserted that the two countries were 
not rivals or competitors but friendly neighbours who were out to further 
improve their relations through cooperation. 
China put an end to the 30-year old controversy between the two 
countries, by presenting the Indian Government with the newly printed official 
map, which showed the State of Sikkim as part of Indian Union. Sikkim now 
formally ceases to be a cause of friction between the two countries. New Delhi, 
on it part had recognised before the Chinese leader's visit the Tibetan 
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Autonomous Region as part of Chinese territory.^^ The process of exchanging 
maps indicted their respective perceptions of the entire alignment of the LAC 
on the basis of already agreed parameters with the objective of arriving at a 
common understanding of the alignment as soon as possible. '^* To mark the 
55 anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between India 
and China in 2005, the two countries decided to organise a series of 
commemorative activities. Two sides declared 2006 as the "year of Sino-Indian 
friendship". 
During the visit, the leaders of the two countries have therefore, agreed 
to establish an India-China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and 
Prosperity based on the principles of Panchsheel, mutual respect and sensitivity 
for each others concerns and aspirations and equality. Both the countries also 
agreed for high-level exchanges between the governments, Parliaments and 
political parties of the two countries. The two sides also reiterated their 
intention to promote regular ministerial-level exchanges and make full use of 
the Sino-Indian strategic dialogue and other bilateral dialogue mechanisms. 
Indicating a new flexibility on both sides, the two sides exchanged 
views on the Sino-Indian boundary question and reiterated their readiness to 
seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution, through equal and 
friendly consultations and proceeding from the overall interest of bilateral 
relations. They expressed satisfaction over the progress made in the discussions 
between the Special Representatives of the two countries and welcomed the 
conclusion of the 11-point Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding 
Principles for the settlement of the boundary question. Both sides are 
convinced that an early settlement of the boundary question will advance the 
basic interests of the two coimtries and should therefore, be pursued as a 
strategic objective. They expressed their commitment to the mechanism of 
Special Representatives for seeking a political settlement of the boundary 
question in the context of their long-term interests and the overall bilateral 
relationship.^^ 
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This embodies a transitional shift from the legal historical approach to a 
political approach and puts the negotiations of the border on a new plane. 
Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing described it as "the first political 
document in the past 20 years for resolving the boundary issue".^^ Pending a 
final resolution, the two sides decided to continue to make joint efforts to 
maintain peace and tranquillity in the border areas in accordance with the 
agreements of 1993 and 1996 and also agreed that while continuing the 
discussions between the Special Representatives, it was also pertinent that the 
Joint Working Group Continued its work to seek an early clarification and 
confirmation of the Line o Actual Control (LAC). Progress made so far on the 
clarification of the LAC in the Sino-Indian border areas was noted. Both the 
countries agreed to complete the process of exchanging maps indicating their 
respective perceptions of the entire alignment of the LAC on the basis of 
already agreed parameters, with the objective of arriving at a common 
understanding of the alignment, as soon as possible.^^ 
On the other hand the visiting Premier did not categorically support 
India's candidature for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security 
Council. Instead, he indicated that "India would be welcomed as an important 
player" in the U.N. "India hopes to play an important role in the UN and we 
extend our support", he further said in his speech at the IIT. It was a general 
perception that China was not willing to give a firm commitment about backing 
India for a permanent seat in an expanded Security Council. However, 
Chinese non-committed response got nothing to do with bilateral progress 
between India and China. 
The two countries agreed to make joint efforts to increase the bilateral 
trade volume to US $ 20 billion or higher by 2008 and welcomed the report of 
the Joint Study Group (JSG). They also agreed to promote the cooperation in 
the spheres of education, science and technology, healthcare, information, 
tourism, youth exchange, agriculture, dairy development, sports and other 
fields on the basis of mutual benefit and reciprocity and decided to establish an 
India-China Steering Committee on Scientific and Technological Cooperation 
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chaired by their Ministers for Science and Technology, and start consultations 
on an agreement on mutual recognition of academic certifications and degrees 
between India and China.^' 
Inspite of the above development, a couple of problems necessitated 
resolution especially the demarcation of the 4,056 km long line of actual 
control, besides contesting claims over Arunachal Pradesh 2000 sq km area in 
Uttaranchal and Himachal Pradesh and 38,000 sq km in Aksai Chin. Another 
point of difference is on Beijing's concern about the growing Indo- US 
relationship, as Beijing does not want Delhi to be a part of any axis. Thirdly, 
the differences remain on Beijing's nuclear and missile support to Pakistan.''^ 
Eventually, both the leaders heralded that difference on border issue and 
some other moves to fulfill their national interest according to the demand of 
time will not over shadow their bilateral relations. Indian Foreign Secretary 
Shyam Saran described the visit as an "extremely successful one that would 
produce far reaching results" and soon draws the "attention of the world". 
Sino-Indian friendship was important for Asia and the world. ^ ' The visit was 
path breaking as the two neighbours signed a number of agreements, besides 
evolving a set of 11 "political parameters and Guiding Principles" to resolve 
the vexed 43 years old boundary dispute. The Panchsheel partners have made a 
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new beginning to cope with a new world environment. 
The ups and downs of bilateral relations over the past 55 years have 
offered a plethora of lessons for the leaders of the two countries. They are 
building a more mature relationship based on rationality and pragmatism... this 
positive momentum on the economic front gave wings to the advancement of 
bilateral ties.^^ India and China were among the fastest growing economies of 
the 21^' century, and the expansion of economic cooperation was one of the key 
priority areas. Combining the strong points of both the countries could help to 
achieve a faster and greater development in the global order. 
China on April 21, 2005 stressed that Sino-Indian friendship 
and cooperation was "a major contribution" to the "whole humanity". 
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Coordination and cooperation among them served the interest of peace and 
stability in the region and the world at large/^ On May 25, 2005, the Chief of 
Staff of Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), Liang Guanglie, during 
his meeting with National Security Advisor, M.K. Narayanan, who was 
also India's Special Representative on the Sino-Indian boundary issue, in 
New Delhi stated that China was willing to solve the boundary issue with India 
on the basis to equality and consultation with mutual understanding and 
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concessions. Besides, Manmohan Singh the Prime Minister of India on June 
11, 2005 stated that efforts will be made to open trade routes with Aksai Chin 
area. He also stated that a conversation would be made with China for opening 
up the route to Kailash Mansarover through Ladakh, so that the time of 
pilgrimage to one of the most sacred religious place could be reduced. ^ ^ 
In July, Union Commerce Minister Kamal Nath and his Chinese 
counterpart Bo Xilai met in Dalin (China) on the margins of multilateral 
meeting and agreed that the two countries should oppose the ongoing moves by 
the developed countries to divide developing countries on the basis of trade and 
other economic issues. Eventually, Chinese leader expressed his belief that the 
two countries "are on the same wavelength". 
The Sixth Round of Special Representatives Negotiations: 
India's Special Representative on Sino-Indian boundary question and 
National Security Advisor, MK Narayanan held the sixth round of talks with 
the Chinese Special Representative and Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo on 
September 26-28, 2005 in Beijing. The sixth round in this high-level series 
since 2003-took place in a friendly, cooperative and constructive atmosphere. 
The meeting was originally planned for September 26 and 27, but 
continued to the third day of formal sessions. This, in itself was seen as a 
noteworthy development. Special Representatives of both the countries have 
now begun the "second phase of negotiations" under their big-picture mandate 
of exploring "the framework of a boundary settlement" by addressing the issue 
from the "political perspective" of the overall bilateral relationship. The two 
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sides now took note of the "sound groundwork" that had been done in the form 
of the agreement. And they undertook a "conscientious exploration" of the 
framework for an eventual boundary settlement. 
The Chinese view was that the "sound momentum" of the ongoing 
evolution of a "strategic and cooperative partnership" between the two 
countries had provided "favourable conditions" now, more than ever before, for 
shaping a final settlement of an issue "left over from history". With these new 
beginning both the sides have now begun to exert efforts, from the all-
important political perspective, to fashion a framework that could then serve as 
a settlement or lead to a solution.'^ 
India and China had agreed to speed up the process of resolving their 
long-standing border disputes on the basis of agreed principles. Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh said on December 14, 2005, that, he had very good 
discussions with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and both the Heads of the States 
felt that the negotiations should be expedited. He ftirther thought that it was 
possible to move forward at a faster pace. In a New Year message to Chinese 
Premier Wen Jiabao, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said that the fast 
developing ties between India and China were an important determinant for the 
peace and security as well as development and prosperity of Asia and the 
World. ^ ' 
The second round of the Strategic Dialogue between India and China 
took place in Beijing on January 9-10, 2006.^^ The Indian side was led by 
Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, India's Ambassador to China Nalin Surie and 
Joint Secretar}^ (East Asia) Ashok Kantha participated in the talks, the Chinese 
side was led by Vice-Foreign Minister Wu Dawei.^ '^  The second round of 
strategic dialogue aimed at enhancing co-operation and co-ordination in 
regional and global issues of common concern. The strategic dialogue was not 
limited to the bilateral dimensions. It exceeded to regional and global 
dimensions too. 
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During the second round of Sino-Indian strategic dialogue, the 
delegations of both the countries discussed how to address the boundary 
question, among various "outstanding issues", in a "proactive manner". Both 
sides are committed to seek an early settlement on the basis of the Political 
Parameters and Guiding Principles.^'' It reflects the readiness of the two sides 
to resolve outstanding differences without letting them come in the way of the 
continued development of bilateral relaions.^^ 
While addressing the Shanghai Institute of International Studies in 
Shanghai, Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran said that "the old mindset of balance 
of power or conflict of interests" between India and China were "outdated" as 
the ties between the two big neighbours had acquired a "long-term, global and 
strategic character". India believes that there is enough space and opportunity 
in Asia and beyond for the two countries to grow. The simultaneous emergence 
of India and China as Asian and global powers, made it imperative for them to 
be sensitive to each other's interests and aspirations. The prevailing global 
paradigm of cooperation among major powers also demanded that they work 
together to mutually support their rightful place in the comity of nations.^^ 
The other key aspects of the strategic dialogue covered "a certain 
convergence of views" on the current international situation, the importance of 
global responses to global challenges. United Nations reform including that 
of the Security Council, the creation of an East Asia Community, and trilateral 
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cooperation involving not only India and China but also Russia. 
The qualitative up-gradation of the relationship between India and China has 
been manifested because of their level of strategic and global landscape in 
diverse areas. The Friendship Year "is truly a tribute to the distance traversed 
through friendly exchanges and contacts by two nations through labyrinth of 
time."^^ 
The Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Yuxi said the dialogue on the 
issue was part of a series of confidence building exercises being imdertaken by 
the two countries. There were no major impediments to settling the issue 
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except that the area under dispute was large and located at a high attitude, 
which made demarcation difficult.^ 
The Seventh Round of Special Representatives Negotiations: 
India and China on March 11, 2006, held high level talks in New Delhi 
aimed at settling the boundary questions. The Special Representatives-National 
Security Adviser MK Narayanan and Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Dai 
Bingguo held parleys for about six hours to discuss a mutually - acceptable 
solution to the decade old issue.'' Both sides showed confidence in giving a 
final shape to the basic frame work for settlement in the near future. 
Mr. Narayanan said that the two sides were negotiating a "package proposal on 
all sectors of the border" and expressed optimism and satisfaction at the on 
going discussions. The border talks were held in a constructive and friendly 
manner.'^  
The talks were moving in the right direction. The two countries are 
working to evolve a methodology for the settlement of the dispute, based on 
parameters and guiding principles agreed, between the two governments 
earlier. The joining of hands by India and China and their pursuit of 
cooperation and common development carried a "significant meaning" for 
peace, stability and development in Asia and the world at large, Chinese 
Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing said in Beijing on March 28, 2006 while 
releasing a compilation of important bilateral documents as part of the 2006 
Sino-Indian Friendship year.'"* 
India and China agreed to share experiences, and hold consultations on 
financial sector. Both the countries expressed concern over the risks to global 
expansion emanating from the surge in oil prices in the international markets 
and consequent growing economic imbalances.'^  On May 29, 2006 India and 
China signed the first ever memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the 
Defence Ministries of the two countries.'^ Efforts to find a political settlement 
to the vexed Sino-Indian boundary dispute by their Special Representatives 
were viewed during a meeting between Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and 
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visiting Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee on May 31, 2006. Mukherjee 
emphasised the need for "poHtical will" to resolve the boundary dispute which 
had worsened Sino-Indian bilateral relations.'^ 
Chinese President Hu Jintao said on June 16, 2006, that Sino-Indian 
relations have entered in a "new phase" and Beijing is committed to forging a 
long-term strategic cooperative partnership with New Delhi. The joint efforts 
from both the side shows that the relations between India and China will keep 
upgrading^^ (ameliorating). 
The Eighth Round of Special Representatives talks: 
The eighth round of special representatives talks was held in Beijing 
from June 25 to 27, 2006 between National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan 
and Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo - marking another step 
forward on the slow road to conflict resolution. The two have tasked with 
finding a package boundary deal within the framework of the guiding 
principles. The Special Representatives of both the countries continued their 
discussions on an agreed framework for a boundary settlement on the basis of 
the Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for settlement of 
Sino-Indian Boundary Questions.^^ 
It was declared during the meeting that both sides in the spirit of mutual 
respect and mutual understanding make meaningful and mutually acceptable 
adjustments to their respective positions on the boundary question so as to 
arrive at a package settlement. The wording of the statement with its reference 
to the concept of "adjustment" implied a give and take of territory, invoking the 
old western-eastern sector "swapp" idea once again. In the intervening time 
both Indian and Chinese leaders have emphasised that pragmatism is key to a 
swift resolution. With all the 14 countries bordering China it had boundary 
disputes at some point or the other. However, in recent years. Beijing has 
managed to settle all but two of its land border disputes, to its own considerable 
advantage. It is in this context that Beijing is looking to settle the boundary 
issue with India as well. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao told India's Special 
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Representative, M.K. Narayanan that you are not only the special 
representative for the Sino-Indian border talks, but also a friendship envoy and 
added that the bilateral ties were in "good shape". Several other high level 
exchanges are being planned, including a visit by Chinese President Hu Jintao 
to India later in the year.'"" The talks ended in a friendly and candid 
atmosphere. 
Opening a new avenue for enhancing mutual trust. Parliaments of India 
and China signed an agreement to regularise bilateral exchanges India and 
China on July 3, agreed that the irritant border dispute between the two 
countries should be settled peacefully through dialogue while tapping on the 
mutual goodwill that exists in bilateral relations.'°' 
The reopening of Nathu La trade pass (linking the north eastern India 
state of SikJ<:im with Tibet in China) on July 6, 2006, after four decade, opens a 
new chapter in the Sino-Indian relations that turned icy since the Dalai Lama's 
flight from Tibet in 1959 and the 1962 Sino-Indian war.'°^ The reopening of 
the Nathu La border trade point had not only presented a profitable chance for 
bilateral trade, but also signalled a new attitude over the border dispute long 
haunting the two countries. This was an important landmark in the complicated 
relations between the two countries and would further help to improve 
Sino-Indian relations.'"'^ Being enriched with growing trade, political and 
military linlcs the two Asian giants are celebrating 2006 as the "year of 
friendship". 
Shortly before President Hu Jintao's visit to New Delhi, the Chinese 
Ambassador, Sun Yuxi triggered a diplomatic row claiming Arunachal Pradesh 
as "Chinese territory", but the demand was strongly rejected by India."'^ Amid 
India's strong rejection and hue and cry of Chinese claim of sovereignty over 
Arunachal Pradesh, Beijing on November 14 sought to manipulate the issue 
and said it was the "strategic goal" of the two countries to find an early fair and 
rational solution to the vexed boundary issue.'°^ China on November 15 
expressed that the two countries must make "mutual compromises". 
On disputed issue of Arunachal Pradesh and it was ready to do so. The two 
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countries, through "friendly consultations", could arrive at a "mutually 
acceptable and mutually satisfactory" solution to the issue "left over from 
history". '"^  
President Hii Jintao's Visit: 
Chinese President Mr Hu Jintao paid in November 20, 2006 a three-day 
visit to India. This was his first visit to India since he took over as the leader of 
one of the world's biggest and most flourishing economies. His visit was in a 
bid to give a new and more dynamic direction to the bilateral relations between 
India and China in the rapidly changing global diplomatic context.'"^ Charting 
a new course for an "irreversible friendship". India and China decided to 
"promote" cooperation in civil nuclear field and sought "innovative and 
forward looking approaches" to pursue such an endeavour at the international 
level. 
During wide-ranging talks between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
and Chinese President Hu Jintao, the two countries agreed to speed up efforts 
to resolve the nagging boundary dispute and not allow it to hamper all round 
development of ties. The two also decided to venture on a Ten-pronged 
strategy to boost up their comprehensive ties in commercial, political and 
strategic areas, and signed thirteen pacts, including the Bilateral Investment 
Protection Agreement (BIPA). '°^ 
In all, thirteen agreements were signed in the field of economy, trade, 
finance, energy, science, technology, agriculture, human resource development, 
education, wild life protection and smuggling of artefacts. The "ten-pronged 
strategy" revealed the new policy to "fiilly realise the substantial potential for 
their cooperation in a wide range of areas like the up-gradation of Sino-Indian 
relations to a qualitatively new and substantial level fiirther reinforcing their 
strategic and cooperative partnership."*^ 
Dr. Manmohan Singh and President Hu appreciated the progress made 
by the Special Representatives in their discussions on the boundary question, 
and they fiarther assured that the Special Representatives "shall complete 
214 
at an early date", finalising an appropriate framework for a final package 
settlement. Chinese President Hu hoped the boundary would be converted 
into a "bond of good-neighbourliness and mutually beneficial cooperation". 
He said that the settlement of the boundary issue would contributed to peace 
and stability in the region, moreover, China was ready to work with India to 
"actively seek a fair, just and mutually acceptable solution through friendly 
consultation on an equal footing". 
Delivering a lecture in New Delhi, he anticipated that peaceful and 
prosperous South Asia was beneficial for the entire Asia and the world at large. 
China neither would nor stand in the way of India getting permanent 
membership of the expanded UN Security Council. China's willingness to 
cooperate with India in civil nuclear field was a step in the "right direction in 
the difficult and complex" relations.'^' 
The visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to India marked an "important 
step forward" in the process of developing a cooperative framework of bilateral 
engagements. It also offered an opportunity to send out a strong signal to the 
international community that as good neighbours and partners, there was 
"enough space" for India and China to develop together in a mutually 
supportive manner, while remaining sensitive to each other's concerns and 
aspirations. The External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee said in Lok Sabha 
on Hu's visit that they were encouraged by the positive trends in Sino-Indian 
relations and remained hopeful that their continued engagement with China at 
the highest level would give further impetus to their bilateral relations and 
speed up the process of resolution of their outstanding differences. 
During the meeting in Cebu in the Philippines on the sidelines of India-
ASEAN summit, the Prime Minister of India and China urged their Special 
Representatives to carry out their discussions on the border issue with "greater 
vigour and greater innovativeness". Manmohan Singh and Wen Jiabao affirmed 
the view that the border issue was one that the two sides could solve and 
were willing to solve. The general ambience of the talks reflected a maturity 
in the relationship. Besides, a common understanding of the fact that the 
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simultaneous rise of India and China is something that the rest of the world 
should take note of from an economic, political and strategic perspective.' 113 
The Ninth Round of Special Representatives Negotiations: 
Indian and Chinese Special Representatives M.K. Narayanan and Dai 
Bingguo, who have been tasked with negotiating a settlement of the border 
dispute, concluded their ninth round of consultations in New Delhi between 
January 17-18, 2007."'' As a matter of policy, both the countries have chosen 
not to give any details of the deliberations that took place between the Special 
Representatives. Pending the resolution of the boundary question, both sides 
shall maintain peace and tranquillity in the border areas in accordance with the 
agreements of 1993, 1996 and 2005."^ 
The Tenth Round of Special Representatives Negotiations: 
The tenth round of talks between Special Representatives of India and 
China-National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan and Executive Vice-Foreign 
Minister Dai Binguo on the border dispute were held partly in Delhi and partly 
in Coonoor in Tamil Nadu for three days. A large gamut of issues regarding the 
125,000 sq km of disputed border territory was discussed imder this series of 
negotiation. The two Special Representatives held their discussions on a frame 
work for the boundary settlement on the basis of the Agreement on Political 
Parameters and Guiding Principles reached in 2005. 
The talks were held in an open, friendly, cooperative and constructive 
atmosphere. Both India and China agreed to hold further parleys to find an 
amicable and mutually beneficial resolution to the decades old dispute. The 
talks on boundary dispute ended on April 22, 2007 which followed the same 
pattern as ninth such previous roimds, there was neither any breakthrough nor 
any breakdown. Leaderships of the two countries have been pushing their 
Special Representatives to find an early resolution of the issue, as it would 
serve basic interests of the two neighbours."^ 
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The Eleventh Round of Special Representatives Negotiations: 
The eleventh round of negotiations between the Special Representatives 
of India and China-National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan and Executive 
Vice Foreign Minister Dai Binguo on the border dispute between the two 
countries began on September 25, 2007. The talks were focussed on devising a 
framework agreement for resolving the dispute. Welcoming Mr. Narayanan, 
the Premier Mr. Wen said that there was "progress" in the ongoing boundary 
talks. 
The latest round of talks comes ahead of a slew of high level bilateral 
visits. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Congress President Sonia Gandhi 
are expected to visit China later this year. Vice-Minister of the International 
Department of the Communist Party of China Central Committee Zhang Zhijun 
told journalists that the upcoming visit to China by Ms. Gandhi would further 
enhance the mutual understanding and friendship between the leaders of the 
two countries and promote the exchanges between the two political parties and 
strive for the development of state-to-state relations. 
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Conclusion 
"From friendship to confrontation, from confrontations to detente and 
ttien to normalization, Sino-Indian relations have gone through a tortuous 
process". Both India and China have paid a price for past errors, from which 
both have many lessons to learn and many questions to reflect upon. 
India recognized China within two months of establishment of People's 
of China. Among non-communist countries India was second to do that after 
Burma. Also, India fought for China's entry into the world body organization 
subsequently. India always withstood for China's cause at all fronts - national 
and international. India supported China in establishing a sound society and 
nation building when China was passing through formative phases. In 1954 
India and China signed the five principles of peaceful coexistence or 
Panchsheel, assuring each other's territorial integrity and peaceful coexistence. 
The Sino-Indian relationship entered into bright phase in 1955. India 
sincerely wanted China's participation in international affairs. In April 1955 an 
Afro-Asian Conference was held in Bandung, China participated in the 
conference, which became possible because of good offices of Nehru. China 
got an opportunity to enter into world diplomacy and at the first instance could 
succeed to woo the Afro-Asian nations away from India's leadership. China 
had the ambition to lead the uncommitted block and to become the spokesman 
of Asia. NeJiru was the stumbling bloc to the Chinese designs. From 1954 to 
1957 the Sino-Indian relations were very cordial and it was called as 
honeymoon days. The foreign policy of China had a dual role to perform, on 
the one hand it had to show that good neighbourliness was its perennial 
concern and on the other that it had the most important military strength in 
Asia. 
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The worsening of the relationship was unfortunate. The bitterness of 
relationship grew over the cartographic invasion of China. India was surprised 
to see an officially circulated Chinese map where incorrect boundary alignment 
between India and China was shown and that also incorporated 50,000 sq. 
miles of the Indian Territory in China. For nearly a decade New Delhi sincerely 
wanted a peaceful and good neighbourly China. But the imperial image 
pursued by China could not provide friendly atmosphere. Side by side the flight 
of Dalai Lama to India added fuel to the fire. In July 1959 the Chinese forces 
entered into Ladakh and arrested the Indian patrol party in Aksai Chin. 
A similar action was observed in NEFA in August 1959. The intension was 
that both the regions fell in China. In September 1959 Chou En Lai, the 
Chinese Premier, demanded 50,000 sq miles of the Indian territory and within a 
fortnight the Chinese forces entered into Ladakh and waged a limited war. 
In April 1960, the two Premiers met but their talks did not result in 
resolution of differences. In 1961 under pressure from the opposition Nehru, 
adopted a forward policy the purpose of which was to establish some symbolic 
posts both in Ladakh and NEFA. The fortification of the Indian border with 
the creation of many out posts came as 'irritants' to undeclared intentions. 
This provoked them to cross the McMahon Line on September 8, 1962 and 
initiated a large scale war on both eastern and western sectors, on October 20, 
1962. The Chinese troops overwhelmed the Indian frontier posts. The Chinese 
proposal for ceasefire and disengagement after sufficient entry was turned 
down by India, which demanded a status quo on the border as on September 8, 
1962. On November 21, 1962 China declared unilateral ceasefire and its 
decision to withdraw. The Chinese attack was a great unexpected shock for 
India. China exhibited its 'middle kingdom' attitude towards a harmless 
neighbour India) in South Asia. The entire momentum of friendship and spirit 
of Panchsheel shattered down at this time. 
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The years between 1963 to 1975, could be termed as the period of 
stalemate between India and China. The borders were far from stable and 
peaceful. The Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi adopted a flexible 
posture and indicated her willingness to reopen a dialogue with China without 
any preconditions. In response to India's overtures, during the May day parade 
at Beijing on May 1, 1970, Chairman Mao shook hands with the Indian Charge 
d'Affaires, signalling China's intention to normalise relations with India. 
But the hopeful pointers evaporated due to Bangladesh crisis and later on the 
political crisis in Sikkim. The relations that remained frozen for long time 
were again brought to life by Indira Gandhi in 1976 by upgrading the Chiefs of 
the Mission. This was the first step taken by India towards the process of 
negotiations. India announced the appointment of Shri K.R. Narayanan as 
India's ambassador to China and China responded quickly. 
With the installation of Janta Party regime in India, the new External 
Affairs Minister, Shri A.B. Vajpayee visited China in 1979. He identified the 
border problem as the key obstacle to the process of negotiated settlement. 
The Chinese assurance of stopping support to insurgency in the northeast and 
the gesture of reopening the holy places of Kailash and Mansorover to India 
pilgrims was one step forward in the process of negotiated settlement. 
The direct contacts at the highest political level began in 1980's when 
Mrs. Gandhi came back to power. In May 1980 the Prime Ministers of both 
countries met at Belgrade and decided to continue the process of improvement 
in bilateral relations. More substantial talks took place in June 1981, when the 
Chinese Foreign Minister, Huang Hua visited India and held extensive talks 
with Indian leaders. Both sides decided to hold official level talks on bilateral 
problems and issues. The ice had been broken down between India and China. 
The period of 1980's proved to be the turning point in the history of Sino-
Indian relations because from that year onward the process of negotiated 
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settlement had gathered momentum. The Border talks started in 1981 and 
concluded in 1998. Eight rounds of official level talks were held to resolve the 
border issue alternatively in Beijing and New Delhi at Vice-Minister level. 
The first four rounds were focussed primarily on the development of basic 
negotiating principles, and the second four dealt with "the situation on the 
ground". Among these five were held during Indira Gandhi's regime and three 
during Rajiv Gandhi's Premiership. 
Rajiv Gandhi picked up the threads of Indira Gandhi's China policy, 
modified them in the face of rapid changes in India and China in particular and 
in international arena in general. The New India Premier, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi 
evinced keen interest in improving ties with China. In his first meeting with 
Chinese counterpart, Zhao Ziyang at New York, both agreed that there was 
need to push forward the efforts to find a equitable solution to border problem 
and to promote friendship between the two countries. The years 1986 and 1987, 
however, witnessed a tense atmosphere on the Sino-Indian borders, because of 
Chinese intrusion in the Sumdorong Chu valley in Arunachal Pradesh. China 
also lodged a protest against India's decision of granting statehood to the union 
territory of Arunachal Pradesh. Both sides, however, did not allow bilateral 
relations to deteriorate. By the end of 1987, the eighth round of official level 
talks had made little progress, with each side reiterating its stated position. 
Indian Premier, Rajiv Gandhi decided in a bold move to visit China in 
December 1988. The historic visit of Rajiv Gandhi to China was a great leap 
forward in the process of negotiated settlement of Sino-Indian boundary 
dispute, as no Indian Prime Minister had visited China since 1954. During his 
visit, two Joint Working Groups on border and economic relations were 
constituted. The commission was to make concrete recommendations for an 
overall solution of the boundary question within a definite time frame; and to 
ensure peace and tranquillity in the border areas. Joint Working Group was an 
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advancement of the previous mechanism. The leaders of two countries also 
agreed to increase cooperation in economic, cultural and technological fields. 
The two sides expressed full faith in the five principles of Panchsheel and 
indicated their desire to promote good neighbourly and friendly relations on the 
basis of these principles. 
The subsequent establishment of Joint Expert Group consisting of 
diplomatic and military officials under the Joint Working Group contributed to 
the deepening of understanding between two countries. Between 1989 to 2005, 
the Joint Working Group has held fifteen rounds of talks, of which ten Joint 
Working group meeting were held between 1989 and 1997. The continuing 
process of negotiated settlement suffered a setback in early 1998 due to India's 
nuclear explosions at Pokharan and statement given by Indian Defence 
Minister, George Fernandas that China was India's threat no.l China strongly 
condemned the tests and described them as 'outrageous contempt' for the 
international community. Despite this India tried to give a projection that it 
wants the best of relations with China and would like the dialogue to continue. 
Remaining four more meetings were held till 2002, but the problems in all 
three sectors remained largely unsettled. 
Side by side the continuation of high-level political interactions 
contributed in more tangible manner to enhanced understanding between both 
nations. As a result of the summit level talks, Sino-Indian relations registered 
all round improvement. On the border issue, the agreement of 1993 and 1996 
were significant developments and both nations agreed to ensure peace and 
tranquillity on the Line of Actual Control, on one hand and move forward, on 
the other with Confidence Building Measures. India and China seemingly were 
pursuing step-by-step approach to resolve the intractable and vexed issue of 
border. To broaden the base of bilateral relations, both nations move forward to 
cooperate in the areas of economy, trade, science and technology etc. 
227 
At the political plane, as a result of the Prime Ministerial Summits of the 
years 2002 and 2003, Sino-Indian bilateral relations registered upward trend. 
The political input to a large extent enhanced the overall quality of bilateral 
relations. In particular, Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee's China visit was quite 
successful and may be put in the same league as earlier Prime Ministerial visit 
of Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 and Narasimha Rao in 1993. A significant progress 
has been made during A.B. Vajpayee's visit to Beijing in June 2003, in solving 
some of the questions related to Tibet and Sikkim, which helped in improving 
bilateral relations between India and China. Similarly, the resumption of 
defence relations and high level defence exchanges enabled the military 
establishments to enhance mutual trust and understanding. 
On the vexed border issue following positive steps could be underlined-
maintenance of peace and tranquillity, initiation of various confidence building 
measures, exchange of maps according to sectors and seeking clarifications on 
each other's position continued a pace. Further more, with the appointment of 
Special Representatives on the border issue another step forward has been 
taken in the right direction. It seems that the adoption of political approach 
would go a long way in resolution of this long standing problem in Sino-Indian 
relations. Between 2003 to 2007, special representatives have held eleven 
rounds of talks. By now both India and China had adopted a pragmatic 
approach to solve their boundary as well as other disputes. 
As we have seen that both the countries had adopted different 
mechanism from time to time to resolve the boundary dispute but could not 
fully reach at its final solution due to different reasons-such as lack of political 
will, differences exist on claims from both sides, Sino - Pak collaboration, USA 
factor, differences of opinion on both sides, domestic problem, Tibet problem, 
lack of proper preparatory work, Indo-Soviet encirclement, India's nuclear test, 
small incidents on border areas and recently the wording of Chinese 
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Ambassador Sun Yuxi, "Arunachal Pradesh as Chinese territory" cast negative 
impact in the process of negotiated settlement. It always seems after a 
particular negotiation or visit of leaders that it would produce concrete results 
and solutions of the problem but thereafter it remains as it was. 
The entire panorama of Sino-Indian relations presents a picture in which 
both the countries seem to be preponderant and cautious of their security 
perspective in Asia. Since both are assertive in establishing their positions in 
South Asia, their diplomacies and instrumental approaches are also effective 
while exercising their powers at their respective fronts. 
Presently, the era of conflict has withered away and optimism seems to 
emerge in positive direction. China has started to change its perception towards 
India and other South Asian neighbours. Hopefully the prolonging boundary 
issue is likely to be resolved in near future as it is encouraging to note that the 
other strategic, trade, economic and political relations between India and China 
have been established in recent past. 
The end of the cold war has also provided a more benign global 
environment for China's growth. It withstood the impact of the disintegration 
of the former Soviet Union by hastening the reforms, which benefited millions 
of population. Between 1988 and 2007 there was brisk exchange of highest-
level visits by Presidents, Vice Presidents, Premiers and Foreign Ministers 
between India and China. In this connection two agreements were very 
important. 
1. Agreements on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the 
Line of Actual Control in India and China border areas (September 
1993). 
2. Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in military field along the 
Line of Actual Control in Sino-India border areas (1996). 
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Taken together these two agreements reflected the poHtical 
determination of decision making authorities of the two countries. Viewed in 
its totahty the relationship between India and China has assumed a more whole 
some character where differences are managed imaginatively and where 
government act as facilitators for a wide spectrum of activities to be undertaken 
by diverse sections of the two people with in and outside by the two 
governments. After Pranab Mukherjee's visit to China in May 2006 and 
Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to New Delhi in November 2006, the year 
2006 has been declared as year of Sino-Indian friendship. 
The fast changing political climate has to surmount diverse challenges. 
Most importantly these challenges appear in the form of non-compromising 
behaviour, US and Pakistan factor, lack of political will or to only linger on the 
issue etc. 
In order to safeguard the precarious balance of power between India and 
Pakistan, China gradually developed a close defence relations with Pakistan 
and carefully nurtured it. Chinese arms transfer and nuclear assistance to 
Pakistan can prove counter productive to India, which is the preponderant 
power of the region. India was against China's attempt to supervise the 
subcontinent in the wake of May 1998 nuclear test (Pokhran) or to mediate in 
New Delhi-Islamabad rivalry during Kargil conflict May 1999, because India 
perceives Beijing as part of problem rather than part of solution. 
Evidently the Sino-Pak relationship survived and prospered through 
numerous changes at domestic and international levels. India continued to 
remain concerned with this entente and its impact on India's peace negotiations 
with China and its role on South Asia in general. But on the other hand 
triangular relationship may play a positive role in the peace process between 
China and India. It implies four important parameters: 
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1. Three of them are more or less independent decision makers regarding 
their foreign policies. (Independent thinking) 
2. Each of them is well aware with the fact that its behaviour to any other 
state has implication to the other one. (Behavioural reactions) 
3. There is tendency for two of the countries to going up against the third. 
(Alliance formation) 
4. All three expect mutually influencing relationship to endure for 
sometime. (Protractedness) 
All three of them are independent and autonomous but at the same time 
try to manage their alliances or axis to deter any external force to impact upon 
them from any other comer of the world. Moreover each is well aware of 
behavioural reaction and their repercussions on their mutual relations. If they 
move in positive direction it would yield a good result in solving boundary 
debacle. If Pakistan does not get concerned with improved relations between 
India and China and India also does not take any burden of Sino-Pak 
collaborations the chances of political and territorial tensions would improve in 
future. 
Another important factor that many times hindered in Sino-Indian 
negotiation is divergent perception for their capacities to dominate South Asian 
region. Not only India and China but there are others also who play vital role-
negative or positive in regional power balance like Soviet Russia, Sri Lanka 
and Pakistan etc. But the primary factors have been the Sino-Soviet prestige 
issue and the Sino-Indian territorial tensions. 
China perceived itself as part of South Asia because of geographical 
contiguity, historical, linkages and common heredity with the mongoloid group 
of people in India, Nepal and Bhutan. Consequently, China considers itself in 
the intra-regional affairs of South Asia. On the other hand India had its own 
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role and perception because of its pre occupied perception of Indo-centric 
character or 'big brother' attitude. It viewed China's attempt to forge close 
relations with its South Asian neighbours as hostile act. 
These perceptional differences many times created menace in peace 
process. If these two major powers accept each other's importance in South 
Asia and remain 'non-egoistic' on some important issues like leadership, 
resources, territory and ideology and relations with neighbours etc-both may 
come much closer to each other. And while coming closer to each other India 
and China may form a pan-Asian solidarity. 
Another external force is US factor which has directly affected 
Sino-India relations, India-Pakistan and Pakistan China relations. From cold 
war to post cold war and from post cold war to the era of terrorism - US has 
been taking keen interest in South Asia but since 2001 attack on WTC it has 
completely involved in South Asia and Central Asia and tried to implant its 
military roots in the entire region in the name of 'war against terrorism'. 
There are different perceptions related to the US factor especially from 
two sides India and China each of them takes US moves in accordance with 
its security perception. India worries that China may use its permanent 
membership in UN Security Council and its relationship with Washington to 
block New Delhi from taking its appropriate place on world stage. According 
to some analyst there are some discomfiture in triangle-US, China and India. 
This is because US has paid more attention to China in comparison to Delhi in 
Asia Pacific and its world affairs. Its policies concentrated on equation with 
China, alliance with Gulf countries and stable defence relations with Pakistan 
etc. It did not consider India a significant country, besides US and China has 
common interest to urge India to take part in international non proliferation 
regime to give up nuclear weapons. 
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On the other hand India has also been very important for US in South 
Asia and US-India share same challenge of rising China to their respective 
dominance in the world and South Asia. 
Another perception from Chinese side is that India by virtue of its 
geopolitical situation, naval capabilities, unresolved boundary disputes and 
history of hostility with China is an ideal country for US to face any eventuality 
or crucial time of conflict with China. China wonders weather India is going to 
line up with US against China or join China and Russia to push for a 
multi-polar world order against the US hegemonism. If India does not 
participate in containing China, China's development will lighten US strategic 
pressure on India and if India joins force with US to contain China the future 
years may be very challenging to India. 
But the above perception and estimate that might not prove true, there is 
possibility of emergence of another kind of world order-as India, Russia and 
China; India, US and EU; India, Japan and Central Asia and India, Pakistan, 
Russia, China and Japan all collectively together etc. These orders would 
present a different kind of phenomenon in South Asia and the world. 
At this crucial juncture when entire world is moving towards disorder 
and chaos and US doctrines of hegemony, pre-emption and war against 
terrorism are trying to dominate the world behaviour and activities, a strong 
'Asian order' can stand as 'off the stream', bulwark. If 20''^  century belonged 
to US and Europe, 21^' century may well belong to Asia. The entire Asia 
comprising of South Asia, Far East, West Asia, Central Asia, Eurasia may 
collaborate with African continent to face such types of challenges. 
China, India and Russia share many common interests in promoting 
democratic international relationship and safeguarding international security 
and stability. Evidently there are various tireless organisational efforts which 
may lead to entire Asia towards cooperation and peace instead of tensions and 
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threats. These efforts would take time and attitudinal changes in nation's 
behaviour will also face many challenges to reach the ultimate peace and order. 
The process is not a bed of roses. The establishment of space nuclear 
programmes and frequent cross border disturbances make India careful and 
cautious of the surrounding activities but still there are many rays of hope for 
betterment if both India and China keep their mindset clear in decision making 
to each other. But even after the parleys of 27 years, the border issue is 
awaiting resolution, from the above study, it can be conclude that the aim and 
objectives of various mechanism adopted for negotiated settlement were the 
same but the method of work is quite different. The border issue is jittery as 
both sides hold divergent views. Now the time has come to rethink over the 
whole matter for the overall solution of the boundary problem, first and 
foremost, both India and China may forget the past. 
There is need of attitudinal approach rather than institutional approach. 
Negotiations, Joint Working Group, Expert Group, Special Representatives and 
good offices - all need a strong base of attitude of willingness to be successful 
and practical. Action and practicality will do stronger than rhetorical 
deliberations in meetings. India must not talk of 1963 Parliament resolution 
that talks of taking back every inch of Indian territory. Similarly, China may 
stop the rhetoric that it does not recognise the so-called Arunachal. If both 
sides are sincere, they may immediately withdraw these remarks and stop 
publishing them over their official websites. It is obvious that India does not 
need Chinese certification for any recognhion; and so is the case with China. 
Meanwhile, more border areas should be opened for trade. It is hoped that the 
CBMS in border areas, the alignment of the LAC, and increased trade ties and 
people to people contacts between India and China would build trust and 
ultimately lead to a fair and reasonable solution of the border problem. The 
construction of roads is good development but India has to be very carefial 
because road may open the possibility of Chinese army in Indian territory. 
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Therefore, understanding between two countries is essential. Border question 
would be resolved by negotiations involving 'give and take' diplomacy on 
both sides along the Line of Actual Control. The need for confidentiality 
should not be a pretext for keeping the public completely in the dark about the 
negotiations on the boundary questions. 
In recent past China has resolved many disporatic boundary disputes 
with Russian states (CIS), ASEAN states and Japan then, why not with India. 
But there is sheer need of strong determination and accommodative approach 
of both the countries somehow loss and gain are the essential part of political 
solutions. India and China would have to forego with some perseverance and 
patience also. This careful policy making applicable strategies, determined 
mind set, expedite practices and unselfish spirit to resolve the problem - may 
bring out the permanent solution. 
In the changed geopolitical situation in the world, both sides may adopt 
benign approach towards each other. This is the right time to show political 
will and obliterate the dark cloud of 1962 that has eclipsed the bright sun of 
Sino-Indian amity. 
Either as competitor or potential partners relation between India and 
China will have a tremendous effect on the stability of South Asia as well as on 
the leadership alignments with in the third-world in the emerging global 
system. Both India and China two most important Asian powers must come 
forward with creative initiative to build on effective structure of Asian peace 
and stability. The rise and peaceful development of China would be incomplete 
without the comprehensive improvement of its relations with India. 
Conversely, India's success is positioning itself as a global or strategic partner 
of major powers - US, EU, Russia, Japan, ASEAN, Central Asia, France and 
Italy etc. would have not been achieved without the rapid improvement in 
Sino-Indian relations. Their determination to work together in different fields 
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i.e. strategy, economy, security, terrorism, ecology, global warming, territorial 
demarcations and other global commons - is a harbinger that two civilizational 
states would have a beneficial impact on Asia in first decade of millennium. 
The world would see more positive results and epochal changes in the long 
journey of Sino-Indian negotiation process in the time to come. 
The current phase of negotiations has recently started. The future visit 
of Congress President Sonia Gandhi and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh later 
this year would likely to emphasis on "Consistency in Policy" and position 
should further be insisted on removing the basis for "misunderstanding". 
It cannot be foretold that how much time an efforts would be required to 
solve the boundary issue completely but still there are positive 
anticipations for bright future. 
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